Narrative:

During landing rollout on sea runway 16R tower advised us to hold short of runway 16L and remain on tower frequency. I repeated the hold short instructions over the radio and also repeated it to the captain. As we cleared off on the last usable taxiway I started to perform the items on our after landing checklist (retract flaps, turn off: landing lights, transponder, DME, pitot heat, window heat, etc) when I noticed we were passing the painted hold lines and not slowing down. I simultaneously put my feet on the brakes and called out 'hold short!' we finally came to stop considerably past the hold lines (I guess about 75 ft) but still about 35 ft short of the edge of runway 16L. A landing widebody transport on the left runway had been instructed to turn left off the runway at the next available taxiway, which turned out to be the extension of the same one we were on. As the widebody transport turned left in front of us his right wingtip antenna swung out very close to our aircraft. After he completed his turn, tower cleared an mdt into position and hold at midfield runway 16L. Tower then asked if we had passed the hold lines. I responded that we had. Tower then cleared the mdt for immediate takeoff, even though they knew we had encroached the runway. The mdt was airborne about 1000 ft before our position. Next, we were instructed to expedite crossing runway 16L. Distrs both outside and inside the cockpit (captain watching the widebody transport landing and myself being preoccupied with the after landing administrative duties) caused the situation to develop. Keep 'flying' the aircraft until engines are shut down at the gate should always remain the most important duty. But on critical analysis, I should have immediately reported our passing the hold lines to tower. By assuming everyone else would remain vigilant we further compromised safety. Let me explain. Since we did not say anything, tower did not direct the widebody transport off the runway via a different taxiway. Additionally, the widebody transport crew might have assumed we were sufficiently clear for him to make his turn (the widebody transport copilot was not paying any attention to us as they approached to make the turn). Had we both been on the ramp, wing walkers would have been required. Had I said anything about passing the hold lines, I'm sure the widebody transport crew would have turned off somewhere else. The next event should not have taken place. After tower confirming we had passed the hold lines, they cleared an aircraft for takeoff. Some concern other than safety overrode their decision-making process. Maybe it was landing traffic and their desire to prevent a go around, I can't say. But it was a most uncomfortable 3-4 min period.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TECHNICAL RWY INCURSION AS ACR LGT CROSSES OVER THE HOLD LINE AFTER LNDG PROC ROLLOUT. MULTIPLE RWY OP PARALLEL RWYS. LNDG DEP TFC ARE TOO CLOSE FOR COMFORT.

Narrative: DURING LNDG ROLLOUT ON SEA RWY 16R TWR ADVISED US TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 16L AND REMAIN ON TWR FREQ. I REPEATED THE HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTIONS OVER THE RADIO AND ALSO REPEATED IT TO THE CAPT. AS WE CLRED OFF ON THE LAST USABLE TXWY I STARTED TO PERFORM THE ITEMS ON OUR AFTER LNDG CHKLIST (RETRACT FLAPS, TURN OFF: LNDG LIGHTS, XPONDER, DME, PITOT HEAT, WINDOW HEAT, ETC) WHEN I NOTICED WE WERE PASSING THE PAINTED HOLD LINES AND NOT SLOWING DOWN. I SIMULTANEOUSLY PUT MY FEET ON THE BRAKES AND CALLED OUT 'HOLD SHORT!' WE FINALLY CAME TO STOP CONSIDERABLY PAST THE HOLD LINES (I GUESS ABOUT 75 FT) BUT STILL ABOUT 35 FT SHORT OF THE EDGE OF RWY 16L. A LNDG WDB ON THE L RWY HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO TURN L OFF THE RWY AT THE NEXT AVAILABLE TXWY, WHICH TURNED OUT TO BE THE EXTENSION OF THE SAME ONE WE WERE ON. AS THE WDB TURNED L IN FRONT OF US HIS R WINGTIP ANTENNA SWUNG OUT VERY CLOSE TO OUR ACFT. AFTER HE COMPLETED HIS TURN, TWR CLRED AN MDT INTO POS AND HOLD AT MIDFIELD RWY 16L. TWR THEN ASKED IF WE HAD PASSED THE HOLD LINES. I RESPONDED THAT WE HAD. TWR THEN CLRED THE MDT FOR IMMEDIATE TKOF, EVEN THOUGH THEY KNEW WE HAD ENCROACHED THE RWY. THE MDT WAS AIRBORNE ABOUT 1000 FT BEFORE OUR POS. NEXT, WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO EXPEDITE XING RWY 16L. DISTRS BOTH OUTSIDE AND INSIDE THE COCKPIT (CAPT WATCHING THE WDB LNDG AND MYSELF BEING PREOCCUPIED WITH THE AFTER LNDG ADMINISTRATIVE DUTIES) CAUSED THE SIT TO DEVELOP. KEEP 'FLYING' THE ACFT UNTIL ENGS ARE SHUT DOWN AT THE GATE SHOULD ALWAYS REMAIN THE MOST IMPORTANT DUTY. BUT ON CRITICAL ANALYSIS, I SHOULD HAVE IMMEDIATELY RPTED OUR PASSING THE HOLD LINES TO TWR. BY ASSUMING EVERYONE ELSE WOULD REMAIN VIGILANT WE FURTHER COMPROMISED SAFETY. LET ME EXPLAIN. SINCE WE DID NOT SAY ANYTHING, TWR DID NOT DIRECT THE WDB OFF THE RWY VIA A DIFFERENT TXWY. ADDITIONALLY, THE WDB CREW MIGHT HAVE ASSUMED WE WERE SUFFICIENTLY CLR FOR HIM TO MAKE HIS TURN (THE WDB COPLT WAS NOT PAYING ANY ATTN TO US AS THEY APCHED TO MAKE THE TURN). HAD WE BOTH BEEN ON THE RAMP, WING WALKERS WOULD HAVE BEEN REQUIRED. HAD I SAID ANYTHING ABOUT PASSING THE HOLD LINES, I'M SURE THE WDB CREW WOULD HAVE TURNED OFF SOMEWHERE ELSE. THE NEXT EVENT SHOULD NOT HAVE TAKEN PLACE. AFTER TWR CONFIRMING WE HAD PASSED THE HOLD LINES, THEY CLRED AN ACFT FOR TKOF. SOME CONCERN OTHER THAN SAFETY OVERRODE THEIR DECISION-MAKING PROCESS. MAYBE IT WAS LNDG TFC AND THEIR DESIRE TO PREVENT A GAR, I CAN'T SAY. BUT IT WAS A MOST UNCOMFORTABLE 3-4 MIN PERIOD.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.