Narrative:

Filed IFR to hayward due to stratus layer over the bay area. Intended to make the VOR-a approach to hayward, then cancel IFR when below clouds and proceed to san carlos. Departed reno at XA30 local. Flight was normal until vicinity of livermore when bay approach advised that current WX would probably not permit flight across the bay under VFR. Stated my intention to land at hayward and wait until safe flight across the bay could occur. Received clearance for the hayward VOR-a approach. Was advised to switch to the CTAF at hayward, then contact approach upon landing to cancel IFR. Broke out of clouds at 900 ft MSL. Made visual contact with a rotating beacon, proceeded toward that beacon, made visual contact with the runway and landed. Contacted approach to cancel IFR. Approach asked where I was. I stated that I was on the ground at hayward. Approach advised that I was actually on the ground at oakland. I have listed below the specific errors that I recognize as having led to this incident. However, I firmly believe that the underlying cause of this incident was pilot fatigue, caused by the following: upset of my circadian rhythm due to lack of sleep. Improper nutrition during the 18 hour period prior to the incident. High stress during the 10 hour period prior to the incident. This fatigue led to the following errors: poor judgement about my condition to fly. I had originally planned to sleep a few hours before the flight. However, upon arrival at the FBO in reno, I felt ok so I reasoned that I would make the flight, then sleep when I got home. Poor review of approach. I had flown the approach numerous times in the past and thought I was familiar enough with it, so my review was not as thorough as it should have been. Poor planning and execution of approach. I was 'behind the airplane' throughout the approach. Specifically, I was off course, fast, and started the timer late. Failure to execute missed approach. I failed to factor in the 'late start' of the timer. The timer expired just as I spotted the beacon. I should have realized that having started the timer late and being fast, I would be far beyond the airport when the timer expired. Improper mind set. I was not mentally prepared to execute a missed approach. I assumed that I would break out, see the airport, and land -- which is exactly what I did. This incident made me keenly aware of what fatigue can do to a pilot. I now know that staying awake is not enough. Fatigue makes the mind lazy and target for a complacent attitude. I knew I was fatigued, but I believe my fatigue made me incorrectly think that I was okay to fly. I will take more care to prevent myself from being in sits where I might be flying in such a fatigued state. Additionally, this incident serves a good lesson of what complacency can do to flying safety. My complacency brought on a mind set that I would make the approach and land like I had done so many times before. Therefore, I should use this to recognize times that I could succumb to complacency, and take measures to prevent it.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WRONG ARPT APCH LNDG. UNAUTH LNDG.

Narrative: FILED IFR TO HAYWARD DUE TO STRATUS LAYER OVER THE BAY AREA. INTENDED TO MAKE THE VOR-A APCH TO HAYWARD, THEN CANCEL IFR WHEN BELOW CLOUDS AND PROCEED TO SAN CARLOS. DEPARTED RENO AT XA30 LCL. FLT WAS NORMAL UNTIL VICINITY OF LIVERMORE WHEN BAY APCH ADVISED THAT CURRENT WX WOULD PROBABLY NOT PERMIT FLT ACROSS THE BAY UNDER VFR. STATED MY INTENTION TO LAND AT HAYWARD AND WAIT UNTIL SAFE FLT ACROSS THE BAY COULD OCCUR. RECEIVED CLRNC FOR THE HAYWARD VOR-A APCH. WAS ADVISED TO SWITCH TO THE CTAF AT HAYWARD, THEN CONTACT APCH UPON LNDG TO CANCEL IFR. BROKE OUT OF CLOUDS AT 900 FT MSL. MADE VISUAL CONTACT WITH A ROTATING BEACON, PROCEEDED TOWARD THAT BEACON, MADE VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE RWY AND LANDED. CONTACTED APCH TO CANCEL IFR. APCH ASKED WHERE I WAS. I STATED THAT I WAS ON THE GND AT HAYWARD. APCH ADVISED THAT I WAS ACTUALLY ON THE GND AT OAKLAND. I HAVE LISTED BELOW THE SPECIFIC ERRORS THAT I RECOGNIZE AS HAVING LED TO THIS INCIDENT. HOWEVER, I FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT THE UNDERLYING CAUSE OF THIS INCIDENT WAS PLT FATIGUE, CAUSED BY THE FOLLOWING: UPSET OF MY CIRCADIAN RHYTHM DUE TO LACK OF SLEEP. IMPROPER NUTRITION DURING THE 18 HR PERIOD PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT. HIGH STRESS DURING THE 10 HR PERIOD PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT. THIS FATIGUE LED TO THE FOLLOWING ERRORS: POOR JUDGEMENT ABOUT MY CONDITION TO FLY. I HAD ORIGINALLY PLANNED TO SLEEP A FEW HRS BEFORE THE FLT. HOWEVER, UPON ARR AT THE FBO IN RENO, I FELT OK SO I REASONED THAT I WOULD MAKE THE FLT, THEN SLEEP WHEN I GOT HOME. POOR REVIEW OF APCH. I HAD FLOWN THE APCH NUMEROUS TIMES IN THE PAST AND THOUGHT I WAS FAMILIAR ENOUGH WITH IT, SO MY REVIEW WAS NOT AS THOROUGH AS IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN. POOR PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF APCH. I WAS 'BEHIND THE AIRPLANE' THROUGHOUT THE APCH. SPECIFICALLY, I WAS OFF COURSE, FAST, AND STARTED THE TIMER LATE. FAILURE TO EXECUTE MISSED APCH. I FAILED TO FACTOR IN THE 'LATE START' OF THE TIMER. THE TIMER EXPIRED JUST AS I SPOTTED THE BEACON. I SHOULD HAVE REALIZED THAT HAVING STARTED THE TIMER LATE AND BEING FAST, I WOULD BE FAR BEYOND THE ARPT WHEN THE TIMER EXPIRED. IMPROPER MIND SET. I WAS NOT MENTALLY PREPARED TO EXECUTE A MISSED APCH. I ASSUMED THAT I WOULD BREAK OUT, SEE THE ARPT, AND LAND -- WHICH IS EXACTLY WHAT I DID. THIS INCIDENT MADE ME KEENLY AWARE OF WHAT FATIGUE CAN DO TO A PLT. I NOW KNOW THAT STAYING AWAKE IS NOT ENOUGH. FATIGUE MAKES THE MIND LAZY AND TARGET FOR A COMPLACENT ATTITUDE. I KNEW I WAS FATIGUED, BUT I BELIEVE MY FATIGUE MADE ME INCORRECTLY THINK THAT I WAS OKAY TO FLY. I WILL TAKE MORE CARE TO PREVENT MYSELF FROM BEING IN SITS WHERE I MIGHT BE FLYING IN SUCH A FATIGUED STATE. ADDITIONALLY, THIS INCIDENT SERVES A GOOD LESSON OF WHAT COMPLACENCY CAN DO TO FLYING SAFETY. MY COMPLACENCY BROUGHT ON A MIND SET THAT I WOULD MAKE THE APCH AND LAND LIKE I HAD DONE SO MANY TIMES BEFORE. THEREFORE, I SHOULD USE THIS TO RECOGNIZE TIMES THAT I COULD SUCCUMB TO COMPLACENCY, AND TAKE MEASURES TO PREVENT IT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.