Narrative:

Flight was bound for dfw from txk. The flight departed the gate at approximately XA50 and had been cleared to runway 22. During the taxi, the taxi checklist was completed and the aircraft was holding short at runway 22. Upon receiving takeoff clearance, the before takeoff checklist items were completed and the captain called for the power to be set. After setting and confirming that the power was set, I made the 80 KT call, at which time the captain responded 'my aircraft' and I confirmed his aircraft. As we approached 100 KTS, the red confign light and horn both came on, I called for an abort. The captain wrestled with the controls and applied maximum braking as we continued down the runway, eventually running off the end and stopping approximately 20 yards into a grass field. Although the NTSB investigation is not complete, brake failure and the power console mechanism are the probable causes for the inability of the crew to stop the aircraft on the runway. Factors contributing to the incident are warm temperature and high humidity, weight of the aircraft all requiring high V speeds. The design and mechanics of the power lever console and the brake failure also contributed to the incident, as well as the condition lever mechanics. Detailed training on the use of and peculiarities of the power lever console and use of friction locks should be addressed by the manufacturer and the airline in order to prevent additional incidents.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RWY EXCURSION AFTER TKOF ABORTED DUE TO ACFT CONFIGN PROB SENSED BY WARNING SYS.

Narrative: FLT WAS BOUND FOR DFW FROM TXK. THE FLT DEPARTED THE GATE AT APPROX XA50 AND HAD BEEN CLRED TO RWY 22. DURING THE TAXI, THE TAXI CHKLIST WAS COMPLETED AND THE ACFT WAS HOLDING SHORT AT RWY 22. UPON RECEIVING TKOF CLRNC, THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST ITEMS WERE COMPLETED AND THE CAPT CALLED FOR THE PWR TO BE SET. AFTER SETTING AND CONFIRMING THAT THE PWR WAS SET, I MADE THE 80 KT CALL, AT WHICH TIME THE CAPT RESPONDED 'MY ACFT' AND I CONFIRMED HIS ACFT. AS WE APCHED 100 KTS, THE RED CONFIGN LIGHT AND HORN BOTH CAME ON, I CALLED FOR AN ABORT. THE CAPT WRESTLED WITH THE CTLS AND APPLIED MAX BRAKING AS WE CONTINUED DOWN THE RWY, EVENTUALLY RUNNING OFF THE END AND STOPPING APPROX 20 YARDS INTO A GRASS FIELD. ALTHOUGH THE NTSB INVESTIGATION IS NOT COMPLETE, BRAKE FAILURE AND THE PWR CONSOLE MECHANISM ARE THE PROBABLE CAUSES FOR THE INABILITY OF THE CREW TO STOP THE ACFT ON THE RWY. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE INCIDENT ARE WARM TEMP AND HIGH HUMIDITY, WT OF THE ACFT ALL REQUIRING HIGH V SPDS. THE DESIGN AND MECHS OF THE PWR LEVER CONSOLE AND THE BRAKE FAILURE ALSO CONTRIBUTED TO THE INCIDENT, AS WELL AS THE CONDITION LEVER MECHS. DETAILED TRAINING ON THE USE OF AND PECULIARITIES OF THE PWR LEVER CONSOLE AND USE OF FRICTION LOCKS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED BY THE MANUFACTURER AND THE AIRLINE IN ORDER TO PREVENT ADDITIONAL INCIDENTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.