Narrative:

At 9 NM east of ful and around 4000 ft, initial contact with ont approach was made, the pilot requested transit to L26, climb to 7500 ft. However, the pilot intended L26 to be a waypoint, the final destination was el mirage dry lake bed, 19 NM west of george AFB. In the past, the pilot had experienced trouble relating the off airport location to controllers, thus he opted to use L26 because L26 was a waypoint and the nearest airport to the destination. Especially on that extremely busy day, the pilot felt the controllers would tolerate the 3 letter identifier better than a descriptive reply. Over 1 airport the pilot reached 7500 ft and soon after was handed off to the next controller who seemed very busy. As the pilot arrived at cajon pass, he waited for the controller to terminate radar service amidst the continuous ATC chatter. The termination never occurred. As the pilot entered cajon pass, he requested frequency change but there was no reply. The controller never heard that transmission although it was clearly recorded on the tape, 45 seconds went by before the controller issued radar service cancellation. However, by that time the pilot had already lost radio contact with ont, he had reset transponder to 1200, changed course and proceeded to his destination (where he camped over night). Meanwhile, the controller knowing the hazards of cajon pass was disturbed by the sudden loss of radar contact and by the lack of a radio reply. He may even momentarily noticed a course change which would bring the airplane closer to the hill side rather than a straight heading for L26. Unable to further determine that aircraft's progress, he initiated procedures for a ramp check at L26. Of course the pilot never made it to L26, and around the same time the satellite was picking up an ELT in the radar lost vicinity. Unable to locate the now missing aircraft at L26, the possibility for another cajon crash must have seemed overwhelming, thus a sheriff and civil air patrol search was initiated. They searched the cajon hill sides that evening, however bad WX later halted the search. As the civil air patrol team gathered more information, and after viewing tapes of radar traces from ont and joshua (on the other side of the pass) approachs they were able to determine that the missing plane actually flew safely out of cajon pass and was located about 25 NM northwest of cajon. Next morning before another search plane was sent, the pilot was already returning to sna. As he requested transit through ont airspace, he was informed of the current search for him. After landing at sna the pilot promptly contacted civil air patrol and ont approach. There are several issues at hand. First of all, far 91.130 states pilots must maintain radio contact while in the arsa, the pilot was well out of the arsa at cajon pass. He could have circled back to sign off with the controller, however, the pilot thought the controller would be much too busy to entertain such aerobatics, besides it is normal to lose contact in the cajon pass. Thus the pilot thought no further action was needed, other than resetting the transponder to 1200. At this point the pilot was at worst unknowingly discourteous and meant no malice. The biggest confusion arose from the pilot telling the controller he was going to L26, as explained earlier, the controllers have a high affinity for 3 letter identifiers. The pilot assumed waypoints, not necessarily final destination airports, are acceptable for arsa transit requests, and why can't L26 be a waypoint? Also, it is not illegal for VFR pilots to change their minds and fly to other airports, especially when no flight plan was filed. After the ramp check at L26, the focus on the crash theory must have been so tremendous that other possibilities must have seemed very removed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A SEARCH IS BEGUN WHEN RPTR DOESN'T SHOW UP AT ARPT CTLR THOUGHT WAS HIS DEST.

Narrative: AT 9 NM E OF FUL AND AROUND 4000 FT, INITIAL CONTACT WITH ONT APCH WAS MADE, THE PLT REQUESTED TRANSIT TO L26, CLB TO 7500 FT. HOWEVER, THE PLT INTENDED L26 TO BE A WAYPOINT, THE FINAL DEST WAS EL MIRAGE DRY LAKE BED, 19 NM W OF GEORGE AFB. IN THE PAST, THE PLT HAD EXPERIENCED TROUBLE RELATING THE OFF ARPT LOCATION TO CTLRS, THUS HE OPTED TO USE L26 BECAUSE L26 WAS A WAYPOINT AND THE NEAREST ARPT TO THE DEST. ESPECIALLY ON THAT EXTREMELY BUSY DAY, THE PLT FELT THE CTLRS WOULD TOLERATE THE 3 LETTER IDENTIFIER BETTER THAN A DESCRIPTIVE REPLY. OVER 1 ARPT THE PLT REACHED 7500 FT AND SOON AFTER WAS HANDED OFF TO THE NEXT CTLR WHO SEEMED VERY BUSY. AS THE PLT ARRIVED AT CAJON PASS, HE WAITED FOR THE CTLR TO TERMINATE RADAR SVC AMIDST THE CONTINUOUS ATC CHATTER. THE TERMINATION NEVER OCCURRED. AS THE PLT ENTERED CAJON PASS, HE REQUESTED FREQ CHANGE BUT THERE WAS NO REPLY. THE CTLR NEVER HEARD THAT XMISSION ALTHOUGH IT WAS CLRLY RECORDED ON THE TAPE, 45 SECONDS WENT BY BEFORE THE CTLR ISSUED RADAR SVC CANCELLATION. HOWEVER, BY THAT TIME THE PLT HAD ALREADY LOST RADIO CONTACT WITH ONT, HE HAD RESET XPONDER TO 1200, CHANGED COURSE AND PROCEEDED TO HIS DEST (WHERE HE CAMPED OVER NIGHT). MEANWHILE, THE CTLR KNOWING THE HAZARDS OF CAJON PASS WAS DISTURBED BY THE SUDDEN LOSS OF RADAR CONTACT AND BY THE LACK OF A RADIO REPLY. HE MAY EVEN MOMENTARILY NOTICED A COURSE CHANGE WHICH WOULD BRING THE AIRPLANE CLOSER TO THE HILL SIDE RATHER THAN A STRAIGHT HDG FOR L26. UNABLE TO FURTHER DETERMINE THAT ACFT'S PROGRESS, HE INITIATED PROCS FOR A RAMP CHK AT L26. OF COURSE THE PLT NEVER MADE IT TO L26, AND AROUND THE SAME TIME THE SATELLITE WAS PICKING UP AN ELT IN THE RADAR LOST VICINITY. UNABLE TO LOCATE THE NOW MISSING ACFT AT L26, THE POSSIBILITY FOR ANOTHER CAJON CRASH MUST HAVE SEEMED OVERWHELMING, THUS A SHERIFF AND CIVIL AIR PATROL SEARCH WAS INITIATED. THEY SEARCHED THE CAJON HILL SIDES THAT EVENING, HOWEVER BAD WX LATER HALTED THE SEARCH. AS THE CIVIL AIR PATROL TEAM GATHERED MORE INFO, AND AFTER VIEWING TAPES OF RADAR TRACES FROM ONT AND JOSHUA (ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE PASS) APCHS THEY WERE ABLE TO DETERMINE THAT THE MISSING PLANE ACTUALLY FLEW SAFELY OUT OF CAJON PASS AND WAS LOCATED ABOUT 25 NM NW OF CAJON. NEXT MORNING BEFORE ANOTHER SEARCH PLANE WAS SENT, THE PLT WAS ALREADY RETURNING TO SNA. AS HE REQUESTED TRANSIT THROUGH ONT AIRSPACE, HE WAS INFORMED OF THE CURRENT SEARCH FOR HIM. AFTER LNDG AT SNA THE PLT PROMPTLY CONTACTED CIVIL AIR PATROL AND ONT APCH. THERE ARE SEVERAL ISSUES AT HAND. FIRST OF ALL, FAR 91.130 STATES PLTS MUST MAINTAIN RADIO CONTACT WHILE IN THE ARSA, THE PLT WAS WELL OUT OF THE ARSA AT CAJON PASS. HE COULD HAVE CIRCLED BACK TO SIGN OFF WITH THE CTLR, HOWEVER, THE PLT THOUGHT THE CTLR WOULD BE MUCH TOO BUSY TO ENTERTAIN SUCH AEROBATICS, BESIDES IT IS NORMAL TO LOSE CONTACT IN THE CAJON PASS. THUS THE PLT THOUGHT NO FURTHER ACTION WAS NEEDED, OTHER THAN RESETTING THE XPONDER TO 1200. AT THIS POINT THE PLT WAS AT WORST UNKNOWINGLY DISCOURTEOUS AND MEANT NO MALICE. THE BIGGEST CONFUSION AROSE FROM THE PLT TELLING THE CTLR HE WAS GOING TO L26, AS EXPLAINED EARLIER, THE CTLRS HAVE A HIGH AFFINITY FOR 3 LETTER IDENTIFIERS. THE PLT ASSUMED WAYPOINTS, NOT NECESSARILY FINAL DEST ARPTS, ARE ACCEPTABLE FOR ARSA TRANSIT REQUESTS, AND WHY CAN'T L26 BE A WAYPOINT? ALSO, IT IS NOT ILLEGAL FOR VFR PLTS TO CHANGE THEIR MINDS AND FLY TO OTHER ARPTS, ESPECIALLY WHEN NO FLT PLAN WAS FILED. AFTER THE RAMP CHK AT L26, THE FOCUS ON THE CRASH THEORY MUST HAVE BEEN SO TREMENDOUS THAT OTHER POSSIBILITIES MUST HAVE SEEMED VERY REMOVED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.