Narrative:

I was the first officer on flight dfw to hou. After an uneventful landing on runway 12R at hou, we rolled to the end and were told to contact ground on taxiway M. Ground instructed us to proceed north on taxiway M and hold short of runway 12L at taxiway O. I acknowledged those instructions. While on taxiway M, an medium large transport landed on runway 12R and took the high speed, taxiway west. We were told to give way to medium large transport, and then medium large transport was told to proceed north on taxiway M and cross runway 12L and runway 4/22 at taxiway C. Medium large transport acknowledged and proceeded. As we turned right on taxiway O, I told the captain that we had not been cleared across runway 12L. He replied that we were cleared across behind aircraft. I replied that I had not acknowledged that clearance. By this time we had crossed onto runway 12L, tower immediately called us to say that we crossed onto an active runway. Our captain replied to ground that large transport was cleared across runway 12L and 4/22. Tower replied that clearance was for medium large transport and that an small aircraft had to abort his takeoff. We were then cleared to our gate. Contributing factors: 1) we were told to hold short of runway 12L while on taxiway M, but medium large transport was cleared across runway 12L in front of us, even though they had landed after us. 2) the ground controller told us to give way to medium large transport and then proceeded with medium large transport clearance, without getting an acknowledgement from us to give way. 3) we were switched to ground frequency after landing, even though we would have to cross an active runway. This did not allow us to monitor tower frequency and conflicts that might arise, i.e., the small aircraft given takeoff clearance on runway 12 after medium large transport and before us. Human performance considerations: 1) not stopping to confirm a clearance. 2) keeping aircraft on tower frequency until across all active runways (as is common practice at most major airports). 3) making sure all clrncs given are given time to be acknowledged and are! At no time was the small aircraft ever in danger of striking our airplane.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LGT MISINTERPRETS CLRNC, TAXIES ACROSS ACTIVE RWY.

Narrative: I WAS THE FO ON FLT DFW TO HOU. AFTER AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG ON RWY 12R AT HOU, WE ROLLED TO THE END AND WERE TOLD TO CONTACT GND ON TXWY M. GND INSTRUCTED US TO PROCEED N ON TXWY M AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 12L AT TXWY O. I ACKNOWLEDGED THOSE INSTRUCTIONS. WHILE ON TXWY M, AN MLG LANDED ON RWY 12R AND TOOK THE HIGH SPD, TXWY W. WE WERE TOLD TO GIVE WAY TO MLG, AND THEN MLG WAS TOLD TO PROCEED N ON TXWY M AND CROSS RWY 12L AND RWY 4/22 AT TXWY C. MLG ACKNOWLEDGED AND PROCEEDED. AS WE TURNED R ON TXWY O, I TOLD THE CAPT THAT WE HAD NOT BEEN CLRED ACROSS RWY 12L. HE REPLIED THAT WE WERE CLRED ACROSS BEHIND ACFT. I REPLIED THAT I HAD NOT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT CLRNC. BY THIS TIME WE HAD CROSSED ONTO RWY 12L, TWR IMMEDIATELY CALLED US TO SAY THAT WE CROSSED ONTO AN ACTIVE RWY. OUR CAPT REPLIED TO GND THAT LGT WAS CLRED ACROSS RWY 12L AND 4/22. TWR REPLIED THAT CLRNC WAS FOR MLG AND THAT AN SMA HAD TO ABORT HIS TKOF. WE WERE THEN CLRED TO OUR GATE. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) WE WERE TOLD TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 12L WHILE ON TXWY M, BUT MLG WAS CLRED ACROSS RWY 12L IN FRONT OF US, EVEN THOUGH THEY HAD LANDED AFTER US. 2) THE GND CTLR TOLD US TO GIVE WAY TO MLG AND THEN PROCEEDED WITH MLG CLRNC, WITHOUT GETTING AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT FROM US TO GIVE WAY. 3) WE WERE SWITCHED TO GND FREQ AFTER LNDG, EVEN THOUGH WE WOULD HAVE TO CROSS AN ACTIVE RWY. THIS DID NOT ALLOW US TO MONITOR TWR FREQ AND CONFLICTS THAT MIGHT ARISE, I.E., THE SMA GIVEN TKOF CLRNC ON RWY 12 AFTER MLG AND BEFORE US. HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS: 1) NOT STOPPING TO CONFIRM A CLRNC. 2) KEEPING ACFT ON TWR FREQ UNTIL ACROSS ALL ACTIVE RWYS (AS IS COMMON PRACTICE AT MOST MAJOR ARPTS). 3) MAKING SURE ALL CLRNCS GIVEN ARE GIVEN TIME TO BE ACKNOWLEDGED AND ARE! AT NO TIME WAS THE SMA EVER IN DANGER OF STRIKING OUR AIRPLANE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.