Narrative:

On the majic 7 STAR for arrival at clt, ATC instructed our flight to begin descent from FL280 and to maintain best forward airspeed. During the power-on descent, the captain noticed the engines were out of sync and attempted to correct the condition. It became apparent that the left engine was not responding to the throttle changes. The flight descended with the left engine at approximately 1.65 EPR to 10000 ft. During the initial portion of the descent, we monitored the affected engine to see if, at some point, it may begin to respond to throttle changes. Reaching the downwind and having been cleared for the visual approach, it became apparent that the only way to reduce the power on the affected engine was to remove power from it altogether. The tower was notified that the flight was on a single engine and that we were neither declaring an emergency nor requesting any assistance (i.e., crash fire rescue trucks). We accomplished the appropriate checklists, shut down the affected engine, and flew a single-engine visual approach and landed without incident. Upon arrival at the gate, maintenance researched the problem and found the throttle cable to be disconnected from the fuel control unit. In reviewing the incident, the captain and I discussed if it might have enhanced the situation to have declared an emergency at the point we removed power from the affected engine during the approach. We each agreed that given the WX conditions and the flight's position relative to the airport, this did not constitute an emergency situation. Other discussion with various line and supervisory pilots did not constitute an emergency situation. Other discussions with various line and supervisory pilots revealed a discrepancy between perceptions among these pilots as to whether or not we would have been obligated to declare an emergency by virtue of the fact that we were conducting a portion of the flight on a single engine. Upon reviewing the FARS, we found no reference regarding the necessity to declare an emergency in such a situation. An argument was put forth by one pilot that because we used a portion of an emergency checklist, and in consideration of the wording in our company flight operations manual regarding classification of emergencys, that a case could be made that we should have declared an emergency in this instance. Looking back at the event, the conservative option would have been to declare an emergency and to request that the crash fire rescue equipment be standing by for our landing. What was a near-routine landing could have degenerated into something less than a routine situation if, for any reason, we needed to execute a go around with a single engine or encountered some other difficulty with the aircraft during the landing. The specter of causing ATC to alter their operations and for the crash fire rescue crew to demobilized didn't seem warranted at the time, but may have been welcome if we had encountered any other problems. They are all there at our service and it doesn't hurt to call on them as a precaution. The idea of having to explain why we didn't request their assistance if anything had happened upon landing would not be easy.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MLG HAS ENG WHICH DOES NOT RESPOND TO THROTTLE CHANGES.

Narrative: ON THE MAJIC 7 STAR FOR ARR AT CLT, ATC INSTRUCTED OUR FLT TO BEGIN DSCNT FROM FL280 AND TO MAINTAIN BEST FORWARD AIRSPD. DURING THE PWR-ON DSCNT, THE CAPT NOTICED THE ENGS WERE OUT OF SYNC AND ATTEMPTED TO CORRECT THE CONDITION. IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THE L ENG WAS NOT RESPONDING TO THE THROTTLE CHANGES. THE FLT DSNDED WITH THE L ENG AT APPROX 1.65 EPR TO 10000 FT. DURING THE INITIAL PORTION OF THE DSCNT, WE MONITORED THE AFFECTED ENG TO SEE IF, AT SOME POINT, IT MAY BEGIN TO RESPOND TO THROTTLE CHANGES. REACHING THE DOWNWIND AND HAVING BEEN CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH, IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THE ONLY WAY TO REDUCE THE PWR ON THE AFFECTED ENG WAS TO REMOVE PWR FROM IT ALTOGETHER. THE TWR WAS NOTIFIED THAT THE FLT WAS ON A SINGLE ENG AND THAT WE WERE NEITHER DECLARING AN EMER NOR REQUESTING ANY ASSISTANCE (I.E., CRASH FIRE RESCUE TRUCKS). WE ACCOMPLISHED THE APPROPRIATE CHKLISTS, SHUT DOWN THE AFFECTED ENG, AND FLEW A SINGLE-ENG VISUAL APCH AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. UPON ARR AT THE GATE, MAINT RESEARCHED THE PROB AND FOUND THE THROTTLE CABLE TO BE DISCONNECTED FROM THE FUEL CTL UNIT. IN REVIEWING THE INCIDENT, THE CAPT AND I DISCUSSED IF IT MIGHT HAVE ENHANCED THE SIT TO HAVE DECLARED AN EMER AT THE POINT WE REMOVED PWR FROM THE AFFECTED ENG DURING THE APCH. WE EACH AGREED THAT GIVEN THE WX CONDITIONS AND THE FLT'S POS RELATIVE TO THE ARPT, THIS DID NOT CONSTITUTE AN EMER SIT. OTHER DISCUSSION WITH VARIOUS LINE AND SUPERVISORY PLTS DID NOT CONSTITUTE AN EMER SIT. OTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH VARIOUS LINE AND SUPERVISORY PLTS REVEALED A DISCREPANCY BTWN PERCEPTIONS AMONG THESE PLTS AS TO WHETHER OR NOT WE WOULD HAVE BEEN OBLIGATED TO DECLARE AN EMER BY VIRTUE OF THE FACT THAT WE WERE CONDUCTING A PORTION OF THE FLT ON A SINGLE ENG. UPON REVIEWING THE FARS, WE FOUND NO REF REGARDING THE NECESSITY TO DECLARE AN EMER IN SUCH A SIT. AN ARGUMENT WAS PUT FORTH BY ONE PLT THAT BECAUSE WE USED A PORTION OF AN EMER CHKLIST, AND IN CONSIDERATION OF THE WORDING IN OUR COMPANY FLT OPS MANUAL REGARDING CLASSIFICATION OF EMERS, THAT A CASE COULD BE MADE THAT WE SHOULD HAVE DECLARED AN EMER IN THIS INSTANCE. LOOKING BACK AT THE EVENT, THE CONSERVATIVE OPTION WOULD HAVE BEEN TO DECLARE AN EMER AND TO REQUEST THAT THE CRASH FIRE RESCUE EQUIP BE STANDING BY FOR OUR LNDG. WHAT WAS A NEAR-ROUTINE LNDG COULD HAVE DEGENERATED INTO SOMETHING LESS THAN A ROUTINE SIT IF, FOR ANY REASON, WE NEEDED TO EXECUTE A GAR WITH A SINGLE ENG OR ENCOUNTERED SOME OTHER DIFFICULTY WITH THE ACFT DURING THE LNDG. THE SPECTER OF CAUSING ATC TO ALTER THEIR OPS AND FOR THE CRASH FIRE RESCUE CREW TO DEMOBILIZED DIDN'T SEEM WARRANTED AT THE TIME, BUT MAY HAVE BEEN WELCOME IF WE HAD ENCOUNTERED ANY OTHER PROBS. THEY ARE ALL THERE AT OUR SVC AND IT DOESN'T HURT TO CALL ON THEM AS A PRECAUTION. THE IDEA OF HAVING TO EXPLAIN WHY WE DIDN'T REQUEST THEIR ASSISTANCE IF ANYTHING HAD HAPPENED UPON LNDG WOULD NOT BE EASY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.