Narrative:

Shortly after takeoff out of dallas (dfw) air carrier X flight was on the way up to an assigned altitude of 10000 ft. The conditions that day were clear, VFR, with scattered cumulus clouds in the area. During our climb out center directed our attention to numerous traffic targets in the area, therefore all 3 crew members were looking out for traffic and pointing out to each other what they thought were the various targets. I recall we had some difficulty reconciling one target and this diverted a considerable amount of our attention. Thus, in the process of trying to be vigilant in our climb with respect to traffic, our altitude was momentarily exceeded. However, we realized what had happened very quickly and were in the process of expediting back down when center alerted us. Reflecting back afterwards, we found that the altitude alerter on the aircraft is so quiet that it is only audible in a perfectly quiet cockpit, and a dc-8 after takeoff has extremely high levels of cockpit noise. Also, neither the flight engineer nor myself was able to hear the '1000 ft to go' callout from the captain. In the future, I am going to strongly suggest to the capts that any 'quiet' altitude alerters be written up for adjustment even though they aren't 'broken.' also, I think it is good practice to have the PF verbally recognize the callouts of the PNF to make sure he is aware of what was said -- especially in a noisy cockpit where communication is difficult. Supplemental information from acn 273752: crew preoccupied looking for traffic outside of the cockpit for a prolonged period. PF abandoning some of his duties to look for traffic. Not getting ATC advisories when traffic is no longer a factor if we didn't locate traffic. Poor delegation of duties in this situation and a general crew error. Supplemental information from acn 273174: aircraft reported on frequency did not state current or assigned altitude. I reissued 'maintain 10000 ft.' at approximately 8000 ft I issued 'traffic 1 O'clock, 8 mi, nebound, 11000 ft.' the pilot stated 'looking.' several seconds later another controller alerted me that the aircraft had busted his altitude. I observed him climbing out of 10400 ft and issued an immediate descent to 10000 ft. This aircraft was not TCASII equipped. The 11000 ft traffic had already received an RA and began a descent to 10000 ft which created an imminent conflict with a second departure climbing to 10000 ft. The second aircraft received an RA and we were able to stop his climb at 9000 ft. One thing that concerns me greatly is that you cannot have a coordinated resolution with only 1 participant. If I had seen the deviation a little sooner and actually descended the non TCASII aircraft back to 10000 ft, then there might have been a controled collision, both aircraft doing what they were told -- 1 by TCASII, and 1 by me. As it was, the TCASII aircraft was able to descend below the deviating aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF AN ACR HVT OVERSHOT ASSIGNED CLB ALT RESULTING IN A LTSS WITH ANOTHER ACFT IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION.

Narrative: SHORTLY AFTER TKOF OUT OF DALLAS (DFW) ACR X FLT WAS ON THE WAY UP TO AN ASSIGNED ALT OF 10000 FT. THE CONDITIONS THAT DAY WERE CLR, VFR, WITH SCATTERED CUMULUS CLOUDS IN THE AREA. DURING OUR CLBOUT CTR DIRECTED OUR ATTN TO NUMEROUS TFC TARGETS IN THE AREA, THEREFORE ALL 3 CREW MEMBERS WERE LOOKING OUT FOR TFC AND POINTING OUT TO EACH OTHER WHAT THEY THOUGHT WERE THE VARIOUS TARGETS. I RECALL WE HAD SOME DIFFICULTY RECONCILING ONE TARGET AND THIS DIVERTED A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF OUR ATTN. THUS, IN THE PROCESS OF TRYING TO BE VIGILANT IN OUR CLB WITH RESPECT TO TFC, OUR ALT WAS MOMENTARILY EXCEEDED. HOWEVER, WE REALIZED WHAT HAD HAPPENED VERY QUICKLY AND WERE IN THE PROCESS OF EXPEDITING BACK DOWN WHEN CTR ALERTED US. REFLECTING BACK AFTERWARDS, WE FOUND THAT THE ALT ALERTER ON THE ACFT IS SO QUIET THAT IT IS ONLY AUDIBLE IN A PERFECTLY QUIET COCKPIT, AND A DC-8 AFTER TKOF HAS EXTREMELY HIGH LEVELS OF COCKPIT NOISE. ALSO, NEITHER THE FE NOR MYSELF WAS ABLE TO HEAR THE '1000 FT TO GO' CALLOUT FROM THE CAPT. IN THE FUTURE, I AM GOING TO STRONGLY SUGGEST TO THE CAPTS THAT ANY 'QUIET' ALT ALERTERS BE WRITTEN UP FOR ADJUSTMENT EVEN THOUGH THEY AREN'T 'BROKEN.' ALSO, I THINK IT IS GOOD PRACTICE TO HAVE THE PF VERBALLY RECOGNIZE THE CALLOUTS OF THE PNF TO MAKE SURE HE IS AWARE OF WHAT WAS SAID -- ESPECIALLY IN A NOISY COCKPIT WHERE COM IS DIFFICULT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 273752: CREW PREOCCUPIED LOOKING FOR TFC OUTSIDE OF THE COCKPIT FOR A PROLONGED PERIOD. PF ABANDONING SOME OF HIS DUTIES TO LOOK FOR TFC. NOT GETTING ATC ADVISORIES WHEN TFC IS NO LONGER A FACTOR IF WE DIDN'T LOCATE TFC. POOR DELEGATION OF DUTIES IN THIS SIT AND A GENERAL CREW ERROR. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 273174: ACFT RPTED ON FREQ DID NOT STATE CURRENT OR ASSIGNED ALT. I REISSUED 'MAINTAIN 10000 FT.' AT APPROX 8000 FT I ISSUED 'TFC 1 O'CLOCK, 8 MI, NEBOUND, 11000 FT.' THE PLT STATED 'LOOKING.' SEVERAL SECONDS LATER ANOTHER CTLR ALERTED ME THAT THE ACFT HAD BUSTED HIS ALT. I OBSERVED HIM CLBING OUT OF 10400 FT AND ISSUED AN IMMEDIATE DSCNT TO 10000 FT. THIS ACFT WAS NOT TCASII EQUIPPED. THE 11000 FT TFC HAD ALREADY RECEIVED AN RA AND BEGAN A DSCNT TO 10000 FT WHICH CREATED AN IMMINENT CONFLICT WITH A SECOND DEP CLBING TO 10000 FT. THE SECOND ACFT RECEIVED AN RA AND WE WERE ABLE TO STOP HIS CLB AT 9000 FT. ONE THING THAT CONCERNS ME GREATLY IS THAT YOU CANNOT HAVE A COORDINATED RESOLUTION WITH ONLY 1 PARTICIPANT. IF I HAD SEEN THE DEV A LITTLE SOONER AND ACTUALLY DSNDED THE NON TCASII ACFT BACK TO 10000 FT, THEN THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN A CTLED COLLISION, BOTH ACFT DOING WHAT THEY WERE TOLD -- 1 BY TCASII, AND 1 BY ME. AS IT WAS, THE TCASII ACFT WAS ABLE TO DSND BELOW THE DEVIATING ACFT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.