Narrative:

Lax-jfk was a B-767-300 which was planned by the morning dispatcher and the captain but was flight-followed by me. The afternoon dispatcher, after the shift change at XX00 pm. This aircraft had an anti-skid inoperative placard which essentially restr its landing to runways of more than 11000 ft of usable length. Errors in planning were made which assumed a much greater flexibility of runway choice at jfk and that ewr would be a suitable landing alternate. I corrected these errors when the flight was en route, advising the captain he could only use runways 4L and 31L at jfk with certain weight and tailwind limitations and designated iad as the nearest acceptable landing alternate. I advised the jfk tower supervisor that flight 4 had an anti-skid inoperative and requested runway 31L as, at that time, the tailwind component for runway 4L created too great a weight penalty. He advised us to expect about 30 mins of hold as he sequenced the flight into the landing pattern which was for another runway. The captain and I agreed we could take the hold. During holding for runway 31L, the weight of the aircraft and the wind dropped to acceptable limits for landing on runway 4L and the flight landed on runway 4L with less delay than waiting for runway 31L. The tower had advised emergency vehicles to stand by after my call to them. When the flight landed, smoke was seen to come from one of the landing gears, but when the aircraft came to a stop, the smoke was gone. Inspection of the gear at that time revealed no irregularities. As a precaution, the aircraft was towed to the gate where a full inspection revealed no damage. The anti-skid was returned to service at jfk that night by company maintenance.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: COMPANY DISPATCHER ASSURES THAT FLC OF WDB IS AWARE OF THE RWY LENGTH REQUIRED FOR LNDG WITH ANTI-SKID INOP.

Narrative: LAX-JFK WAS A B-767-300 WHICH WAS PLANNED BY THE MORNING DISPATCHER AND THE CAPT BUT WAS FLT-FOLLOWED BY ME. THE AFTERNOON DISPATCHER, AFTER THE SHIFT CHANGE AT XX00 PM. THIS ACFT HAD AN ANTI-SKID INOP PLACARD WHICH ESSENTIALLY RESTR ITS LNDG TO RWYS OF MORE THAN 11000 FT OF USABLE LENGTH. ERRORS IN PLANNING WERE MADE WHICH ASSUMED A MUCH GREATER FLEXIBILITY OF RWY CHOICE AT JFK AND THAT EWR WOULD BE A SUITABLE LNDG ALTERNATE. I CORRECTED THESE ERRORS WHEN THE FLT WAS ENRTE, ADVISING THE CAPT HE COULD ONLY USE RWYS 4L AND 31L AT JFK WITH CERTAIN WT AND TAILWIND LIMITATIONS AND DESIGNATED IAD AS THE NEAREST ACCEPTABLE LNDG ALTERNATE. I ADVISED THE JFK TWR SUPVR THAT FLT 4 HAD AN ANTI-SKID INOP AND REQUESTED RWY 31L AS, AT THAT TIME, THE TAILWIND COMPONENT FOR RWY 4L CREATED TOO GREAT A WT PENALTY. HE ADVISED US TO EXPECT ABOUT 30 MINS OF HOLD AS HE SEQUENCED THE FLT INTO THE LNDG PATTERN WHICH WAS FOR ANOTHER RWY. THE CAPT AND I AGREED WE COULD TAKE THE HOLD. DURING HOLDING FOR RWY 31L, THE WT OF THE ACFT AND THE WIND DROPPED TO ACCEPTABLE LIMITS FOR LNDG ON RWY 4L AND THE FLT LANDED ON RWY 4L WITH LESS DELAY THAN WAITING FOR RWY 31L. THE TWR HAD ADVISED EMER VEHICLES TO STAND BY AFTER MY CALL TO THEM. WHEN THE FLT LANDED, SMOKE WAS SEEN TO COME FROM ONE OF THE LNDG GEARS, BUT WHEN THE ACFT CAME TO A STOP, THE SMOKE WAS GONE. INSPECTION OF THE GEAR AT THAT TIME REVEALED NO IRREGULARITIES. AS A PRECAUTION, THE ACFT WAS TOWED TO THE GATE WHERE A FULL INSPECTION REVEALED NO DAMAGE. THE ANTI-SKID WAS RETURNED TO SVC AT JFK THAT NIGHT BY COMPANY MAINT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.