Narrative:

Ready to taxi, the crew configured the aircraft for takeoff. The checklists were completed and we were cleared into position and hold. Upon the clearance for takeoff, power was applied and the takeoff warning horn sounded. The takeoff was aborted at approximately 10 KTS. After we cleared the active runway we proceeded to troubleshoot the cause of the warning horn activation. The cause was found to be a flap 1 setting, which is not authority/authorized for this particular 737-500 aircraft. Everything in each aircraft is identical except for a placard and slight changes in the takeoff V speed FLIP cards. The oversight on the flap setting is exacerbated by the minimal differences in flight deck configns for the different aircraft. The flap 5 only restr placard is also located in a position that is not visible from the captain's seat and is marginally visible from the first officer's seat. A crew may fly the `flap 1 737-300' `flap 1 737-500', and once in a while a `flap 5 737-500', which enhances the possibility of this oversight. There are a number of methods to minimize the oversight of proper flap settings by configuring the flight decks with a limit sticker on the flap settings gauge, a placard on the throttle quadrant next to the flap settings indicators to even changing the v-spd FLIP card color for the flap 5 aircraft. Until all 737-500 are configured for flap 1 takeoffs the possibility of this situation being repeated is very high. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that he is working through the union safety reps and the air carrier to sort out the `fix' on this issue. The aircraft had been originally sold to the air carrier with the certification for flaps 1 for takeoff for use at high altitude airports such as mex and den. Some aircraft were not configured for that, the flap sensing and warnings system being set for 5 degree flaps. That is why there is a `mix' of aircraft, some with the flap 1 sensors corrected, and some not. Reporter says that they are expecting to get the flap awareness on these non mod aircraft altered by adding a red DOT by the flap handle until flaps 1 are authority/authorized. He was not certain of the completion date of this program. Reporter called back again and added that there were 27 unmod aircraft versus 30 mod aircraft and that the air carrier had funds for the mod completion at the end of 1995 but is asking for additional funding for earlier completion at the end of 1994. It takes three days for the mod, a surprising amount of time for a supposedly simple procedure.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TKOF ABORTED WHEN IMPROPER FLAP SETTING IS USED.

Narrative: READY TO TAXI, THE CREW CONFIGURED THE ACFT FOR TKOF. THE CHKLISTS WERE COMPLETED AND WE WERE CLRED INTO POS AND HOLD. UPON THE CLRNC FOR TKOF, PWR WAS APPLIED AND THE TKOF WARNING HORN SOUNDED. THE TKOF WAS ABORTED AT APPROX 10 KTS. AFTER WE CLRED THE ACTIVE RWY WE PROCEEDED TO TROUBLESHOOT THE CAUSE OF THE WARNING HORN ACTIVATION. THE CAUSE WAS FOUND TO BE A FLAP 1 SETTING, WHICH IS NOT AUTH FOR THIS PARTICULAR 737-500 ACFT. EVERYTHING IN EACH ACFT IS IDENTICAL EXCEPT FOR A PLACARD AND SLIGHT CHANGES IN THE TKOF V SPD FLIP CARDS. THE OVERSIGHT ON THE FLAP SETTING IS EXACERBATED BY THE MINIMAL DIFFERENCES IN FLT DECK CONFIGNS FOR THE DIFFERENT ACFT. THE FLAP 5 ONLY RESTR PLACARD IS ALSO LOCATED IN A POS THAT IS NOT VISIBLE FROM THE CAPT'S SEAT AND IS MARGINALLY VISIBLE FROM THE FO'S SEAT. A CREW MAY FLY THE `FLAP 1 737-300' `FLAP 1 737-500', AND ONCE IN A WHILE A `FLAP 5 737-500', WHICH ENHANCES THE POSSIBILITY OF THIS OVERSIGHT. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF METHODS TO MINIMIZE THE OVERSIGHT OF PROPER FLAP SETTINGS BY CONFIGURING THE FLT DECKS WITH A LIMIT STICKER ON THE FLAP SETTINGS GAUGE, A PLACARD ON THE THROTTLE QUADRANT NEXT TO THE FLAP SETTINGS INDICATORS TO EVEN CHANGING THE V-SPD FLIP CARD COLOR FOR THE FLAP 5 ACFT. UNTIL ALL 737-500 ARE CONFIGURED FOR FLAP 1 TKOFS THE POSSIBILITY OF THIS SIT BEING REPEATED IS VERY HIGH. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT HE IS WORKING THROUGH THE UNION SAFETY REPS AND THE ACR TO SORT OUT THE `FIX' ON THIS ISSUE. THE ACFT HAD BEEN ORIGINALLY SOLD TO THE ACR WITH THE CERTIFICATION FOR FLAPS 1 FOR TKOF FOR USE AT HIGH ALT ARPTS SUCH AS MEX AND DEN. SOME ACFT WERE NOT CONFIGURED FOR THAT, THE FLAP SENSING AND WARNINGS SYS BEING SET FOR 5 DEG FLAPS. THAT IS WHY THERE IS A `MIX' OF ACFT, SOME WITH THE FLAP 1 SENSORS CORRECTED, AND SOME NOT. RPTR SAYS THAT THEY ARE EXPECTING TO GET THE FLAP AWARENESS ON THESE NON MOD ACFT ALTERED BY ADDING A RED DOT BY THE FLAP HANDLE UNTIL FLAPS 1 ARE AUTH. HE WAS NOT CERTAIN OF THE COMPLETION DATE OF THIS PROGRAM. RPTR CALLED BACK AGAIN AND ADDED THAT THERE WERE 27 UNMOD ACFT VERSUS 30 MOD ACFT AND THAT THE ACR HAD FUNDS FOR THE MOD COMPLETION AT THE END OF 1995 BUT IS ASKING FOR ADDITIONAL FUNDING FOR EARLIER COMPLETION AT THE END OF 1994. IT TAKES THREE DAYS FOR THE MOD, A SURPRISING AMOUNT OF TIME FOR A SUPPOSEDLY SIMPLE PROC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.