Narrative:

My entire crew of 5 arrived at the airport in sfo for an originator about 5 mins later than normal due to hotel transportation problems. Upon arriving the operations agent advised us that a local FAA operations specialist was going to check ride us and that we had already demanded access to the jet prior to my crew's arrival. The operations agent described him as 'cocky and difficult.' he was. Upon boarding the jet he was already aboard and began by being rude and intimidating to my flight attendants. Being unhappy about this, I queried him for his identify and asked why he didn't have it out and visible. He began to explain that he could go anywhere north the world with his identify badge but I couldn't with mine because he had 34 yrs of government service and I was just an airline pilot. He attempted to intimidate me with power. I explained that we were a little late and asked if we could dispense with the pleasantries while we all attended to our preflight duties. He generally disrupted all of my crew during the course of our duties. During the initial cockpit setup I always brief the crew of any unusual operational aspects regarding the equipment, WX, NOTAMS, departure procedures or unusual performance requirements. During my attempt to check, and set up the cockpit and brief my first officer, he interrupted me at least 3 times asking for my license and medical. I asked him to wait but he wouldn't. It is due to this unnecessary and belligerent interruption that I failed to brief my first officer (it's his first month on the line) that the 737-500 is a flaps 5 only takeoff. It is unusual since our other jets (dash 200/dash 300) more frequently use the flaps 1 for takeoff. After the start I asked for and received flaps 1. My new first officer, no brief, a belligerent fed, and the fact that the cockpit of the dash 500 is exactly the same as the dash 300 contributed to this scenario. On the takeoff just as we brought the power up and before takeoff power was attained and before the airspeed was 'off the peg' we got a takeoff warning horn. I rejected the takeoff. The first officer advised tower. We cleared the runway and corrected the flap setting, re-ran the checklist, talked about rejected takeoff's regarding brake cooling, paperwork, etc, and I made a PA to our customers with the parking brake set. We were delayed 9 mins for flow to phx. I would like to note that the dash 500 will fly with flaps 1 and was flight tested by boeing. Flaps 1 takeoff data is not owned by our carrier because we didn't think it would be necessary since the dash 500 lifts a lot of weight anyway with its large engines. My suggestions: 1) mark all dash 500 flap indicators with a red band between flaps 1 and flaps 5 for takeoff then on the taxi out checklist the red band would be a visual clue that this is a dash 500 and requires flaps 5 instead of relying upon memory. 2) stop this adversarial relationship between acrs and feds before someone gets hurt. 3) do not allow feds to badger a crew. 4) give crews training and support to throw the fed off without repercussions if the fed behaves thusly. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter states that there has been no FAA followup to this incident. The aci stated he saw nothing that was unsafe in the flight but reporter felt safer with the filing of the report. The chief pilot was consulted regarding the possible marking of the flap indicators. Chief pilot felt that boeing would have to make that change. Reporter feels a simple red band for very minimal cost would do. Reporter is following up with chief pilot and will take the matter to the next step higher if no satisfaction from chief pilot. This company has such a serious approach to standardization that one cannot tell the difference between the 737-500 or the 737-300 once inside the cockpit. Thus the red mark would be the attention getter for the flap setting.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MLG FLC STARTS TKOF WITH WRONG FLAP SETTING. TKOF ABORTED.

Narrative: MY ENTIRE CREW OF 5 ARRIVED AT THE ARPT IN SFO FOR AN ORIGINATOR ABOUT 5 MINS LATER THAN NORMAL DUE TO HOTEL TRANSPORTATION PROBS. UPON ARRIVING THE OPS AGENT ADVISED US THAT A LCL FAA OPS SPECIALIST WAS GOING TO CHK RIDE US AND THAT WE HAD ALREADY DEMANDED ACCESS TO THE JET PRIOR TO MY CREW'S ARR. THE OPS AGENT DESCRIBED HIM AS 'COCKY AND DIFFICULT.' HE WAS. UPON BOARDING THE JET HE WAS ALREADY ABOARD AND BEGAN BY BEING RUDE AND INTIMIDATING TO MY FLT ATTENDANTS. BEING UNHAPPY ABOUT THIS, I QUERIED HIM FOR HIS IDENT AND ASKED WHY HE DIDN'T HAVE IT OUT AND VISIBLE. HE BEGAN TO EXPLAIN THAT HE COULD GO ANYWHERE N THE WORLD WITH HIS IDENT BADGE BUT I COULDN'T WITH MINE BECAUSE HE HAD 34 YRS OF GOV SVC AND I WAS JUST AN AIRLINE PLT. HE ATTEMPTED TO INTIMIDATE ME WITH PWR. I EXPLAINED THAT WE WERE A LITTLE LATE AND ASKED IF WE COULD DISPENSE WITH THE PLEASANTRIES WHILE WE ALL ATTENDED TO OUR PREFLT DUTIES. HE GENERALLY DISRUPTED ALL OF MY CREW DURING THE COURSE OF OUR DUTIES. DURING THE INITIAL COCKPIT SETUP I ALWAYS BRIEF THE CREW OF ANY UNUSUAL OPERATIONAL ASPECTS REGARDING THE EQUIP, WX, NOTAMS, DEP PROCS OR UNUSUAL PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS. DURING MY ATTEMPT TO CHK, AND SET UP THE COCKPIT AND BRIEF MY FO, HE INTERRUPTED ME AT LEAST 3 TIMES ASKING FOR MY LICENSE AND MEDICAL. I ASKED HIM TO WAIT BUT HE WOULDN'T. IT IS DUE TO THIS UNNECESSARY AND BELLIGERENT INTERRUPTION THAT I FAILED TO BRIEF MY FO (IT'S HIS FIRST MONTH ON THE LINE) THAT THE 737-500 IS A FLAPS 5 ONLY TKOF. IT IS UNUSUAL SINCE OUR OTHER JETS (DASH 200/DASH 300) MORE FREQUENTLY USE THE FLAPS 1 FOR TKOF. AFTER THE START I ASKED FOR AND RECEIVED FLAPS 1. MY NEW FO, NO BRIEF, A BELLIGERENT FED, AND THE FACT THAT THE COCKPIT OF THE DASH 500 IS EXACTLY THE SAME AS THE DASH 300 CONTRIBUTED TO THIS SCENARIO. ON THE TKOF JUST AS WE BROUGHT THE PWR UP AND BEFORE TKOF PWR WAS ATTAINED AND BEFORE THE AIRSPD WAS 'OFF THE PEG' WE GOT A TKOF WARNING HORN. I REJECTED THE TKOF. THE FO ADVISED TWR. WE CLRED THE RWY AND CORRECTED THE FLAP SETTING, RE-RAN THE CHKLIST, TALKED ABOUT RTO'S REGARDING BRAKE COOLING, PAPERWORK, ETC, AND I MADE A PA TO OUR CUSTOMERS WITH THE PARKING BRAKE SET. WE WERE DELAYED 9 MINS FOR FLOW TO PHX. I WOULD LIKE TO NOTE THAT THE DASH 500 WILL FLY WITH FLAPS 1 AND WAS FLT TESTED BY BOEING. FLAPS 1 TKOF DATA IS NOT OWNED BY OUR CARRIER BECAUSE WE DIDN'T THINK IT WOULD BE NECESSARY SINCE THE DASH 500 LIFTS A LOT OF WT ANYWAY WITH ITS LARGE ENGS. MY SUGGESTIONS: 1) MARK ALL DASH 500 FLAP INDICATORS WITH A RED BAND BTWN FLAPS 1 AND FLAPS 5 FOR TKOF THEN ON THE TAXI OUT CHKLIST THE RED BAND WOULD BE A VISUAL CLUE THAT THIS IS A DASH 500 AND REQUIRES FLAPS 5 INSTEAD OF RELYING UPON MEMORY. 2) STOP THIS ADVERSARIAL RELATIONSHIP BTWN ACRS AND FEDS BEFORE SOMEONE GETS HURT. 3) DO NOT ALLOW FEDS TO BADGER A CREW. 4) GIVE CREWS TRAINING AND SUPPORT TO THROW THE FED OFF WITHOUT REPERCUSSIONS IF THE FED BEHAVES THUSLY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATES THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO FAA FOLLOWUP TO THIS INCIDENT. THE ACI STATED HE SAW NOTHING THAT WAS UNSAFE IN THE FLT BUT RPTR FELT SAFER WITH THE FILING OF THE RPT. THE CHIEF PLT WAS CONSULTED REGARDING THE POSSIBLE MARKING OF THE FLAP INDICATORS. CHIEF PLT FELT THAT BOEING WOULD HAVE TO MAKE THAT CHANGE. RPTR FEELS A SIMPLE RED BAND FOR VERY MINIMAL COST WOULD DO. RPTR IS FOLLOWING UP WITH CHIEF PLT AND WILL TAKE THE MATTER TO THE NEXT STEP HIGHER IF NO SATISFACTION FROM CHIEF PLT. THIS COMPANY HAS SUCH A SERIOUS APCH TO STANDARDIZATION THAT ONE CANNOT TELL THE DIFFERENCE BTWN THE 737-500 OR THE 737-300 ONCE INSIDE THE COCKPIT. THUS THE RED MARK WOULD BE THE ATTN GETTER FOR THE FLAP SETTING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.