Narrative:

Copilot is PF. Prior to descent I set up my approach charts for arrival. I look to the copilot's side and see that he has the ILS approach plate out and ready to brief, the one involving a DME arc and final approach course north of the field. The approach I expected to use was the VOR-a straight-in from the south, the direction we were approaching from. The destination wind was out of the north at 7-10 KTS, right down the runway. The visibility was excellent (30 mi) and the ceiling was high enough (6000-8000 ft), allowing for a nice efficient straight-in descent over the VOR. However, descent must begin 50 NM sooner to allow us to descend into VMC, acquire the airport and runway visually, and cancel IFR (before the VOR passage). I go ahead and request lower altitude, and center asks which approach we would like, the ILS 11 or the VOR-a. I now realize the copilot is not aware of the VOR-a approach and is asking me why we wouldn't want to approach from the north on the ILS circle to land north. I explain the inefficiency of his plan based on the wind and ceiling. Now I have allowed a dangerous situation to develop. During cruise I did not take the time to confirm that the copilot was aware of the ceiling, wind, and visibility pointing to a straight-in arrival from the south and that the copilot was aware of the VOR-a approach as the instrument approach procedure used to let down from en route to VMC and subsequent cancellation of IFR. At top-of-descent I realize that the copilot does not have the approach plate for the VOR-a handy, is not familiar with it and is unable to brief it to the crew prior to descent. At this point, I could've taken the airplane as PF and initiated descent while he caught up with me (if my first mistake was not ensuring that everyone was familiar with the arrival that I was expecting so that there was plenty of time to discuss it and understand it, my second mistake was not initiating descent myself and assuming the role of PF to prevent a hurried high speed descent). Instead, the copilot was frustrated and confused by his hurried descent. As we approached the VOR at 8000 ft in IMC I told him we cold not proceed beyond the VOR unless we were in VMC and that we must now turn left in a course reversal to intercept and use the procedure turn to continue descent. At this point, the copilot asked me to 'take the airplane' and I did, momentarily overbanking to 45 degrees (maximum 30 degrees) as I turned hastily outbound while he coordinated our procedure turn entry with center. Within moments we were in VMC, visually acquired the runway, cancelled IFR and contacted airport advisory service. I gave the airplane back to the copilot who completed the approach and landing. I apologized to the copilot for my not confirming with him earlier about his familiarity with the airport and navaids and thanked him for handing over the airplane when he did. This was the first leg of the duty day. I had flown with him twice before. We had flown into this airport 11 months ago at night using the ILS without incident. In future, I will ensure my crewmembers' familiarity with a particular operation before it's too late.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LGT FLC HAS LACK OF COORD REF WHICH APCH IN USE. FO GIVES ACFT TO CAPT.

Narrative: COPLT IS PF. PRIOR TO DSCNT I SET UP MY APCH CHARTS FOR ARR. I LOOK TO THE COPLT'S SIDE AND SEE THAT HE HAS THE ILS APCH PLATE OUT AND READY TO BRIEF, THE ONE INVOLVING A DME ARC AND FINAL APCH COURSE N OF THE FIELD. THE APCH I EXPECTED TO USE WAS THE VOR-A STRAIGHT-IN FROM THE S, THE DIRECTION WE WERE APCHING FROM. THE DEST WIND WAS OUT OF THE N AT 7-10 KTS, RIGHT DOWN THE RWY. THE VISIBILITY WAS EXCELLENT (30 MI) AND THE CEILING WAS HIGH ENOUGH (6000-8000 FT), ALLOWING FOR A NICE EFFICIENT STRAIGHT-IN DSCNT OVER THE VOR. HOWEVER, DSCNT MUST BEGIN 50 NM SOONER TO ALLOW US TO DSND INTO VMC, ACQUIRE THE ARPT AND RWY VISUALLY, AND CANCEL IFR (BEFORE THE VOR PASSAGE). I GO AHEAD AND REQUEST LOWER ALT, AND CTR ASKS WHICH APCH WE WOULD LIKE, THE ILS 11 OR THE VOR-A. I NOW REALIZE THE COPLT IS NOT AWARE OF THE VOR-A APCH AND IS ASKING ME WHY WE WOULDN'T WANT TO APCH FROM THE N ON THE ILS CIRCLE TO LAND N. I EXPLAIN THE INEFFICIENCY OF HIS PLAN BASED ON THE WIND AND CEILING. NOW I HAVE ALLOWED A DANGEROUS SIT TO DEVELOP. DURING CRUISE I DID NOT TAKE THE TIME TO CONFIRM THAT THE COPLT WAS AWARE OF THE CEILING, WIND, AND VISIBILITY POINTING TO A STRAIGHT-IN ARR FROM THE S AND THAT THE COPLT WAS AWARE OF THE VOR-A APCH AS THE INST APCH PROC USED TO LET DOWN FROM ENRTE TO VMC AND SUBSEQUENT CANCELLATION OF IFR. AT TOP-OF-DSCNT I REALIZE THAT THE COPLT DOES NOT HAVE THE APCH PLATE FOR THE VOR-A HANDY, IS NOT FAMILIAR WITH IT AND IS UNABLE TO BRIEF IT TO THE CREW PRIOR TO DSCNT. AT THIS POINT, I COULD'VE TAKEN THE AIRPLANE AS PF AND INITIATED DSCNT WHILE HE CAUGHT UP WITH ME (IF MY FIRST MISTAKE WAS NOT ENSURING THAT EVERYONE WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE ARR THAT I WAS EXPECTING SO THAT THERE WAS PLENTY OF TIME TO DISCUSS IT AND UNDERSTAND IT, MY SECOND MISTAKE WAS NOT INITIATING DSCNT MYSELF AND ASSUMING THE ROLE OF PF TO PREVENT A HURRIED HIGH SPD DSCNT). INSTEAD, THE COPLT WAS FRUSTRATED AND CONFUSED BY HIS HURRIED DSCNT. AS WE APCHED THE VOR AT 8000 FT IN IMC I TOLD HIM WE COLD NOT PROCEED BEYOND THE VOR UNLESS WE WERE IN VMC AND THAT WE MUST NOW TURN L IN A COURSE REVERSAL TO INTERCEPT AND USE THE PROC TURN TO CONTINUE DSCNT. AT THIS POINT, THE COPLT ASKED ME TO 'TAKE THE AIRPLANE' AND I DID, MOMENTARILY OVERBANKING TO 45 DEGS (MAX 30 DEGS) AS I TURNED HASTILY OUTBOUND WHILE HE COORDINATED OUR PROC TURN ENTRY WITH CTR. WITHIN MOMENTS WE WERE IN VMC, VISUALLY ACQUIRED THE RWY, CANCELLED IFR AND CONTACTED ARPT ADVISORY SVC. I GAVE THE AIRPLANE BACK TO THE COPLT WHO COMPLETED THE APCH AND LNDG. I APOLOGIZED TO THE COPLT FOR MY NOT CONFIRMING WITH HIM EARLIER ABOUT HIS FAMILIARITY WITH THE ARPT AND NAVAIDS AND THANKED HIM FOR HANDING OVER THE AIRPLANE WHEN HE DID. THIS WAS THE FIRST LEG OF THE DUTY DAY. I HAD FLOWN WITH HIM TWICE BEFORE. WE HAD FLOWN INTO THIS ARPT 11 MONTHS AGO AT NIGHT USING THE ILS WITHOUT INCIDENT. IN FUTURE, I WILL ENSURE MY CREWMEMBERS' FAMILIARITY WITH A PARTICULAR OP BEFORE IT'S TOO LATE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.