Narrative:

I was working the d-side of the buj low -- intermediate int combined. The right side was manned by an right side developmental and instructor. Also plugged in was a supervisor who was not certified on the sector. He was plugged in to do a certification determination for the right side developmental. Very quickly the sector began filling up with aircraft for an evening arrival push. There were also a few overflts to add to the complexity, along with metering. It seemed obvious to me from looking at the mix of traffic that the sectors should have been split. This was not done however by the supervisor. This was so to see how much the trainee could absorb and then ask for help (first mistake on supervisor's part. This is the supervisor's responsibility). After it started getting real busy (over 20 aircraft in the sector) the supervisor made the second mistake. He had the instructor act as a handoff controller instead of getting a dedicated handoff controller. The instructor should function only to watch the developmental. The supervisor then began acting as a quasi-handoff man. This was being done on a sector that he was not certified on. This is in violation of FAA orders. The situation did get out of hand and through lots of very hard work, no incidents occurred. Acrs aren't allowed to experiment with people on board. We shouldn't either. Always keep in control of sector management. Don't wait until the last min to staff a sector. 'Never' try to push a controller trainee past a safe level in other than simulated traffic. If 'normal' workload dictates splitting a sector or staffing a handoff controller, do so.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CTLR RADAR CERTIFICATION IN COMBINED POS OF OP.

Narrative: I WAS WORKING THE D-SIDE OF THE BUJ LOW -- INTERMEDIATE INT COMBINED. THE R SIDE WAS MANNED BY AN R SIDE DEVELOPMENTAL AND INSTRUCTOR. ALSO PLUGGED IN WAS A SUPVR WHO WAS NOT CERTIFIED ON THE SECTOR. HE WAS PLUGGED IN TO DO A CERTIFICATION DETERMINATION FOR THE R SIDE DEVELOPMENTAL. VERY QUICKLY THE SECTOR BEGAN FILLING UP WITH ACFT FOR AN EVENING ARR PUSH. THERE WERE ALSO A FEW OVERFLTS TO ADD TO THE COMPLEXITY, ALONG WITH METERING. IT SEEMED OBVIOUS TO ME FROM LOOKING AT THE MIX OF TFC THAT THE SECTORS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SPLIT. THIS WAS NOT DONE HOWEVER BY THE SUPVR. THIS WAS SO TO SEE HOW MUCH THE TRAINEE COULD ABSORB AND THEN ASK FOR HELP (FIRST MISTAKE ON SUPVR'S PART. THIS IS THE SUPVR'S RESPONSIBILITY). AFTER IT STARTED GETTING REAL BUSY (OVER 20 ACFT IN THE SECTOR) THE SUPVR MADE THE SECOND MISTAKE. HE HAD THE INSTRUCTOR ACT AS A HDOF CTLR INSTEAD OF GETTING A DEDICATED HDOF CTLR. THE INSTRUCTOR SHOULD FUNCTION ONLY TO WATCH THE DEVELOPMENTAL. THE SUPVR THEN BEGAN ACTING AS A QUASI-HDOF MAN. THIS WAS BEING DONE ON A SECTOR THAT HE WAS NOT CERTIFIED ON. THIS IS IN VIOLATION OF FAA ORDERS. THE SIT DID GET OUT OF HAND AND THROUGH LOTS OF VERY HARD WORK, NO INCIDENTS OCCURRED. ACRS AREN'T ALLOWED TO EXPERIMENT WITH PEOPLE ON BOARD. WE SHOULDN'T EITHER. ALWAYS KEEP IN CTL OF SECTOR MGMNT. DON'T WAIT UNTIL THE LAST MIN TO STAFF A SECTOR. 'NEVER' TRY TO PUSH A CTLR TRAINEE PAST A SAFE LEVEL IN OTHER THAN SIMULATED TFC. IF 'NORMAL' WORKLOAD DICTATES SPLITTING A SECTOR OR STAFFING A HDOF CTLR, DO SO.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.