Narrative:

After landing on runway 22L and rolling out onto taxiway B, we were instructed to proceed to taxiway P and proceed northbound. As I was taxiing the aircraft, performing the after landing items and discussing a faulty #1 engine thrust reverser problem with the flight engineer, the PNF in the right seat, himself a very experienced and qualified B-707 captain, was referencing to the taxi chart to orient himself with the instructions we had received. None of us saw taxiway P as we passed it. The PNF repeatedly assured me that PAPI was the parallel taxiway on the west side of runway 22R (which is actually delta). Unfortunately, my taxi chart was hidden under my approach plate and I did not refer to it to verify his guidance. We briefly discussed whether we were cleared to cross runway 22R, and wrongly agreed that, since we had been cleared to the far parallel taxiway without instructions to hold short of runway 22R, that we could proceed. As per our procedures, as we approached runway 22R I requested a 'check right' from the PNF and he noted an aircraft, which he felt was holding in position. As I made the half right turnoff taxiway bravo to cross the runway, I looked down to the approach end and noted the aircraft in position had his taxi lights on, meaning to me that he had probably already been cleared for takeoff. It was too late to stop since I was already on the runway so I proceeded, and noted that the taxiway I was turning onto was indeed delta and not papa as we had expected. As we came to a stop, tower immediately advised us of our error and advised me to phone after parking, which I did, to describe the incident as I have here. The chain of events which led this began with a 20 min approach in a high density area with continual heading, altitude, and airspeed changes directed by ATC due to heavy arrs, we received landing clearance on short final, encountered a minus 10 KT wind shear over the overrun, which resulted in a less than satisfactory 'firm' touchdown. On rollout, we were discussing the previous aircraft report of a plus 10 KT shear, as I was struggling with a #1 engine reverser that did not properly deploy. As we departed the runway on bravo, I probably did not adequately process the taxi instructions, relying too much on the PNF to direct me. The most important lapse was in not stopping the aircraft to verify that we were indeed cleared to cross the active runway, if there was any doubt in anyone's mind. Contributing human factors I think were possible subtle fatigue at the end of a 12-hour duty day that began in paris with an en route stop at iad in washington. I have so much respect in the competency of the PNF that I did not consider questioning his directions. When at an unfamiliar airport, it is important to pre-brief the taxi chart when briefing the approach.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RWY INCURSION.

Narrative: AFTER LNDG ON RWY 22L AND ROLLING OUT ONTO TXWY B, WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO PROCEED TO TXWY P AND PROCEED NBOUND. AS I WAS TAXIING THE ACFT, PERFORMING THE AFTER LNDG ITEMS AND DISCUSSING A FAULTY #1 ENG THRUST REVERSER PROB WITH THE FE, THE PNF IN THE R SEAT, HIMSELF A VERY EXPERIENCED AND QUALIFIED B-707 CAPT, WAS REFING TO THE TAXI CHART TO ORIENT HIMSELF WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS WE HAD RECEIVED. NONE OF US SAW TXWY P AS WE PASSED IT. THE PNF REPEATEDLY ASSURED ME THAT PAPI WAS THE PARALLEL TXWY ON THE W SIDE OF RWY 22R (WHICH IS ACTUALLY DELTA). UNFORTUNATELY, MY TAXI CHART WAS HIDDEN UNDER MY APCH PLATE AND I DID NOT REFER TO IT TO VERIFY HIS GUIDANCE. WE BRIEFLY DISCUSSED WHETHER WE WERE CLRED TO CROSS RWY 22R, AND WRONGLY AGREED THAT, SINCE WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO THE FAR PARALLEL TXWY WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 22R, THAT WE COULD PROCEED. AS PER OUR PROCS, AS WE APCHED RWY 22R I REQUESTED A 'CHK RIGHT' FROM THE PNF AND HE NOTED AN ACFT, WHICH HE FELT WAS HOLDING IN POS. AS I MADE THE HALF R TURNOFF TXWY BRAVO TO CROSS THE RWY, I LOOKED DOWN TO THE APCH END AND NOTED THE ACFT IN POS HAD HIS TAXI LIGHTS ON, MEANING TO ME THAT HE HAD PROBABLY ALREADY BEEN CLRED FOR TKOF. IT WAS TOO LATE TO STOP SINCE I WAS ALREADY ON THE RWY SO I PROCEEDED, AND NOTED THAT THE TXWY I WAS TURNING ONTO WAS INDEED DELTA AND NOT PAPA AS WE HAD EXPECTED. AS WE CAME TO A STOP, TWR IMMEDIATELY ADVISED US OF OUR ERROR AND ADVISED ME TO PHONE AFTER PARKING, WHICH I DID, TO DESCRIBE THE INCIDENT AS I HAVE HERE. THE CHAIN OF EVENTS WHICH LED THIS BEGAN WITH A 20 MIN APCH IN A HIGH DENSITY AREA WITH CONTINUAL HDG, ALT, AND AIRSPD CHANGES DIRECTED BY ATC DUE TO HVY ARRS, WE RECEIVED LNDG CLRNC ON SHORT FINAL, ENCOUNTERED A MINUS 10 KT WIND SHEAR OVER THE OVERRUN, WHICH RESULTED IN A LESS THAN SATISFACTORY 'FIRM' TOUCHDOWN. ON ROLLOUT, WE WERE DISCUSSING THE PREVIOUS ACFT RPT OF A PLUS 10 KT SHEAR, AS I WAS STRUGGLING WITH A #1 ENG REVERSER THAT DID NOT PROPERLY DEPLOY. AS WE DEPARTED THE RWY ON BRAVO, I PROBABLY DID NOT ADEQUATELY PROCESS THE TAXI INSTRUCTIONS, RELYING TOO MUCH ON THE PNF TO DIRECT ME. THE MOST IMPORTANT LAPSE WAS IN NOT STOPPING THE ACFT TO VERIFY THAT WE WERE INDEED CLRED TO CROSS THE ACTIVE RWY, IF THERE WAS ANY DOUBT IN ANYONE'S MIND. CONTRIBUTING HUMAN FACTORS I THINK WERE POSSIBLE SUBTLE FATIGUE AT THE END OF A 12-HR DUTY DAY THAT BEGAN IN PARIS WITH AN ENRTE STOP AT IAD IN WASHINGTON. I HAVE SO MUCH RESPECT IN THE COMPETENCY OF THE PNF THAT I DID NOT CONSIDER QUESTIONING HIS DIRECTIONS. WHEN AT AN UNFAMILIAR ARPT, IT IS IMPORTANT TO PRE-BRIEF THE TAXI CHART WHEN BRIEFING THE APCH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.