Narrative:

Aircraft type dehavilland dash 8. We received aircraft in clt. The maintenance log showed the anti-skid MEL'ed and 3 days prior on mar/xx/94 the #1 electronic control unit (ecu) which controls 25 percent of the fuel flow, as well as performing other functions, had failed in-flight. Maintenance provided corrective action that day. We left clt and en route to phf at 1700 ft cruise flight, the torque fluctuated plus or minus 15 percent and the fuel flow fluctuated plus or minus 15 pph. On the descent into phf at 11000 ft as power was increased the #1 engine torque rolled back and was unresponsive to increased power selection. A #1 engine manual caution light came on indicating a failure of the #1 ecu. I, as the PF, restored power to match the #1 torque to the #2 torque and called for the ecu failure checklist. After completing the checklist, I, as the PIC, considered that with the anti-skid inoperative as well as wet runways, thunderstorms, and variable winds at the destination to declare an emergency. I was concerned about directional control on the runway since the #1 engine would have grater power, the #2 engine would be the only engine providing reverse and use of the brakes without anti- skid on a wet runway would require great care. We rolled out and cleared the runway without incident. The only corrective action I would offer would be greater attention to fixing an ecu failure by maintenance especially if the aircraft (dash 8) is to be dispatched with the anti-skid inoperative. An airline is not permitted to dispatch a dash 8 under far part 121 with an ecu inoperative and anti-skid inoperative (they are incompatible).

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF AN MDT ACR ACFT DECLARED AN EMER WHILE DSNDING DUE TO 1 ENG ELECTRONIC FUEL CTLR AND ANTI-SKID BRAKING SYS WERE INOP AND WET RWY AND GUSTY WINDS WOULD CAUSE DIRECTIONAL CTL PROBS DURING LNDG.

Narrative: ACFT TYPE DEHAVILLAND DASH 8. WE RECEIVED ACFT IN CLT. THE MAINT LOG SHOWED THE ANTI-SKID MEL'ED AND 3 DAYS PRIOR ON MAR/XX/94 THE #1 ELECTRONIC CTL UNIT (ECU) WHICH CTLS 25 PERCENT OF THE FUEL FLOW, AS WELL AS PERFORMING OTHER FUNCTIONS, HAD FAILED INFLT. MAINT PROVIDED CORRECTIVE ACTION THAT DAY. WE LEFT CLT AND ENRTE TO PHF AT 1700 FT CRUISE FLT, THE TORQUE FLUCTUATED PLUS OR MINUS 15 PERCENT AND THE FUEL FLOW FLUCTUATED PLUS OR MINUS 15 PPH. ON THE DSCNT INTO PHF AT 11000 FT AS PWR WAS INCREASED THE #1 ENG TORQUE ROLLED BACK AND WAS UNRESPONSIVE TO INCREASED PWR SELECTION. A #1 ENG MANUAL CAUTION LIGHT CAME ON INDICATING A FAILURE OF THE #1 ECU. I, AS THE PF, RESTORED PWR TO MATCH THE #1 TORQUE TO THE #2 TORQUE AND CALLED FOR THE ECU FAILURE CHKLIST. AFTER COMPLETING THE CHKLIST, I, AS THE PIC, CONSIDERED THAT WITH THE ANTI-SKID INOP AS WELL AS WET RWYS, TSTMS, AND VARIABLE WINDS AT THE DEST TO DECLARE AN EMER. I WAS CONCERNED ABOUT DIRECTIONAL CTL ON THE RWY SINCE THE #1 ENG WOULD HAVE GRATER PWR, THE #2 ENG WOULD BE THE ONLY ENG PROVIDING REVERSE AND USE OF THE BRAKES WITHOUT ANTI- SKID ON A WET RWY WOULD REQUIRE GREAT CARE. WE ROLLED OUT AND CLRED THE RWY WITHOUT INCIDENT. THE ONLY CORRECTIVE ACTION I WOULD OFFER WOULD BE GREATER ATTN TO FIXING AN ECU FAILURE BY MAINT ESPECIALLY IF THE ACFT (DASH 8) IS TO BE DISPATCHED WITH THE ANTI-SKID INOP. AN AIRLINE IS NOT PERMITTED TO DISPATCH A DASH 8 UNDER FAR PART 121 WITH AN ECU INOP AND ANTI-SKID INOP (THEY ARE INCOMPATIBLE).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.