Narrative:

In reviewing recent articles in the aviation safety journal, other pubs, and now the DOT/FAA advisory of dec/22/93, I have concluded that proper emphasis on the seriousness of the problem is not being addressed. Wishey- washey terminology in the FAA advisory, such as: 'one or more of 4 incidents may have been,' 'reduce the possibility,' 'anticipating conditions conductive to,' 'pilot to adjust flight path,' etc, has prompted me to speak out. Doubling separation on final and reclassifying the 757 as heavy is nice, but it will not prevent future disasters. Our company's gulfstream iv departed teterboro (teb), nj, on a routine night trip to fort myers (fmy), fl, with a crew of 3 and 2 passenger, the company's chairman and his wife. The trip was cavu with smooth air, with 1 major exception, from takeoff to landing. The jet streams were respectfully far north and south of our route of flight. The chairman had a severe headcold, so we step climbed the aircraft to FL450 so the cabin could be brought up to 6000 ft at 150 FPM. Conversely, we planned to initiate our descent into fmy 230 NM north (100 NM further than normal) to provide more time to bring the cabin down slowly. At approximately FL250 south of sarasota on SID, ZMA advised us we might see traffic crossing from right to left, 757 traffic en route to miami. We spotted the 757 cross so far ahead (no factor), we did not bother to acknowledge visual contact. It was a clear 950 mi visibility) night. We watched highlights disappear across central florida. Suddenly at about 15000 ft and 300 KTS, we hit what I thought was another aircraft, or we had an explosion onboard the aircraft. We still seemed to be flying and realized we still had control of the aircraft. The shock was something I have never experienced in my 19,964 hours of flight time or in any other physical encounter. It felt like we hit a 20 ft thick concrete wall at 300 KTS. Fortunately we had completed the descent-in-range checklist. We were harnessed and the cabin seat belt sign was on. Everything in the cockpit that could move, did -- manuals, clipboard, maintrecord, etc, even the steel approach plate holder secured on the yoke came up and hit me in the face. I thought we had a momentary total power failure, but that was not the case. We slowed to 200 KTS because we were still unsure of damage to the gulfstream. I went back to check on the cabin and passenger, and upon opening the door all the horror of total disaster was there. Debris was everywhere, broken china, smashed crystal glassware, silverware, even the stowed tray tables had lifted out of the side cabinets and traveled around the cabin. More importantly, the flight attendant was injured and the chairman's wife lay on the floor in severe pain. Both had been jettisoned to the ceiling then slammed to the floor in a microsecond. I called ahead for an ambulance and asked fmy approval for special landing priority for medical emergency. The following morning, the aircraft was inspected for structural damage and none was found. The chairman's wife 12TH and 14TH vertebrae were broken and total recovery took a full yr. The flight attendant was treated and released with severe bruises. I have provided a lot of detail here to try to convey how severely devastating this shock/impact effected a 53000 pound aircraft. It is certainly a compliment to the structural integrity of a gulfstream which we corporate pilots consider as heavy iron. Any other corporate aircraft or a higher airspeed on our part may have done irreparable harm and driven the NTSB crazy trying to determine the cause of such a disaster. We talked with ZMA controller and supervisor and they said it would be impossible to receive wake turbulence from that 757 even in still air because we passed more than 25-30 mi behind him. They did indicate that a conversation took place with the 757 crew about their high airspeed (cruise descent). They replied 'trying to make up some time.' this brings me to my point that extra separation in the immediate terminal control area at slow speed may be the least of a very serious overall problem. The high speed 757's may provide many times more severe wake turbulence during high speed segments of stars and sids than on final. Distance from crossing a 757 path may be insignificant in still air and altitude separation may be the only safeguard. Until boeing adds some surface or aerodynamic modifications, all air traffic controllers should supply altitude separation or parallel course routing. Air traffic controllers should advise all other aircraft specifically that 757 traffic is ahead of crossing ahead with distance and altitude information. The aviation community should be made aware, without reservation, that we have a dead-serious problem here with 757 wake turbulence. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter states he is sending this report 2 yrs after the vent because of recent articles regarding 757 wake turbulence. One concern is that all of the concentration seems to be on final approach and low altitude areas. This incident occurred at 15000 ft in absolutely clear, still air and 5 mi behind the aircraft. High speed sits may be just as devasting, if not more so, than at low speed. Reporter comments regarding boeing were prompted by information he has seen regarding boeing wind tunnel tests to determine why the 757 wing creates this wake turbulence and others do not. He also suggested that information be distributed world wide, not just through FAA as he had an intrail approach with a 757 in santiago with no advisory from ATC. He will send a copy of this report to NTSB.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CORP JET ENCOUNTERS 757 WAKE TURB, HAS LOSS OF ACFT CTL AND PAX INJURIES.

Narrative: IN REVIEWING RECENT ARTICLES IN THE AVIATION SAFETY JOURNAL, OTHER PUBS, AND NOW THE DOT/FAA ADVISORY OF DEC/22/93, I HAVE CONCLUDED THAT PROPER EMPHASIS ON THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE PROB IS NOT BEING ADDRESSED. WISHEY- WASHEY TERMINOLOGY IN THE FAA ADVISORY, SUCH AS: 'ONE OR MORE OF 4 INCIDENTS MAY HAVE BEEN,' 'REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY,' 'ANTICIPATING CONDITIONS CONDUCTIVE TO,' 'PLT TO ADJUST FLT PATH,' ETC, HAS PROMPTED ME TO SPEAK OUT. DOUBLING SEPARATION ON FINAL AND RECLASSIFYING THE 757 AS HVY IS NICE, BUT IT WILL NOT PREVENT FUTURE DISASTERS. OUR COMPANY'S GULFSTREAM IV DEPARTED TETERBORO (TEB), NJ, ON A ROUTINE NIGHT TRIP TO FORT MYERS (FMY), FL, WITH A CREW OF 3 AND 2 PAX, THE COMPANY'S CHAIRMAN AND HIS WIFE. THE TRIP WAS CAVU WITH SMOOTH AIR, WITH 1 MAJOR EXCEPTION, FROM TKOF TO LNDG. THE JET STREAMS WERE RESPECTFULLY FAR N AND S OF OUR RTE OF FLT. THE CHAIRMAN HAD A SEVERE HEADCOLD, SO WE STEP CLBED THE ACFT TO FL450 SO THE CABIN COULD BE BROUGHT UP TO 6000 FT AT 150 FPM. CONVERSELY, WE PLANNED TO INITIATE OUR DSCNT INTO FMY 230 NM N (100 NM FURTHER THAN NORMAL) TO PROVIDE MORE TIME TO BRING THE CABIN DOWN SLOWLY. AT APPROX FL250 S OF SARASOTA ON SID, ZMA ADVISED US WE MIGHT SEE TFC XING FROM R TO L, 757 TFC ENRTE TO MIAMI. WE SPOTTED THE 757 CROSS SO FAR AHEAD (NO FACTOR), WE DID NOT BOTHER TO ACKNOWLEDGE VISUAL CONTACT. IT WAS A CLR 950 MI VISIBILITY) NIGHT. WE WATCHED HIGHLIGHTS DISAPPEAR ACROSS CENTRAL FLORIDA. SUDDENLY AT ABOUT 15000 FT AND 300 KTS, WE HIT WHAT I THOUGHT WAS ANOTHER ACFT, OR WE HAD AN EXPLOSION ONBOARD THE ACFT. WE STILL SEEMED TO BE FLYING AND REALIZED WE STILL HAD CTL OF THE ACFT. THE SHOCK WAS SOMETHING I HAVE NEVER EXPERIENCED IN MY 19,964 HRS OF FLT TIME OR IN ANY OTHER PHYSICAL ENCOUNTER. IT FELT LIKE WE HIT A 20 FT THICK CONCRETE WALL AT 300 KTS. FORTUNATELY WE HAD COMPLETED THE DSCNT-IN-RANGE CHKLIST. WE WERE HARNESSED AND THE CABIN SEAT BELT SIGN WAS ON. EVERYTHING IN THE COCKPIT THAT COULD MOVE, DID -- MANUALS, CLIPBOARD, MAINTRECORD, ETC, EVEN THE STEEL APCH PLATE HOLDER SECURED ON THE YOKE CAME UP AND HIT ME IN THE FACE. I THOUGHT WE HAD A MOMENTARY TOTAL PWR FAILURE, BUT THAT WAS NOT THE CASE. WE SLOWED TO 200 KTS BECAUSE WE WERE STILL UNSURE OF DAMAGE TO THE GULFSTREAM. I WENT BACK TO CHK ON THE CABIN AND PAX, AND UPON OPENING THE DOOR ALL THE HORROR OF TOTAL DISASTER WAS THERE. DEBRIS WAS EVERYWHERE, BROKEN CHINA, SMASHED CRYSTAL GLASSWARE, SILVERWARE, EVEN THE STOWED TRAY TABLES HAD LIFTED OUT OF THE SIDE CABINETS AND TRAVELED AROUND THE CABIN. MORE IMPORTANTLY, THE FLT ATTENDANT WAS INJURED AND THE CHAIRMAN'S WIFE LAY ON THE FLOOR IN SEVERE PAIN. BOTH HAD BEEN JETTISONED TO THE CEILING THEN SLAMMED TO THE FLOOR IN A MICROSECOND. I CALLED AHEAD FOR AN AMBULANCE AND ASKED FMY APPROVAL FOR SPECIAL LNDG PRIORITY FOR MEDICAL EMER. THE FOLLOWING MORNING, THE ACFT WAS INSPECTED FOR STRUCTURAL DAMAGE AND NONE WAS FOUND. THE CHAIRMAN'S WIFE 12TH AND 14TH VERTEBRAE WERE BROKEN AND TOTAL RECOVERY TOOK A FULL YR. THE FLT ATTENDANT WAS TREATED AND RELEASED WITH SEVERE BRUISES. I HAVE PROVIDED A LOT OF DETAIL HERE TO TRY TO CONVEY HOW SEVERELY DEVASTATING THIS SHOCK/IMPACT EFFECTED A 53000 LB ACFT. IT IS CERTAINLY A COMPLIMENT TO THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF A GULFSTREAM WHICH WE CORPORATE PLTS CONSIDER AS HVY IRON. ANY OTHER CORPORATE ACFT OR A HIGHER AIRSPD ON OUR PART MAY HAVE DONE IRREPARABLE HARM AND DRIVEN THE NTSB CRAZY TRYING TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE OF SUCH A DISASTER. WE TALKED WITH ZMA CTLR AND SUPVR AND THEY SAID IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO RECEIVE WAKE TURB FROM THAT 757 EVEN IN STILL AIR BECAUSE WE PASSED MORE THAN 25-30 MI BEHIND HIM. THEY DID INDICATE THAT A CONVERSATION TOOK PLACE WITH THE 757 CREW ABOUT THEIR HIGH AIRSPD (CRUISE DSCNT). THEY REPLIED 'TRYING TO MAKE UP SOME TIME.' THIS BRINGS ME TO MY POINT THAT EXTRA SEPARATION IN THE IMMEDIATE TERMINAL CTL AREA AT SLOW SPD MAY BE THE LEAST OF A VERY SERIOUS OVERALL PROB. THE HIGH SPD 757'S MAY PROVIDE MANY TIMES MORE SEVERE WAKE TURB DURING HIGH SPD SEGMENTS OF STARS AND SIDS THAN ON FINAL. DISTANCE FROM XING A 757 PATH MAY BE INSIGNIFICANT IN STILL AIR AND ALT SEPARATION MAY BE THE ONLY SAFEGUARD. UNTIL BOEING ADDS SOME SURFACE OR AERODYNAMIC MODIFICATIONS, ALL AIR TFC CTLRS SHOULD SUPPLY ALT SEPARATION OR PARALLEL COURSE ROUTING. AIR TFC CTLRS SHOULD ADVISE ALL OTHER ACFT SPECIFICALLY THAT 757 TFC IS AHEAD OF XING AHEAD WITH DISTANCE AND ALT INFO. THE AVIATION COMMUNITY SHOULD BE MADE AWARE, WITHOUT RESERVATION, THAT WE HAVE A DEAD-SERIOUS PROB HERE WITH 757 WAKE TURB. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATES HE IS SENDING THIS RPT 2 YRS AFTER THE VENT BECAUSE OF RECENT ARTICLES REGARDING 757 WAKE TURB. ONE CONCERN IS THAT ALL OF THE CONCENTRATION SEEMS TO BE ON FINAL APCH AND LOW ALT AREAS. THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED AT 15000 FT IN ABSOLUTELY CLR, STILL AIR AND 5 MI BEHIND THE ACFT. HIGH SPD SITS MAY BE JUST AS DEVASTING, IF NOT MORE SO, THAN AT LOW SPD. RPTR COMMENTS REGARDING BOEING WERE PROMPTED BY INFO HE HAS SEEN REGARDING BOEING WIND TUNNEL TESTS TO DETERMINE WHY THE 757 WING CREATES THIS WAKE TURB AND OTHERS DO NOT. HE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT INFO BE DISTRIBUTED WORLD WIDE, NOT JUST THROUGH FAA AS HE HAD AN INTRAIL APCH WITH A 757 IN SANTIAGO WITH NO ADVISORY FROM ATC. HE WILL SEND A COPY OF THIS RPT TO NTSB.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.