Narrative:

Maintaining 7000 ft, turned over to dca approach over the aml VOR, given vector of 120 degrees, which would clear buildups to the south of my course. Given vector of 160 degrees that would take us into buildup, asked to delay vector to avoid large cumulus, controller became angry said, 'no.' then gave me a heading of 190 degrees, into the cloud, but I made a slow rate of turn to avoid the buildup and he gave me a heading of 200 degrees -- he was evidently determined to drive me through that cloud -- but I was able to avoid a large portion of it. He gave me a descent to 5000 ft and a further turn to a heading of 210 degrees. This placed me on a collision course with another cumulus, only this time I couldn't avoid it. Things got rough and I again asked for a deviation to the left, he refused. My vertical descent would vary from 1000 FPM climb with power at idle, to check my descent without exceeding my maneuvering speed and descended to approximately 4300 ft before airplane leveled off. About this time he began asking me what my altitude was, I told him 4300 ft attempting to climb back to 5000 ft., and I needed a deviation to the left to avoid the turbulence -- he refused. I was on verge of declaring an emergency when he gave me a left turn to a heading of 120 degrees and a descent to 2500 ft which got me out of the turbulence. He gave me another vector to 090 degrees and a descent to 1600 ft. He also said to cancel the IFR flight plan at 1600 ft. When I repeated the clearance and said I would cancel the IFR at 1600 ft, he said, 'your IFR is canceled now, change to code 1200. Knowing I was still in class B airspace, and would be until I dropped below 1500 ft MSL, I repeated his instructions verbatim to get it on the tape. During this entire episode he was receiving and granting requests for deviations from air carrier aircraft. This is prejudicial, and exposed me and my passenger to undue hazard. This controller was the most unprofessional controller I ever experienced in my 35 yrs of flying large and small aircraft. I strongly suspect if I were on my bac 111 he would have treated me differently. Fortunately, he is a rarity, the majority of controllers I know or who have handled me, are great. Just an aside, during a conversation with a controller friend he mentioned that if there are no echoes in the area, they treat it as just turbulence. I discussed contouring with him and he appreciated it. My concern is that other controllers may be under this same assumption, because in my situation today, the clouds were in the cumulus stage and transitioning to the mature stage. Perhaps if the controller saw no echoes, he may have assumed there was no real danger. Additionally, since the air carriers were reporting light turbulence -- which could be moderate or greater to a small airplane -- he may have considered my requests for deviations as discomfort: after all, it was only turbulence. Perhaps a review of controller's training programs with emphasis on radar interpretation and the different effects of reported turbulence (as described in the aim) on large or small airplanes, would aid in avoiding what I had experienced today.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMA CAUGHT IN TURB CUMULUS BUILDUPS HAS ALTDEV.

Narrative: MAINTAINING 7000 FT, TURNED OVER TO DCA APCH OVER THE AML VOR, GIVEN VECTOR OF 120 DEGS, WHICH WOULD CLR BUILDUPS TO THE S OF MY COURSE. GIVEN VECTOR OF 160 DEGS THAT WOULD TAKE US INTO BUILDUP, ASKED TO DELAY VECTOR TO AVOID LARGE CUMULUS, CTLR BECAME ANGRY SAID, 'NO.' THEN GAVE ME A HDG OF 190 DEGS, INTO THE CLOUD, BUT I MADE A SLOW RATE OF TURN TO AVOID THE BUILDUP AND HE GAVE ME A HDG OF 200 DEGS -- HE WAS EVIDENTLY DETERMINED TO DRIVE ME THROUGH THAT CLOUD -- BUT I WAS ABLE TO AVOID A LARGE PORTION OF IT. HE GAVE ME A DSCNT TO 5000 FT AND A FURTHER TURN TO A HDG OF 210 DEGS. THIS PLACED ME ON A COLLISION COURSE WITH ANOTHER CUMULUS, ONLY THIS TIME I COULDN'T AVOID IT. THINGS GOT ROUGH AND I AGAIN ASKED FOR A DEV TO THE L, HE REFUSED. MY VERT DSCNT WOULD VARY FROM 1000 FPM CLB WITH PWR AT IDLE, TO CHK MY DSCNT WITHOUT EXCEEDING MY MANEUVERING SPD AND DSNDED TO APPROX 4300 FT BEFORE AIRPLANE LEVELED OFF. ABOUT THIS TIME HE BEGAN ASKING ME WHAT MY ALT WAS, I TOLD HIM 4300 FT ATTEMPTING TO CLB BACK TO 5000 FT., AND I NEEDED A DEV TO THE L TO AVOID THE TURB -- HE REFUSED. I WAS ON VERGE OF DECLARING AN EMER WHEN HE GAVE ME A L TURN TO A HDG OF 120 DEGS AND A DSCNT TO 2500 FT WHICH GOT ME OUT OF THE TURB. HE GAVE ME ANOTHER VECTOR TO 090 DEGS AND A DSCNT TO 1600 FT. HE ALSO SAID TO CANCEL THE IFR FLT PLAN AT 1600 FT. WHEN I REPEATED THE CLRNC AND SAID I WOULD CANCEL THE IFR AT 1600 FT, HE SAID, 'YOUR IFR IS CANCELED NOW, CHANGE TO CODE 1200. KNOWING I WAS STILL IN CLASS B AIRSPACE, AND WOULD BE UNTIL I DROPPED BELOW 1500 FT MSL, I REPEATED HIS INSTRUCTIONS VERBATIM TO GET IT ON THE TAPE. DURING THIS ENTIRE EPISODE HE WAS RECEIVING AND GRANTING REQUESTS FOR DEVS FROM AIR CARRIER ACFT. THIS IS PREJUDICIAL, AND EXPOSED ME AND MY PAX TO UNDUE HAZARD. THIS CTLR WAS THE MOST UNPROFESSIONAL CTLR I EVER EXPERIENCED IN MY 35 YRS OF FLYING LARGE AND SMALL ACFT. I STRONGLY SUSPECT IF I WERE ON MY BAC 111 HE WOULD HAVE TREATED ME DIFFERENTLY. FORTUNATELY, HE IS A RARITY, THE MAJORITY OF CTLRS I KNOW OR WHO HAVE HANDLED ME, ARE GREAT. JUST AN ASIDE, DURING A CONVERSATION WITH A CTLR FRIEND HE MENTIONED THAT IF THERE ARE NO ECHOES IN THE AREA, THEY TREAT IT AS JUST TURB. I DISCUSSED CONTOURING WITH HIM AND HE APPRECIATED IT. MY CONCERN IS THAT OTHER CTLRS MAY BE UNDER THIS SAME ASSUMPTION, BECAUSE IN MY SIT TODAY, THE CLOUDS WERE IN THE CUMULUS STAGE AND TRANSITIONING TO THE MATURE STAGE. PERHAPS IF THE CTLR SAW NO ECHOES, HE MAY HAVE ASSUMED THERE WAS NO REAL DANGER. ADDITIONALLY, SINCE THE AIR CARRIERS WERE RPTING LIGHT TURB -- WHICH COULD BE MODERATE OR GREATER TO A SMALL AIRPLANE -- HE MAY HAVE CONSIDERED MY REQUESTS FOR DEVS AS DISCOMFORT: AFTER ALL, IT WAS ONLY TURB. PERHAPS A REVIEW OF CTLR'S TRAINING PROGRAMS WITH EMPHASIS ON RADAR INTERP AND THE DIFFERENT EFFECTS OF RPTED TURB (AS DESCRIBED IN THE AIM) ON LARGE OR SMALL AIRPLANES, WOULD AID IN AVOIDING WHAT I HAD EXPERIENCED TODAY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.