Narrative:

On jan fri 94, I was assigned a trip on a scheduled commuter flight pit to fwa flying with a management captain and I serving as first officer. I arrived at the aircraft, an emb-120 (emraer) and proceeded with my preflight. I could not determine if there was any oil in the right engine. I then proceeded to inform the captain of the situation and he said he was going to inform maintenance about it, but apparently he did not. I then proceeded with other duties. We were running 40 mins behind schedule at this time and we had another write up on the aircraft from a previous flight that we were waiting to be cleared. We then flew to fwa and returned to pit without incident. On the next trip, from pit to rdg, we observed, on takeoff roll, a red oil warning light associated with an aural warning and I called abort, it was my leg and I proceeded to abort and the captain decided to continue the takeoff and proceeded by shoving the power levers forward. We then continued the takeoff and I then told him that we should return and land. But he decided to continue and proceed to rdg. I then asked him if the right engine had been serviced by maintenance as the oil warning was from the right engine, and he said he had forgotten about it. We then proceeded to rdg as that was what he wanted to do. We where now approximately 70 mi east of pittsburgh when we noticed the oil pressure steadily declining associated with an increase in oil temperature. I then told him we needed to return to pitt, and we proceeded to return back. We brought the power lever on the right side back to flight idle and oil pressure was stable so we did not have to shut the engine down. We then landed in pittsburgh without incident. Maintenance added 6 quarts of oil. I probably should have asked the captain again before we departed on the 1ST flight if maintenance had serviced that right engine. But I was so occupied with other duties that I forgot about it also. The aircraft has 13 quarts of oil in each engine. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: both of the anomalies covered in this acn and acn 261876 were on the same day, in the same aircraft, and with the same management pilot. The reporter flies the emb-120 for a regional carrier, an affiliate of a major us air carrier. The management pilot had worked for the regional air carrier, went to work for the parent major air carrier where he was furloughed, then came back to work for the regional air carrier in a lower management position. The reporter states that other pilots have had similar sits with the same management pilot. After these incidents, the reporter went to his air carrier's director of operations who stonewalled the situation. The reporter then went to his pilot's union representative. A union lawyer then went to the air carrier president with this matter. The director of operations has made a few remarks to the reporter about getting lawyers into the act. The reporter has reminded the director that the reporter came to him first. The pilot's union staff is ready to go to the FAA if the air carrier does nothing about the management pilot. There is a jump seat in the cockpit of the emb-120, but the mechanic who was along to oversee the hydraulic system was sitting in the rear when the oil temperature began to rise and the pressure to drop. The mechanic was visibly shaken when he was shown this and insisted that the aircraft be landed as soon as possible. These are the reporter's first contributions to the ASRS.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR EMB-120 HAD TO RETURN LAND WITH LOW OIL PRESSURE, LOW OIL QUANTITY, AND HIGH OIL TEMP ON ITS R ENG.

Narrative: ON JAN FRI 94, I WAS ASSIGNED A TRIP ON A SCHEDULED COMMUTER FLT PIT TO FWA FLYING WITH A MGMNT CAPT AND I SERVING AS FO. I ARRIVED AT THE ACFT, AN EMB-120 (EMRAER) AND PROCEEDED WITH MY PREFLT. I COULD NOT DETERMINE IF THERE WAS ANY OIL IN THE R ENG. I THEN PROCEEDED TO INFORM THE CAPT OF THE SIT AND HE SAID HE WAS GOING TO INFORM MAINT ABOUT IT, BUT APPARENTLY HE DID NOT. I THEN PROCEEDED WITH OTHER DUTIES. WE WERE RUNNING 40 MINS BEHIND SCHEDULE AT THIS TIME AND WE HAD ANOTHER WRITE UP ON THE ACFT FROM A PREVIOUS FLT THAT WE WERE WAITING TO BE CLRED. WE THEN FLEW TO FWA AND RETURNED TO PIT WITHOUT INCIDENT. ON THE NEXT TRIP, FROM PIT TO RDG, WE OBSERVED, ON TKOF ROLL, A RED OIL WARNING LIGHT ASSOCIATED WITH AN AURAL WARNING AND I CALLED ABORT, IT WAS MY LEG AND I PROCEEDED TO ABORT AND THE CAPT DECIDED TO CONTINUE THE TKOF AND PROCEEDED BY SHOVING THE PWR LEVERS FORWARD. WE THEN CONTINUED THE TKOF AND I THEN TOLD HIM THAT WE SHOULD RETURN AND LAND. BUT HE DECIDED TO CONTINUE AND PROCEED TO RDG. I THEN ASKED HIM IF THE R ENG HAD BEEN SERVICED BY MAINT AS THE OIL WARNING WAS FROM THE R ENG, AND HE SAID HE HAD FORGOTTEN ABOUT IT. WE THEN PROCEEDED TO RDG AS THAT WAS WHAT HE WANTED TO DO. WE WHERE NOW APPROX 70 MI E OF PITTSBURGH WHEN WE NOTICED THE OIL PRESSURE STEADILY DECLINING ASSOCIATED WITH AN INCREASE IN OIL TEMP. I THEN TOLD HIM WE NEEDED TO RETURN TO PITT, AND WE PROCEEDED TO RETURN BACK. WE BROUGHT THE PWR LEVER ON THE R SIDE BACK TO FLT IDLE AND OIL PRESSURE WAS STABLE SO WE DID NOT HAVE TO SHUT THE ENG DOWN. WE THEN LANDED IN PITTSBURGH WITHOUT INCIDENT. MAINT ADDED 6 QUARTS OF OIL. I PROBABLY SHOULD HAVE ASKED THE CAPT AGAIN BEFORE WE DEPARTED ON THE 1ST FLT IF MAINT HAD SERVICED THAT R ENG. BUT I WAS SO OCCUPIED WITH OTHER DUTIES THAT I FORGOT ABOUT IT ALSO. THE ACFT HAS 13 QUARTS OF OIL IN EACH ENG. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: BOTH OF THE ANOMALIES COVERED IN THIS ACN AND ACN 261876 WERE ON THE SAME DAY, IN THE SAME ACFT, AND WITH THE SAME MGMNT PLT. THE RPTR FLIES THE EMB-120 FOR A REGIONAL CARRIER, AN AFFILIATE OF A MAJOR US ACR. THE MGMNT PLT HAD WORKED FOR THE REGIONAL ACR, WENT TO WORK FOR THE PARENT MAJOR ACR WHERE HE WAS FURLOUGHED, THEN CAME BACK TO WORK FOR THE REGIONAL ACR IN A LOWER MGMNT POS. THE RPTR STATES THAT OTHER PLTS HAVE HAD SIMILAR SITS WITH THE SAME MGMNT PLT. AFTER THESE INCIDENTS, THE RPTR WENT TO HIS ACR'S DIRECTOR OF OPS WHO STONEWALLED THE SIT. THE RPTR THEN WENT TO HIS PLT'S UNION REPRESENTATIVE. A UNION LAWYER THEN WENT TO THE ACR PRESIDENT WITH THIS MATTER. THE DIRECTOR OF OPS HAS MADE A FEW REMARKS TO THE RPTR ABOUT GETTING LAWYERS INTO THE ACT. THE RPTR HAS REMINDED THE DIRECTOR THAT THE RPTR CAME TO HIM FIRST. THE PLT'S UNION STAFF IS READY TO GO TO THE FAA IF THE ACR DOES NOTHING ABOUT THE MGMNT PLT. THERE IS A JUMP SEAT IN THE COCKPIT OF THE EMB-120, BUT THE MECH WHO WAS ALONG TO OVERSEE THE HYD SYS WAS SITTING IN THE REAR WHEN THE OIL TEMP BEGAN TO RISE AND THE PRESSURE TO DROP. THE MECH WAS VISIBLY SHAKEN WHEN HE WAS SHOWN THIS AND INSISTED THAT THE ACFT BE LANDED ASAP. THESE ARE THE RPTR'S FIRST CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE ASRS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.