Narrative:

I was working the local 2 position when the cabin attendant coordinator gave me a heads up on a military evacuate/evacuation X that the satellite controller in the TRACON was working who would be coming to land on runway 14 at buckley ANG base (bkf) 2 mi southeast of stapleton on a visual approach. I told the cabin attendant coordinator that I wanted X to fly right over runway 8 in order to stay with the flow of our departures. We were landing on runway 17 and departing runway 8 at the time. I also questioned why X was on a visual approach when we were below visual minimums and that we would not be able to provide visual separation. He told me they (the TRACON) would not do that, and that they would call us when he was closer. A min later the cabin attendant coordinator told me that the C-9 was 2 mi south of bkf. When I looked at the BRITE radar, I noticed that evacuate/evacuation X was cruising at 220 KTS at 6800 ft MSL. Realizing the problem since I had already cleared air carrier Y (B-727) for takeoff, I told the cabin attendant coordinator that I would put Y on a 040 degree heading immediately after takeoff to avoid evacuate/evacuation X. Y turned immediately off the runway to the 040 degree heading. I eventually turned him further north 010 degrees to pull further away from evacuate/evacuation X. Eventually Y was put back on course of a 065 degree heading to resume his flight. Evacuate/evacuation X concluded his flight and landed on runway 14 at bkf. I was later informed that an operational error had been called on the tower by the TRACON for this incident, which is still being investigated. Both the cabin attendant coordinator and I have been temporarily decertified awaiting the outcome of the investigation. No one in the TRACON has been decertified for this even though they had put an aircraft in the tower's airspace without proper coordination. The cabin attendant coordinator was busy at the time trying to resolve another problem with another controller who had just received 2 aircraft from the final controller without proper heavy jet separation that were landing on runway 17. The TRACON claimed that they did coordinate the inbound with the cabin attendant coordinator. However, the voice tape recording clearly shows the approval was never given. The cabin attendant coordinator was partially aware of the situation but never gave approval, nor did I, the local controller, give approval for anyone to enter my airspace.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR Y HAD LTSS FROM AIR EVAC X. SYS ERROR.

Narrative: I WAS WORKING THE LCL 2 POS WHEN THE CAB COORDINATOR GAVE ME A HEADS UP ON A MIL EVAC X THAT THE SATELLITE CTLR IN THE TRACON WAS WORKING WHO WOULD BE COMING TO LAND ON RWY 14 AT BUCKLEY ANG BASE (BKF) 2 MI SE OF STAPLETON ON A VISUAL APCH. I TOLD THE CAB COORDINATOR THAT I WANTED X TO FLY RIGHT OVER RWY 8 IN ORDER TO STAY WITH THE FLOW OF OUR DEPS. WE WERE LNDG ON RWY 17 AND DEPARTING RWY 8 AT THE TIME. I ALSO QUESTIONED WHY X WAS ON A VISUAL APCH WHEN WE WERE BELOW VISUAL MINIMUMS AND THAT WE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO PROVIDE VISUAL SEPARATION. HE TOLD ME THEY (THE TRACON) WOULD NOT DO THAT, AND THAT THEY WOULD CALL US WHEN HE WAS CLOSER. A MIN LATER THE CAB COORDINATOR TOLD ME THAT THE C-9 WAS 2 MI S OF BKF. WHEN I LOOKED AT THE BRITE RADAR, I NOTICED THAT EVAC X WAS CRUISING AT 220 KTS AT 6800 FT MSL. REALIZING THE PROB SINCE I HAD ALREADY CLRED ACR Y (B-727) FOR TKOF, I TOLD THE CAB COORDINATOR THAT I WOULD PUT Y ON A 040 DEG HDG IMMEDIATELY AFTER TKOF TO AVOID EVAC X. Y TURNED IMMEDIATELY OFF THE RWY TO THE 040 DEG HDG. I EVENTUALLY TURNED HIM FURTHER N 010 DEGS TO PULL FURTHER AWAY FROM EVAC X. EVENTUALLY Y WAS PUT BACK ON COURSE OF A 065 DEG HDG TO RESUME HIS FLT. EVAC X CONCLUDED HIS FLT AND LANDED ON RWY 14 AT BKF. I WAS LATER INFORMED THAT AN OPERROR HAD BEEN CALLED ON THE TWR BY THE TRACON FOR THIS INCIDENT, WHICH IS STILL BEING INVESTIGATED. BOTH THE CAB COORDINATOR AND I HAVE BEEN TEMPORARILY DECERTIFIED AWAITING THE OUTCOME OF THE INVESTIGATION. NO ONE IN THE TRACON HAS BEEN DECERTIFIED FOR THIS EVEN THOUGH THEY HAD PUT AN ACFT IN THE TWR'S AIRSPACE WITHOUT PROPER COORD. THE CAB COORDINATOR WAS BUSY AT THE TIME TRYING TO RESOLVE ANOTHER PROB WITH ANOTHER CTLR WHO HAD JUST RECEIVED 2 ACFT FROM THE FINAL CTLR WITHOUT PROPER HVY JET SEPARATION THAT WERE LNDG ON RWY 17. THE TRACON CLAIMED THAT THEY DID COORDINATE THE INBOUND WITH THE CAB COORDINATOR. HOWEVER, THE VOICE TAPE RECORDING CLRLY SHOWS THE APPROVAL WAS NEVER GIVEN. THE CAB COORDINATOR WAS PARTIALLY AWARE OF THE SIT BUT NEVER GAVE APPROVAL, NOR DID I, THE LCL CTLR, GIVE APPROVAL FOR ANYONE TO ENTER MY AIRSPACE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.