Narrative:

This situation occurred at kansas city center. Kansas city approach control is temporarily being ran from ZKC. The mci controllers, of which I am one, are working approach control on the center radar. We are working on equipment which is very different from our normally used. We received very, very little instruction on this equipment. We are working on a radar scope that is missing range marks which are vital to approach control because they depict airspace, and we are working final radar without any final radar airspace depicted. On 11/X/91, I was working east radar when I received a handoff from the west radar controller on an airplane landing at satellite airport in my airspace. As per LOA, I descended the aircraft from 8000 ft to 5000 ft on initial contact. Air carrier X was in my airspace at 7000 ft and not displayed on my scope. The airplanes got 3.6 mi at 800 ft apart. Normally this would be adequate separation but we are working under center separation rules which requires 5 mi. This situation we are working under and have been working under is very dangerous. We have airplanes in each others airspace nd are working on different equipment with different rules in effect. Since this began on 9/X/91, there have been 3 operrors reported. Several times airplanes have been turned, climbed or descended at the last moment to avoid a conflict. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information. The mci plans and procedures specialist stated the facility had 3 hours to evacuate/evacuation and begin operations at ZKC due to asbestos hazard. The center assigned a qualified controller to make keyboard entries to the computer for several days. The center area manager required approach controllers to use 5 mi radar separation because of the digital equipment in use. There was some conflict between center and approach control supervisors on the use of standard approach control rules and separation. This was later resolved except the 5 mi radar separation which the center insisted on. Approach control was returned to mci in dec. Supplemental information from acn 193896. Approach control services were transferred to ZKC in olathe, ks. We have OPERATED2 scopes split east and west with a D side open to assist the radar controller during busy periods. After about 4 weeks a third scope was made available across the ailse for a satellite or final radar position to be used when traffic dictated. On 11/91 I was working the final radar position with moderate to heavy traffic. The WX was (-X M 6ARC 1/2 s-f). We were using the ILS il approach at mci. I had been instructed to provide a min of 7 mi spacing between arriving aircraft so that the tower which had no radar could get departures off. In order to accomplish this spacing requirement and ensure a smooth flow of traffic aircraft where being positioned and handed off to me on downwind legs at 7000 ft MSL coming from the east and west position. Air carrier X was handed off to me 5 mi east F mci at 7000 ft. At the time I had 8 other aircraft on the downwinds, on base leg or on the final approach course. Final radar at ZKC has no airspace depicted on our radar maps. The practice we have used from the start has been to leave final radars traffic at 7000 on downwind and above 5000 until approximately 20 mi south of mci to allow the east or west radar positions to tunnel beneath final radars aircraft, there is no official written procedure on how to operate when final radar is open at ZKC. I turned air carrier X base leg 25 mi sse of mci shortly thereafter a conflict alert flashed on my screen and I observed cpr Y data tag 4-5 mi east of air carrier X at 7600 ft descending northbound since we have been at ZKC we must use 5 mi lateral or 1000 ft vertical separation instead of 3 mi lateral that we use at mci tower. I was relieved of my position 10 min later and advised that an operational error has occurred and was being investigated. After reviewing the data it was determined that the 'D' side controller at the east radar position had dropped track on air carrier X data tag 6 mins prior to the incident. The controller explained he had done so to reduce clutter so that the radar controller could better keep track of the aircraft he was working. Unlike mci tower at ZKC when a track is dropped the only thing that remains is a verquile (1) symbol at the aircraft's position. The radar east personthat had been working air carrier X prior to handing him off to me had been relieved of his position and the new controller was unaware that air carrier X tag had been dropped. Since the beginning this has been a 'control by the seat of your pants operation' and a controller's nightmare. We as a group were thrown into a situation for which we had no training or forewarning. The ZKC radar display and the computer entries used are totally different than what we are used to at mci tower. Flow control has been used from the start however everyday there are times when we are made to handle too many aircraft with equipment and procedures that cause a dramatic increase in complexity. After working at ZKC 3 weeks we were given 3 hours classroom training on how to use the computer keyboard we had been using and learning on our own all along. We were then certified on ZKC equipment when we felt comfortable. Again, this was 3 weeks after we had been working the positions without being certified. Supplemental information from acn 193819. Air carrier X was vectored to a downwind leg for runway 1 and was put in trail of approximately 7 other aircraft and slowed to 190 KTS. At the same time I was vectoring between 6 to 8 aircraft to runway 3 ILS at the mkc airport. Sector 96 was pen at this and working final to runway 1 at mci. Air carrier X was handed off to final (sector 96) on a downwind 6 mi east of mci at 7000 ft. I shipped the aircraft to final approximately 5 mi north of mkc VOR. I was relieved on the position. According to center documents, air carrier X data tag dropped off of sector 44's scope, due to an entry that the manual controller at sector 44 made. Sector 44 started descending out of 8000 down to 5000 going into mkc airport. The supervisor came over to remind sector 44 about but they had already lost 5 mi (center required) separation. Closest points were 3.5 lateral, 800 vertical and 4.0 lateral, 600 vertical.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CPR Y WAS DSNDED THROUGH OCCUPIED ALT OF ACR X WITH LTSS. SITUATION: MCI APCH CTL BEING WORKED AT ZKC CENTER DUE TO EMER EVAC OF FACILITY BECAUSE OF ASBESTOS HAZARD.

Narrative: THIS SITUATION OCCURRED AT KANSAS CITY CENTER. KANSAS CITY APCH CTL IS TEMPORARILY BEING RAN FROM ZKC. THE MCI CTLRS, OF WHICH I AM ONE, ARE WORKING APCH CTL ON THE CENTER RADAR. WE ARE WORKING ON EQUIP WHICH IS VERY DIFFERENT FROM OUR NORMALLY USED. WE RECEIVED VERY, VERY LITTLE INSTRUCTION ON THIS EQUIP. WE ARE WORKING ON A RADAR SCOPE THAT IS MISSING RANGE MARKS WHICH ARE VITAL TO APCH CTL BECAUSE THEY DEPICT AIRSPACE, AND WE ARE WORKING FINAL RADAR WITHOUT ANY FINAL RADAR AIRSPACE DEPICTED. ON 11/X/91, I WAS WORKING E RADAR WHEN I RECEIVED A HDOF FROM THE W RADAR CTLR ON AN AIRPLANE LNDG AT SATELLITE ARPT IN MY AIRSPACE. AS PER LOA, I DSNDED THE ACFT FROM 8000 FT TO 5000 FT ON INITIAL CONTACT. ACR X WAS IN MY AIRSPACE AT 7000 FT AND NOT DISPLAYED ON MY SCOPE. THE AIRPLANES GOT 3.6 MI AT 800 FT APART. NORMALLY THIS WOULD BE ADEQUATE SEPARATION BUT WE ARE WORKING UNDER CENTER SEPARATION RULES WHICH REQUIRES 5 MI. THIS SITUATION WE ARE WORKING UNDER AND HAVE BEEN WORKING UNDER IS VERY DANGEROUS. WE HAVE AIRPLANES IN EACH OTHERS AIRSPACE ND ARE WORKING ON DIFFERENT EQUIP WITH DIFFERENT RULES IN EFFECT. SINCE THIS BEGAN ON 9/X/91, THERE HAVE BEEN 3 OPERRORS RPTED. SEVERAL TIMES AIRPLANES HAVE BEEN TURNED, CLBED OR DSNDED AT THE LAST MOMENT TO AVOID A CONFLICT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO. THE MCI PLANS AND PROCS SPECIALIST STATED THE FACILITY HAD 3 HRS TO EVAC AND BEGIN OPS AT ZKC DUE TO ASBESTOS HAZARD. THE CENTER ASSIGNED A QUALIFIED CTLR TO MAKE KEYBOARD ENTRIES TO THE COMPUTER FOR SEVERAL DAYS. THE CENTER AREA MGR REQUIRED APCH CTLRS TO USE 5 MI RADAR SEPARATION BECAUSE OF THE DIGITAL EQUIP IN USE. THERE WAS SOME CONFLICT BTWN CENTER AND APCH CTL SUPVRS ON THE USE OF STANDARD APCH CTL RULES AND SEPARATION. THIS WAS LATER RESOLVED EXCEPT THE 5 MI RADAR SEPARATION WHICH THE CENTER INSISTED ON. APCH CTL WAS RETURNED TO MCI IN DEC. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 193896. APCH CTL SVCS WERE TRANSFERRED TO ZKC IN OLATHE, KS. WE HAVE OPERATED2 SCOPES SPLIT E AND W WITH A D SIDE OPEN TO ASSIST THE RADAR CTLR DURING BUSY PERIODS. AFTER ABOUT 4 WKS A THIRD SCOPE WAS MADE AVAILABLE ACROSS THE AILSE FOR A SATELLITE OR FINAL RADAR POS TO BE USED WHEN TFC DICTATED. ON 11/91 I WAS WORKING THE FINAL RADAR POS WITH MODERATE TO HVY TFC. THE WX WAS (-X M 6ARC 1/2 S-F). WE WERE USING THE ILS IL APCH AT MCI. I HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO PROVIDE A MIN OF 7 MI SPACING BTWN ARRIVING ACFT SO THAT THE TWR WHICH HAD NO RADAR COULD GET DEPS OFF. IN ORDER TO ACCOMPLISH THIS SPACING REQUIREMENT AND ENSURE A SMOOTH FLOW OF TFC ACFT WHERE BEING POSITIONED AND HANDED OFF TO ME ON DOWNWIND LEGS AT 7000 FT MSL COMING FROM THE E AND W POS. ACR X WAS HANDED OFF TO ME 5 MI E F MCI AT 7000 FT. AT THE TIME I HAD 8 OTHER ACFT ON THE DOWNWINDS, ON BASE LEG OR ON THE FINAL APCH COURSE. FINAL RADAR AT ZKC HAS NO AIRSPACE DEPICTED ON OUR RADAR MAPS. THE PRACTICE WE HAVE USED FROM THE START HAS BEEN TO LEAVE FINAL RADARS TFC AT 7000 ON DOWNWIND AND ABOVE 5000 UNTIL APPROX 20 MI S OF MCI TO ALLOW THE E OR W RADAR POSITIONS TO TUNNEL BENEATH FINAL RADARS ACFT, THERE IS NO OFFICIAL WRITTEN PROC ON HOW TO OPERATE WHEN FINAL RADAR IS OPEN AT ZKC. I TURNED ACR X BASE LEG 25 MI SSE OF MCI SHORTLY THEREAFTER A CONFLICT ALERT FLASHED ON MY SCREEN AND I OBSERVED CPR Y DATA TAG 4-5 MI E OF ACR X AT 7600 FT DSNDING NBOUND SINCE WE HAVE BEEN AT ZKC WE MUST USE 5 MI LATERAL OR 1000 FT VERT SEPARATION INSTEAD OF 3 MI LATERAL THAT WE USE AT MCI TWR. I WAS RELIEVED OF MY POS 10 MIN LATER AND ADVISED THAT AN OPERROR HAS OCCURRED AND WAS BEING INVESTIGATED. AFTER REVIEWING THE DATA IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE 'D' SIDE CTLR AT THE E RADAR POS HAD DROPPED TRACK ON ACR X DATA TAG 6 MINS PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT. THE CTLR EXPLAINED HE HAD DONE SO TO REDUCE CLUTTER SO THAT THE RADAR CTLR COULD BETTER KEEP TRACK OF THE ACFT HE WAS WORKING. UNLIKE MCI TWR AT ZKC WHEN A TRACK IS DROPPED THE ONLY THING THAT REMAINS IS A VERQUILE (1) SYMBOL AT THE ACFT'S POS. THE RADAR E PERSONTHAT HAD BEEN WORKING ACR X PRIOR TO HANDING HIM OFF TO ME HAD BEEN RELIEVED OF HIS POS AND THE NEW CTLR WAS UNAWARE THAT ACR X TAG HAD BEEN DROPPED. SINCE THE BEGINNING THIS HAS BEEN A 'CTL BY THE SEAT OF YOUR PANTS OP' AND A CTLR'S NIGHTMARE. WE AS A GROUP WERE THROWN INTO A SITUATION FOR WHICH WE HAD NO TRAINING OR FOREWARNING. THE ZKC RADAR DISPLAY AND THE COMPUTER ENTRIES USED ARE TOTALLY DIFFERENT THAN WHAT WE ARE USED TO AT MCI TWR. FLOW CTL HAS BEEN USED FROM THE START HOWEVER EVERYDAY THERE ARE TIMES WHEN WE ARE MADE TO HANDLE TOO MANY ACFT WITH EQUIP AND PROCS THAT CAUSE A DRAMATIC INCREASE IN COMPLEXITY. AFTER WORKING AT ZKC 3 WKS WE WERE GIVEN 3 HRS CLASSROOM TRAINING ON HOW TO USE THE COMPUTER KEYBOARD WE HAD BEEN USING AND LEARNING ON OUR OWN ALL ALONG. WE WERE THEN CERTIFIED ON ZKC EQUIP WHEN WE FELT COMFORTABLE. AGAIN, THIS WAS 3 WKS AFTER WE HAD BEEN WORKING THE POSITIONS WITHOUT BEING CERTIFIED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 193819. ACR X WAS VECTORED TO A DOWNWIND LEG FOR RWY 1 AND WAS PUT IN TRAIL OF APPROX 7 OTHER ACFT AND SLOWED TO 190 KTS. AT THE SAME TIME I WAS VECTORING BTWN 6 TO 8 ACFT TO RWY 3 ILS AT THE MKC ARPT. SECTOR 96 WAS PEN AT THIS AND WORKING FINAL TO RWY 1 AT MCI. ACR X WAS HANDED OFF TO FINAL (SECTOR 96) ON A DOWNWIND 6 MI E OF MCI AT 7000 FT. I SHIPPED THE ACFT TO FINAL APPROX 5 MI N OF MKC VOR. I WAS RELIEVED ON THE POS. ACCORDING TO CENTER DOCUMENTS, ACR X DATA TAG DROPPED OFF OF SECTOR 44'S SCOPE, DUE TO AN ENTRY THAT THE MANUAL CTLR AT SECTOR 44 MADE. SECTOR 44 STARTED DSNDING OUT OF 8000 DOWN TO 5000 GOING INTO MKC ARPT. THE SUPVR CAME OVER TO REMIND SECTOR 44 ABOUT BUT THEY HAD ALREADY LOST 5 MI (CENTER REQUIRED) SEPARATION. CLOSEST POINTS WERE 3.5 LATERAL, 800 VERT AND 4.0 LATERAL, 600 VERT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.