Narrative:

Following an uneventful cross country of 1 1/2 hours from P06 I was vectored to an approximately 5 mi final by phx tower and advised to keep my speed up because of airline traffic behind me.. At approximately a 1 mi final from the airport I slowed the aircraft to 132 KTS and lowered the landing gear. At that time I observed no light on the nosewheel. I recycled the landing gear twice and still did not obtain a safe indication of a nosewheel. At this point I was approximately a 1/4 mi final and advised the tower that I was intending to go around because of unsafe nosewheel indication. I was cleared for the go around with an offset to the left. At the same time, an airliner crew member behind the hold line for 8L indicated he would visually inspect the nose gear as I passed on the low approach. He indicated that the nose gear appeared to be down to him. At that point, I became undecided and tried the press-to-test function on the nosewheel light with no indication. That indicated to me that the bulb was the culprit. The tower also indicated that it appeared to them the nose gear was down. I took a look at the nacelle mirror and observed that the nose gear did indeed appear to be down. Mentally convinced that I had a bad light rather than an actual unsafe condition, I elected to go ahead and land the aircraft. Landing was normal and I kept the nosewheel off the ground as long as possible and at approximately 55 to 60 KTS gently lowered the nosewheel to the runway, at which point it retracted. As the nose settled to the runway, both propeller tips impacted the runway, both engines stopped, and the airplane continued for approximately 100 yards and was steered off the runway onto a taxi apron. During the time the aircraft was coming to a stop I was able to shut down all system and fuel and as soon as I reached a stop I evacuate/evacuationed my passenger. Minor contributing factors to this event may have been my willingness to let other voices influence my decision and a certain amount of complacency towards the gear system in general. Due to the fact that the hydraulic system frequently needed to be recycled in flight because pressure loss allowed the gear to partially extend. Subsequent mechanical ground inspection indicated that a procedure of manually holding the gear lever in the 'extend' position while simultaneously operating the manual hydraulic pump, would probably have produced sufficient pressure to lock the gear down. The press-to-test feature on the nosewheel position was apparently inoperative.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMA TWIN ACFT DAMAGED AS NOSEWHEEL COLLAPSES DURING LNDG PROC ROLLOUT.

Narrative: FOLLOWING AN UNEVENTFUL XCOUNTRY OF 1 1/2 HRS FROM P06 I WAS VECTORED TO AN APPROX 5 MI FINAL BY PHX TWR AND ADVISED TO KEEP MY SPD UP BECAUSE OF AIRLINE TFC BEHIND ME.. AT APPROX A 1 MI FINAL FROM THE ARPT I SLOWED THE ACFT TO 132 KTS AND LOWERED THE LNDG GEAR. AT THAT TIME I OBSERVED NO LIGHT ON THE NOSEWHEEL. I RECYCLED THE LNDG GEAR TWICE AND STILL DID NOT OBTAIN A SAFE INDICATION OF A NOSEWHEEL. AT THIS POINT I WAS APPROX A 1/4 MI FINAL AND ADVISED THE TWR THAT I WAS INTENDING TO GAR BECAUSE OF UNSAFE NOSEWHEEL INDICATION. I WAS CLRED FOR THE GAR WITH AN OFFSET TO THE L. AT THE SAME TIME, AN AIRLINER CREW MEMBER BEHIND THE HOLD LINE FOR 8L INDICATED HE WOULD VISUALLY INSPECT THE NOSE GEAR AS I PASSED ON THE LOW APCH. HE INDICATED THAT THE NOSE GEAR APPEARED TO BE DOWN TO HIM. AT THAT POINT, I BECAME UNDECIDED AND TRIED THE PRESS-TO-TEST FUNCTION ON THE NOSEWHEEL LIGHT WITH NO INDICATION. THAT INDICATED TO ME THAT THE BULB WAS THE CULPRIT. THE TWR ALSO INDICATED THAT IT APPEARED TO THEM THE NOSE GEAR WAS DOWN. I TOOK A LOOK AT THE NACELLE MIRROR AND OBSERVED THAT THE NOSE GEAR DID INDEED APPEAR TO BE DOWN. MENTALLY CONVINCED THAT I HAD A BAD LIGHT RATHER THAN AN ACTUAL UNSAFE CONDITION, I ELECTED TO GO AHEAD AND LAND THE ACFT. LNDG WAS NORMAL AND I KEPT THE NOSEWHEEL OFF THE GND AS LONG AS POSSIBLE AND AT APPROX 55 TO 60 KTS GENTLY LOWERED THE NOSEWHEEL TO THE RWY, AT WHICH POINT IT RETRACTED. AS THE NOSE SETTLED TO THE RWY, BOTH PROP TIPS IMPACTED THE RWY, BOTH ENGS STOPPED, AND THE AIRPLANE CONTINUED FOR APPROX 100 YARDS AND WAS STEERED OFF THE RWY ONTO A TAXI APRON. DURING THE TIME THE ACFT WAS COMING TO A STOP I WAS ABLE TO SHUT DOWN ALL SYS AND FUEL AND AS SOON AS I REACHED A STOP I EVACED MY PAX. MINOR CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THIS EVENT MAY HAVE BEEN MY WILLINGNESS TO LET OTHER VOICES INFLUENCE MY DECISION AND A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF COMPLACENCY TOWARDS THE GEAR SYS IN GENERAL. DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE HYD SYS FREQUENTLY NEEDED TO BE RECYCLED IN FLT BECAUSE PRESSURE LOSS ALLOWED THE GEAR TO PARTIALLY EXTEND. SUBSEQUENT MECHANICAL GND INSPECTION INDICATED THAT A PROC OF MANUALLY HOLDING THE GEAR LEVER IN THE 'EXTEND' POS WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY OPERATING THE MANUAL HYD PUMP, WOULD PROBABLY HAVE PRODUCED SUFFICIENT PRESSURE TO LOCK THE GEAR DOWN. THE PRESS-TO-TEST FEATURE ON THE NOSEWHEEL POS WAS APPARENTLY INOP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.