Narrative:

We were en route on the first leg of a 3-LEG trip from coastal maine to the washington, dc, area. First stop was to be at fitchburg, ma, for fuel -- an airport unfamiliar to any of us on board the airplane. All legs were flight planned for IFR, WX was cavu. The route included kennebunkport, me (ene VORTAC), V106 cinky direct fitchburg airport (fit). Approaching manchester, nh (mht VORTAC) on V106, IFR at 4000 ft, bos approach control (124.4) broke us off the airway with a series of vectors in the general direction of fit. The controller appeared to be overloaded, working more than 1 sector at the time. He made various references to parachute jumpers in our area. ATC advised us fit airport was in our 10 O'clock position, 6 mi, and asked if we had the airport in sight. I replied that we had '...an airport in our 10 O'clock. Is that fitchburg?' ATC replied 'affirmative,' and we canceled IFR in order to contact fitchburg CTAF. ATC advised 'caution jumpers in the area, squawk VFR' etc. Our call to CTAF on 122.7 brought a response from fitchburg unicom, advising runway 32 was in use, with left traffic. I reported entering a left downwind for runway 32 (clearly marked), turning left base, and turning onto final. 6 parachute jumpers were 'away' and clearly visible just west of the airport -- pretty close, we thought. We landed and turned off at the main ramp. The sign at the main terminal building read 'welcome to fort devens -- moore army airfield.' within mins a helicopter landed and an army jump master ran to our airplane. 'Do you know where you are?' he asked. Of course we knew at that point. I described the service just received from bos approach control as 'a perfect setup,' and volunteered to get out of there as soon as possible. The jump master said, 'this happens all the time here. We just ask that you talk to us on our frequency.' what is your frequency?' I asked. '119.35.' we called 119.35 in the blind - - moore tower is no longer manned, no reply from the helicopter. We departed without incident. (On arriving at fit the unicom operator grinned and asked 'so how was moore field?') contributing factors: 1) I was unfamiliar with fitchburg airport. 2) I trusted too much in radar vector service to the right airport. 3) fitchburg and moore are close together -- 6 or 7 mi apart. 4) moore aaf is not shown on the current instrument approach plates for fit published by NOAA, even though it is well within the 10 NM circle drawn around fit, and even though it is a known 'sucker-hole' for pilots intending to land at fit. 5) fitchburg and moore are similar in appearance. Both have a runway 14/32 as their principal runway, and those runways are nearly identical in appearance (fit 4500 ft, moore 4700 ft). 6) the bos approach controller was apparently overloaded and was in a big hurry to turn us loose to VFR operations. 7) in his haste the controller ignored the possibility of our mistaking the nearer airport (moore) for the desired, more distance airport (fit). 8) a controller can't always estimate correctly the pilot's clock position in calling out an airport's location to the pilot. 9) reading distances from a radar display is simple for the controller, but seeing the correct airport (or airplane) called out at a given range by the controller is partly guesswork for the pilot. 10) heavy traffic of all kinds, including parachute jumpers, was probably encouraged by the beautiful wkend WX. Recommended cures: 1) don't allow controllers to get overloaded. 2) remind controllers to advise the pilot of known 'sucker-holes' like moore (for fitchburg) even in excellent visibility. 3) encourage pilots not to be too accommodating to the controller, especially when choosing to make a VFR approach into an unfamiliar airport. 4) show moore on the fitchburg instrument approach plates. 5) install AWOS at fitchburg, to include an advisory that moore field is nearby and can be mistaken for fit.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WRONG ARPT LNDG. UNAUTH LNDG. AERO CHART PRESENTATION NOAA CITED AS CONTRIBUTORY.

Narrative: WE WERE ENRTE ON THE FIRST LEG OF A 3-LEG TRIP FROM COASTAL MAINE TO THE WASHINGTON, DC, AREA. FIRST STOP WAS TO BE AT FITCHBURG, MA, FOR FUEL -- AN ARPT UNFAMILIAR TO ANY OF US ON BOARD THE AIRPLANE. ALL LEGS WERE FLT PLANNED FOR IFR, WX WAS CAVU. THE RTE INCLUDED KENNEBUNKPORT, ME (ENE VORTAC), V106 CINKY DIRECT FITCHBURG ARPT (FIT). APCHING MANCHESTER, NH (MHT VORTAC) ON V106, IFR AT 4000 FT, BOS APCH CTL (124.4) BROKE US OFF THE AIRWAY WITH A SERIES OF VECTORS IN THE GENERAL DIRECTION OF FIT. THE CTLR APPEARED TO BE OVERLOADED, WORKING MORE THAN 1 SECTOR AT THE TIME. HE MADE VARIOUS REFS TO PARACHUTE JUMPERS IN OUR AREA. ATC ADVISED US FIT ARPT WAS IN OUR 10 O'CLOCK POS, 6 MI, AND ASKED IF WE HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT. I REPLIED THAT WE HAD '...AN ARPT IN OUR 10 O'CLOCK. IS THAT FITCHBURG?' ATC REPLIED 'AFFIRMATIVE,' AND WE CANCELED IFR IN ORDER TO CONTACT FITCHBURG CTAF. ATC ADVISED 'CAUTION JUMPERS IN THE AREA, SQUAWK VFR' ETC. OUR CALL TO CTAF ON 122.7 BROUGHT A RESPONSE FROM FITCHBURG UNICOM, ADVISING RWY 32 WAS IN USE, WITH L TFC. I RPTED ENTERING A L DOWNWIND FOR RWY 32 (CLRLY MARKED), TURNING L BASE, AND TURNING ONTO FINAL. 6 PARACHUTE JUMPERS WERE 'AWAY' AND CLRLY VISIBLE JUST W OF THE ARPT -- PRETTY CLOSE, WE THOUGHT. WE LANDED AND TURNED OFF AT THE MAIN RAMP. THE SIGN AT THE MAIN TERMINAL BUILDING READ 'WELCOME TO FORT DEVENS -- MOORE ARMY AIRFIELD.' WITHIN MINS A HELI LANDED AND AN ARMY JUMP MASTER RAN TO OUR AIRPLANE. 'DO YOU KNOW WHERE YOU ARE?' HE ASKED. OF COURSE WE KNEW AT THAT POINT. I DESCRIBED THE SVC JUST RECEIVED FROM BOS APCH CTL AS 'A PERFECT SETUP,' AND VOLUNTEERED TO GET OUT OF THERE ASAP. THE JUMP MASTER SAID, 'THIS HAPPENS ALL THE TIME HERE. WE JUST ASK THAT YOU TALK TO US ON OUR FREQ.' WHAT IS YOUR FREQ?' I ASKED. '119.35.' WE CALLED 119.35 IN THE BLIND - - MOORE TWR IS NO LONGER MANNED, NO REPLY FROM THE HELI. WE DEPARTED WITHOUT INCIDENT. (ON ARRIVING AT FIT THE UNICOM OPERATOR GRINNED AND ASKED 'SO HOW WAS MOORE FIELD?') CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) I WAS UNFAMILIAR WITH FITCHBURG ARPT. 2) I TRUSTED TOO MUCH IN RADAR VECTOR SVC TO THE RIGHT ARPT. 3) FITCHBURG AND MOORE ARE CLOSE TOGETHER -- 6 OR 7 MI APART. 4) MOORE AAF IS NOT SHOWN ON THE CURRENT INST APCH PLATES FOR FIT PUBLISHED BY NOAA, EVEN THOUGH IT IS WELL WITHIN THE 10 NM CIRCLE DRAWN AROUND FIT, AND EVEN THOUGH IT IS A KNOWN 'SUCKER-HOLE' FOR PLTS INTENDING TO LAND AT FIT. 5) FITCHBURG AND MOORE ARE SIMILAR IN APPEARANCE. BOTH HAVE A RWY 14/32 AS THEIR PRINCIPAL RWY, AND THOSE RWYS ARE NEARLY IDENTICAL IN APPEARANCE (FIT 4500 FT, MOORE 4700 FT). 6) THE BOS APCH CTLR WAS APPARENTLY OVERLOADED AND WAS IN A BIG HURRY TO TURN US LOOSE TO VFR OPS. 7) IN HIS HASTE THE CTLR IGNORED THE POSSIBILITY OF OUR MISTAKING THE NEARER ARPT (MOORE) FOR THE DESIRED, MORE DISTANCE ARPT (FIT). 8) A CTLR CAN'T ALWAYS ESTIMATE CORRECTLY THE PLT'S CLOCK POS IN CALLING OUT AN ARPT'S LOCATION TO THE PLT. 9) READING DISTANCES FROM A RADAR DISPLAY IS SIMPLE FOR THE CTLR, BUT SEEING THE CORRECT ARPT (OR AIRPLANE) CALLED OUT AT A GIVEN RANGE BY THE CTLR IS PARTLY GUESSWORK FOR THE PLT. 10) HVY TFC OF ALL KINDS, INCLUDING PARACHUTE JUMPERS, WAS PROBABLY ENCOURAGED BY THE BEAUTIFUL WKEND WX. RECOMMENDED CURES: 1) DON'T ALLOW CTLRS TO GET OVERLOADED. 2) REMIND CTLRS TO ADVISE THE PLT OF KNOWN 'SUCKER-HOLES' LIKE MOORE (FOR FITCHBURG) EVEN IN EXCELLENT VISIBILITY. 3) ENCOURAGE PLTS NOT TO BE TOO ACCOMMODATING TO THE CTLR, ESPECIALLY WHEN CHOOSING TO MAKE A VFR APCH INTO AN UNFAMILIAR ARPT. 4) SHOW MOORE ON THE FITCHBURG INST APCH PLATES. 5) INSTALL AWOS AT FITCHBURG, TO INCLUDE AN ADVISORY THAT MOORE FIELD IS NEARBY AND CAN BE MISTAKEN FOR FIT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.