Narrative:

My flight was perfect until I was cleared for a visual approach to runway 24R at lax. Prior to the turn I was approximately 7000 ft MSL and 250 KIAS. As I turned south on base I could see the airport out the first officer's window and then became preoccupied with getting the aircraft down and configured for the landing. I decided to 'square off' the turn to final to allow myself the time to get down. Still worried about getting down, I heard the tower controller call advisory traffic on approach to the south complex at lax. The first officer advised me to lower the gear. I agreed and asked for gear down. Later as we talked about it, that action was the first indicating that we were thinking about different things. He wanted me to slow down and start the turn. I was still worried about getting down. I commanded the autoplt to turn to a heading of 250 degrees and initiated VOR/localizer to intercept the localizer. The first officer advised me to increase the turn rate. I selected 25 degrees of bank and went back to worrying about my altitude. The TCASII went off and I looked up and saw a dc-10 on final for the south complex. I was above and behind him and I still felt 'comfortable.' the female tower controller raised her voice level 20-30 decibels and continued to call traffic. The TCASII was going off. The tower was alarmed and the first officer was now commanding a big turn. He visually found the baron that was flying an approach to runway 25R and told the tower that we would maintain visual separation. I finally woke up, disconnected the autoplt and rolled to 40 degrees of bank and quickly turned toward the north complex. The tower controller stopped yelling. The TCASII stopped squawking and the rest of the approach went fine. (Overshooting helped me get down.) what happened: 1) my comfort zone was too big. Flying a visual approach on a clear day is normally an easy, relaxed way to terminate a flight. A visual to lax should not be considered that way with multiple runways and aircraft. I became too preoccupied with the descent and not enough with the navigation to the final. I relied on the autoplt to turn the aircraft to final rather than proceed manually, which would have been quicker and more positive. The 'square off' maneuver invited an overshoot and was ill advised. The TCASII, while alerting me initially, became a distraction after I determined that the dc-10 was not a threat. I did not immediately know of the smaller aircraft. The aural warning distracted me from hearing/understanding the first officer. The first officer was alarmed earlier then I thought he had communicated effectively with his advice to lower the gear. As we passed the north complex he saw everything clearly and later chastised himself for not taking positive action at that time. The difference in time when he could have acted and I finally did wake up was approximately 15-30 seconds but it would have made a big difference. We most likely caused some alarm with the baron, most certainly with the tower controller and definitely ourselves. We learned some lessons and we'll try to pass them on to others. Supplemental information from acn 267174: he only half-heard my warnings about the overshoot since he did call for the landing gear and increase bank angle at my first warning, I assumed he understood the problem. We decided that we had both failed in our cockpit resource management skills. The captain was so busy worrying about his hot/high problem that he didn't listen closely to my warnings. I saw the whole thing coming, but assumed that the captain, whom I had flown with all month and whose skills I respected, saw the problem and would correct it. We both agreed that I should have called for the aircraft, disconnected the autoplt, and banked at whatever angle was necessary to avoid the runway 25R centerline comfortably. I should have mentally 'drawn a line' and when we crossed it, called for the aircraft without hesitation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TEXT INDICATES THAT THE PIC DEMONSTRATED POOR FLC PLANNING INFLT AND SUFFERED FROM FLC BEHAVIOR COMPLACENCY. HE EVIDENTLY DID NOT DSND HIS ACFT TOWARDS 3500 FT AFTER SMO VOR BUT MAINTAINED 7000 FT AS HE ENTERED THE TURN ON BASE LEG. NOT IN ACCORD WITH APCH PLATE, VISUAL APCH 24L AND 24R AT LAX. FLC DISTR TASK. CAPT WAS THINKING ALT AND FO WAS THINKING RATE OF TURN AND INTERCEPT OF THE LOC RWY CTRLINE. TALKING ABOUT 2 DIFFERENT THINGS AND LATER AGREED THAT COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT AND COCKPIT COORD MGMNT WAS OFF ON THAT APCH PROC. ONE COULD ASSUME AN ATTITUDE PROB BY NOTING HIS TEXT STARTING WITH, 'MY FLT WAS PERFECT UNTIL ....' THAT'S LIKE AN AUTHOR EXPECTING A PERFECT STORY BY STARTING OFF WITH, 'IT WAS A DARK AND STORMY NIGHT....' FLC TECHNIQUE FLYING SUSPECT. ALTDEV ALT UNDERSHOT. ACFT CONFIGN. MULTIPLE RWY OP PARALLEL RWYS. PHRASEOLOGY PROB IN THE COCKPIT.

Narrative: MY FLT WAS PERFECT UNTIL I WAS CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 24R AT LAX. PRIOR TO THE TURN I WAS APPROX 7000 FT MSL AND 250 KIAS. AS I TURNED S ON BASE I COULD SEE THE ARPT OUT THE FO'S WINDOW AND THEN BECAME PREOCCUPIED WITH GETTING THE ACFT DOWN AND CONFIGURED FOR THE LNDG. I DECIDED TO 'SQUARE OFF' THE TURN TO FINAL TO ALLOW MYSELF THE TIME TO GET DOWN. STILL WORRIED ABOUT GETTING DOWN, I HEARD THE TWR CTLR CALL ADVISORY TFC ON APCH TO THE S COMPLEX AT LAX. THE FO ADVISED ME TO LOWER THE GEAR. I AGREED AND ASKED FOR GEAR DOWN. LATER AS WE TALKED ABOUT IT, THAT ACTION WAS THE FIRST INDICATING THAT WE WERE THINKING ABOUT DIFFERENT THINGS. HE WANTED ME TO SLOW DOWN AND START THE TURN. I WAS STILL WORRIED ABOUT GETTING DOWN. I COMMANDED THE AUTOPLT TO TURN TO A HDG OF 250 DEGS AND INITIATED VOR/LOC TO INTERCEPT THE LOC. THE FO ADVISED ME TO INCREASE THE TURN RATE. I SELECTED 25 DEGS OF BANK AND WENT BACK TO WORRYING ABOUT MY ALT. THE TCASII WENT OFF AND I LOOKED UP AND SAW A DC-10 ON FINAL FOR THE S COMPLEX. I WAS ABOVE AND BEHIND HIM AND I STILL FELT 'COMFORTABLE.' THE FEMALE TWR CTLR RAISED HER VOICE LEVEL 20-30 DECIBELS AND CONTINUED TO CALL TFC. THE TCASII WAS GOING OFF. THE TWR WAS ALARMED AND THE FO WAS NOW COMMANDING A BIG TURN. HE VISUALLY FOUND THE BARON THAT WAS FLYING AN APCH TO RWY 25R AND TOLD THE TWR THAT WE WOULD MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION. I FINALLY WOKE UP, DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND ROLLED TO 40 DEGS OF BANK AND QUICKLY TURNED TOWARD THE N COMPLEX. THE TWR CTLR STOPPED YELLING. THE TCASII STOPPED SQUAWKING AND THE REST OF THE APCH WENT FINE. (OVERSHOOTING HELPED ME GET DOWN.) WHAT HAPPENED: 1) MY COMFORT ZONE WAS TOO BIG. FLYING A VISUAL APCH ON A CLR DAY IS NORMALLY AN EASY, RELAXED WAY TO TERMINATE A FLT. A VISUAL TO LAX SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED THAT WAY WITH MULTIPLE RWYS AND ACFT. I BECAME TOO PREOCCUPIED WITH THE DSCNT AND NOT ENOUGH WITH THE NAV TO THE FINAL. I RELIED ON THE AUTOPLT TO TURN THE ACFT TO FINAL RATHER THAN PROCEED MANUALLY, WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN QUICKER AND MORE POSITIVE. THE 'SQUARE OFF' MANEUVER INVITED AN OVERSHOOT AND WAS ILL ADVISED. THE TCASII, WHILE ALERTING ME INITIALLY, BECAME A DISTR AFTER I DETERMINED THAT THE DC-10 WAS NOT A THREAT. I DID NOT IMMEDIATELY KNOW OF THE SMALLER ACFT. THE AURAL WARNING DISTRACTED ME FROM HEARING/UNDERSTANDING THE FO. THE FO WAS ALARMED EARLIER THEN I THOUGHT HE HAD COMMUNICATED EFFECTIVELY WITH HIS ADVICE TO LOWER THE GEAR. AS WE PASSED THE N COMPLEX HE SAW EVERYTHING CLRLY AND LATER CHASTISED HIMSELF FOR NOT TAKING POSITIVE ACTION AT THAT TIME. THE DIFFERENCE IN TIME WHEN HE COULD HAVE ACTED AND I FINALLY DID WAKE UP WAS APPROX 15-30 SECONDS BUT IT WOULD HAVE MADE A BIG DIFFERENCE. WE MOST LIKELY CAUSED SOME ALARM WITH THE BARON, MOST CERTAINLY WITH THE TWR CTLR AND DEFINITELY OURSELVES. WE LEARNED SOME LESSONS AND WE'LL TRY TO PASS THEM ON TO OTHERS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 267174: HE ONLY HALF-HEARD MY WARNINGS ABOUT THE OVERSHOOT SINCE HE DID CALL FOR THE LNDG GEAR AND INCREASE BANK ANGLE AT MY FIRST WARNING, I ASSUMED HE UNDERSTOOD THE PROB. WE DECIDED THAT WE HAD BOTH FAILED IN OUR COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT SKILLS. THE CAPT WAS SO BUSY WORRYING ABOUT HIS HOT/HIGH PROB THAT HE DIDN'T LISTEN CLOSELY TO MY WARNINGS. I SAW THE WHOLE THING COMING, BUT ASSUMED THAT THE CAPT, WHOM I HAD FLOWN WITH ALL MONTH AND WHOSE SKILLS I RESPECTED, SAW THE PROB AND WOULD CORRECT IT. WE BOTH AGREED THAT I SHOULD HAVE CALLED FOR THE ACFT, DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT, AND BANKED AT WHATEVER ANGLE WAS NECESSARY TO AVOID THE RWY 25R CTRLINE COMFORTABLY. I SHOULD HAVE MENTALLY 'DRAWN A LINE' AND WHEN WE CROSSED IT, CALLED FOR THE ACFT WITHOUT HESITATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.