Narrative:

Upon completing my exterior preflight, I entered the aircraft and started the APU. Approximately 10-15 seconds later, following a normal start, ramp personnel entered the cockpit and notified me that the APU was on fire. He stated that large flames were continuing to exit the APU. I had no fire or other abnormal indication in the cockpit. I initiated an APU fire shutdown checklist and discharged the #1 fire cylinder. Upon seeing that the APU had shut down and that the cylinder had discharged, I exited the aircraft to make an external check of the APU and ensure the reported fire was extinguished. No fire was present, so I went back to the aircraft cockpit. Next, I radioed maintenance at iad ramp and told them of the fire. A few mins later, I had a face-to-face discussion with maintenance, describing what had occurred. I then asked how long it would take them to inspect the APU and fill the cylinder. Maintenance told me that they would not have time (we were due out shortly) so they would simply defer the APU and cylinder. I accepted maintenance's answer and they took the aircraft logbook to prepare everything and close out my write-up concerning the APU fire. I then got back to work preparing my takeoff data, etc. A couple of mins before we were to block out, maintenance brought us the logbook, I checked it noting that the APU and the cylinder were deferred. We blocked out approximately 10 mins late and had a normal flight to mem. The following day, I was notified by my flight manager that there existed a discrepancy with the signoff on the deferred items in the logbook. Specifically, the APU cylinder switch, not the cylinder, was deferred. I was also told that the information I received from maintenance regarding the deferral of a cylinder was incorrect. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the MEL is part of the 'ship's library,' no one crew member is required to carry it. No one on the first crew picked up the MEL to review the correctness of the maintenance sign off. The reporter believes that the maintenance men made an honest mistake, that the flight crew had not been given a 'sales' job. All crew men's names have been turned into the FAA under the 'voluntary disclosure' program. The reporter has not yet heard anything further from his company or the FAA. Supplemental information from acn 240002: the next crew was shown the write-up about the deferred fire bottle and given different MEL numbers as a reference. A maintenance person discovered that both MEL references were wrong and there was no way to defer a discharged fire bottle. The company notified the FAA. The company is deciding on corrective action. Supplemental information from acn 240031: we were advised bottle had been recharged but it had not. Requirement for dispatch were all bottles to be charged. Problem discovered in sea by maintenance. Fully charged bottle installed.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: 2 WDB FGT CREWS AND 2 MAINT CREWS MADE THE SAME MISTAKE REGARDING FLYING AN ACFT WITH THE WRONG MEL ITEM CITED AND THE ACFT IN AN UNAIRWORTHY CONDITION.

Narrative: UPON COMPLETING MY EXTERIOR PREFLT, I ENTERED THE ACFT AND STARTED THE APU. APPROX 10-15 SECONDS LATER, FOLLOWING A NORMAL START, RAMP PERSONNEL ENTERED THE COCKPIT AND NOTIFIED ME THAT THE APU WAS ON FIRE. HE STATED THAT LARGE FLAMES WERE CONTINUING TO EXIT THE APU. I HAD NO FIRE OR OTHER ABNORMAL INDICATION IN THE COCKPIT. I INITIATED AN APU FIRE SHUTDOWN CHKLIST AND DISCHARGED THE #1 FIRE CYLINDER. UPON SEEING THAT THE APU HAD SHUT DOWN AND THAT THE CYLINDER HAD DISCHARGED, I EXITED THE ACFT TO MAKE AN EXTERNAL CHK OF THE APU AND ENSURE THE RPTED FIRE WAS EXTINGUISHED. NO FIRE WAS PRESENT, SO I WENT BACK TO THE ACFT COCKPIT. NEXT, I RADIOED MAINT AT IAD RAMP AND TOLD THEM OF THE FIRE. A FEW MINS LATER, I HAD A FACE-TO-FACE DISCUSSION WITH MAINT, DESCRIBING WHAT HAD OCCURRED. I THEN ASKED HOW LONG IT WOULD TAKE THEM TO INSPECT THE APU AND FILL THE CYLINDER. MAINT TOLD ME THAT THEY WOULD NOT HAVE TIME (WE WERE DUE OUT SHORTLY) SO THEY WOULD SIMPLY DEFER THE APU AND CYLINDER. I ACCEPTED MAINT'S ANSWER AND THEY TOOK THE ACFT LOGBOOK TO PREPARE EVERYTHING AND CLOSE OUT MY WRITE-UP CONCERNING THE APU FIRE. I THEN GOT BACK TO WORK PREPARING MY TKOF DATA, ETC. A COUPLE OF MINS BEFORE WE WERE TO BLOCK OUT, MAINT BROUGHT US THE LOGBOOK, I CHKED IT NOTING THAT THE APU AND THE CYLINDER WERE DEFERRED. WE BLOCKED OUT APPROX 10 MINS LATE AND HAD A NORMAL FLT TO MEM. THE FOLLOWING DAY, I WAS NOTIFIED BY MY FLT MGR THAT THERE EXISTED A DISCREPANCY WITH THE SIGNOFF ON THE DEFERRED ITEMS IN THE LOGBOOK. SPECIFICALLY, THE APU CYLINDER SWITCH, NOT THE CYLINDER, WAS DEFERRED. I WAS ALSO TOLD THAT THE INFO I RECEIVED FROM MAINT REGARDING THE DEFERRAL OF A CYLINDER WAS INCORRECT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE MEL IS PART OF THE 'SHIP'S LIBRARY,' NO ONE CREW MEMBER IS REQUIRED TO CARRY IT. NO ONE ON THE FIRST CREW PICKED UP THE MEL TO REVIEW THE CORRECTNESS OF THE MAINT SIGN OFF. THE RPTR BELIEVES THAT THE MAINT MEN MADE AN HONEST MISTAKE, THAT THE FLC HAD NOT BEEN GIVEN A 'SALES' JOB. ALL CREW MEN'S NAMES HAVE BEEN TURNED INTO THE FAA UNDER THE 'VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE' PROGRAM. THE RPTR HAS NOT YET HEARD ANYTHING FURTHER FROM HIS COMPANY OR THE FAA. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 240002: THE NEXT CREW WAS SHOWN THE WRITE-UP ABOUT THE DEFERRED FIRE BOTTLE AND GIVEN DIFFERENT MEL NUMBERS AS A REF. A MAINT PERSON DISCOVERED THAT BOTH MEL REFS WERE WRONG AND THERE WAS NO WAY TO DEFER A DISCHARGED FIRE BOTTLE. THE COMPANY NOTIFIED THE FAA. THE COMPANY IS DECIDING ON CORRECTIVE ACTION. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 240031: WE WERE ADVISED BOTTLE HAD BEEN RECHARGED BUT IT HAD NOT. REQUIREMENT FOR DISPATCH WERE ALL BOTTLES TO BE CHARGED. PROB DISCOVERED IN SEA BY MAINT. FULLY CHARGED BOTTLE INSTALLED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.