Narrative:

Our flight was proceeding normally from lea to mia at approximately PM30 local time, 200 NM north of mia, mia ARTCC advised that all aircraft on frequency would be routed over, thence south to approach mia from southeast for WX avoidance. I contacted the company flight dispatcher on voice at PM35, asking him if any problem to divert to fll if required. He had no WX advisories or special information and wasn't helpful or concerned. Forecast for mia and fll was for VMC with just chance of occasional 4 mi, light rain (typical). Fuel state, while not allowing for much holding time given diversion (maybe 10 mins hold fuel would be available), was safe and adequate. Reserve 45 min plus fuel to fll alternate was 5800 plus 1800 pound, total 7600 pound. We were switched to approach control and speed assigned 210 KTS about 35 NM from airport, but we were heading directly to mia so everything still looked ok. When about 15 NM from mia and fll, we were assigned further speed reduction to 180 KTS which necessitated deploying flaps and going to high drag, high fuel consumption. Things were not critical, but cells were scattered and building. When abeam mia, I passed on 'minimum fuel advisory', as fuel at that point was within several hundred pounds of 'reserve plus alternate' fuel. Vectored on approach about 10 NM final. Within 1-2 mins, WX went from 2 mi in rain/fog to RVR 3500, then below minimums (RVR 2400). 2 aircraft ahead went missed approach. Tower was now reporting visibility 1/8 mi. We were legal to continue approach because on final approach segment. At decision ht, saw approach lights, continued to approximately 120 ft and fog was worse--did not acquire lights required at 100 ft-- executed missed approach and declared emergency for low fuel (approximately 50-55 min fuel total remaining). Controllers expedited us to fll for uneventful landing. Fuel on landing 5500 pound, approximately 40 minutes endurance. Following chain of events led us to the outcome--however, in critiquing my decisions and actions, I must say that, having the WX forecasts and information that was available, I would not have diverted to alternate earlier. WX forecast for VMC: no reports from dispatch to the contrary. No timely report from approach control that WX was deteriorating rapidly (first RVR notification was the drop to RVR 3500). No expectation from any source that WX would get bad. I was very careful to clearly and precisely pass on a 'minimum fuel advisory' to ATC, knowing the meaning verbatim in the pilot-controller lexicon. Unfortunately, as I thought might happen, the third arrival controller was under the impression we had declared and emergency at that time and I had to correct her. Likewise, worthy of note was the fact that after declaring an emergency on missed approach, it was clear that our emergency status was not passed on to next sector 2 times. We informed new sector of our declaration of emergency on 2 subsequent frequency changes. We did not squawk 7700 and the controllers were very busy with the rapidly changing and deteriorating traffic situation. Other than communication ambiguities, they all did a superb job.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR LGT HAD TO DECLARE A FUEL EMER DUE TO RAPIDLY DETERIORATING WX.

Narrative: OUR FLT WAS PROCEEDING NORMALLY FROM LEA TO MIA AT APPROX PM30 LCL TIME, 200 NM N OF MIA, MIA ARTCC ADVISED THAT ALL ACFT ON FREQ WOULD BE ROUTED OVER, THENCE S TO APCH MIA FROM SE FOR WX AVOIDANCE. I CONTACTED THE COMPANY FLT DISPATCHER ON VOICE AT PM35, ASKING HIM IF ANY PROB TO DIVERT TO FLL IF REQUIRED. HE HAD NO WX ADVISORIES OR SPECIAL INFO AND WASN'T HELPFUL OR CONCERNED. FORECAST FOR MIA AND FLL WAS FOR VMC WITH JUST CHANCE OF OCCASIONAL 4 MI, LIGHT RAIN (TYPICAL). FUEL STATE, WHILE NOT ALLOWING FOR MUCH HOLDING TIME GIVEN DIVERSION (MAYBE 10 MINS HOLD FUEL WOULD BE AVAILABLE), WAS SAFE AND ADEQUATE. RESERVE 45 MIN PLUS FUEL TO FLL ALTERNATE WAS 5800 PLUS 1800 LB, TOTAL 7600 LB. WE WERE SWITCHED TO APCH CTL AND SPD ASSIGNED 210 KTS ABOUT 35 NM FROM ARPT, BUT WE WERE HEADING DIRECTLY TO MIA SO EVERYTHING STILL LOOKED OK. WHEN ABOUT 15 NM FROM MIA AND FLL, WE WERE ASSIGNED FURTHER SPD REDUCTION TO 180 KTS WHICH NECESSITATED DEPLOYING FLAPS AND GOING TO HIGH DRAG, HIGH FUEL CONSUMPTION. THINGS WERE NOT CRITICAL, BUT CELLS WERE SCATTERED AND BUILDING. WHEN ABEAM MIA, I PASSED ON 'MINIMUM FUEL ADVISORY', AS FUEL AT THAT POINT WAS WITHIN SEVERAL HUNDRED LBS OF 'RESERVE PLUS ALTERNATE' FUEL. VECTORED ON APCH ABOUT 10 NM FINAL. WITHIN 1-2 MINS, WX WENT FROM 2 MI IN RAIN/FOG TO RVR 3500, THEN BELOW MINIMUMS (RVR 2400). 2 ACFT AHEAD WENT MISSED APCH. TWR WAS NOW RPTING VISIBILITY 1/8 MI. WE WERE LEGAL TO CONTINUE APCH BECAUSE ON FINAL APCH SEGMENT. AT DECISION HT, SAW APCH LIGHTS, CONTINUED TO APPROX 120 FT AND FOG WAS WORSE--DID NOT ACQUIRE LIGHTS REQUIRED AT 100 FT-- EXECUTED MISSED APCH AND DECLARED EMER FOR LOW FUEL (APPROX 50-55 MIN FUEL TOTAL REMAINING). CTLRS EXPEDITED US TO FLL FOR UNEVENTFUL LNDG. FUEL ON LNDG 5500 LB, APPROX 40 MINUTES ENDURANCE. FOLLOWING CHAIN OF EVENTS LED US TO THE OUTCOME--HOWEVER, IN CRITIQUING MY DECISIONS AND ACTIONS, I MUST SAY THAT, HAVING THE WX FORECASTS AND INFO THAT WAS AVAILABLE, I WOULD NOT HAVE DIVERTED TO ALTERNATE EARLIER. WX FORECAST FOR VMC: NO RPTS FROM DISPATCH TO THE CONTRARY. NO TIMELY RPT FROM APCH CTL THAT WX WAS DETERIORATING RAPIDLY (FIRST RVR NOTIFICATION WAS THE DROP TO RVR 3500). NO EXPECTATION FROM ANY SOURCE THAT WX WOULD GET BAD. I WAS VERY CAREFUL TO CLEARLY AND PRECISELY PASS ON A 'MINIMUM FUEL ADVISORY' TO ATC, KNOWING THE MEANING VERBATIM IN THE PLT-CTLR LEXICON. UNFORTUNATELY, AS I THOUGHT MIGHT HAPPEN, THE THIRD ARR CTLR WAS UNDER THE IMPRESSION WE HAD DECLARED AND EMER AT THAT TIME AND I HAD TO CORRECT HER. LIKEWISE, WORTHY OF NOTE WAS THE FACT THAT AFTER DECLARING AN EMER ON MISSED APCH, IT WAS CLEAR THAT OUR EMER STATUS WAS NOT PASSED ON TO NEXT SECTOR 2 TIMES. WE INFORMED NEW SECTOR OF OUR DECLARATION OF EMER ON 2 SUBSEQUENT FREQ CHANGES. WE DID NOT SQUAWK 7700 AND THE CTLRS WERE VERY BUSY WITH THE RAPIDLY CHANGING AND DETERIORATING TFC SIT. OTHER THAN COM AMBIGUITIES, THEY ALL DID A SUPERB JOB.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.