Narrative:

Upon initial contact with btm FSS, about 25 mi northwest of btm, I was told that there was a metroliner departing and a cessna working closed traffic for runway 33 and that the wind was calm. We were being dispatched to pick up a critically ill patient in btm. As we neared the airport, about 10 mi to the northwest, I called to say that I would enter an extended base for runway 33. Immediately after I had made this call, the flight nurse told me that the ambulance was waiting and some comment that they would be taking a 'code 3' ride to the hospital to pick up the patient. I heard no radio traffic from the cessna that was earlier reported in the traffic. I was about to call btm radio to tell them that I was going to land on runway 15 to save some time. At that point, an aircraft called in to give a position report and requested other flight information. Btm told him to go to another frequency. Apparently, the aircraft had poor reception and continued to try to get his message to btm radio. The net result of this was that the radio was tied up for mins. During this time, I changed my mind and in the interests of time elected to land on runway 15. As I was approaching the airport from right base to final, I saw the cessna approaching me head on and above me. It was sufficiently spaced that I would not call it a near miss. I assumed that the other pilot had departed from runway 22, as did the metroliner. After the radio frequency cleared, I call in my position as short final for runway 33 and then quickly corrected myself and announced runway 15 as my landing runway. After landing, I was told that I ran the cessna out of the traffic pattern. As luck would have it the other pilot was on his first solo flight. I believe that this incident was caused by my strong desire to get my medical crew on the ground quickly. Communication was impeded by an aircraft dominating an advisory frequency with traffic not import to airport traffic safety. In-flight intercom communications and outgoing life flight radio traffic may have distracted me from hearing the cessna's radio xmissions, if indeed he made any. Suggestions for solutions: pilots of lifeguard aircraft should never be told 'hurry, this lady is dying.' TA frequency should only appear on approach plates. En route traffic should not have access to these frequency. All lifeguard operations should be a far mandated, 2 pilot operation. At times I must monitor communications traffic from up to 4 sources, simultaneously. This is the riskiest flying job I have had in 24 yrs of flying. This aeromedical industry bears very close inspection. Most fixed wing operations that I have seen are operated with 3 pilots. Mine is not, today it showed.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AIR AMBULANCE PLT LNDG AT NON TWR ARPT CUTS OFF ACFT ALREADY IN PATTERN.

Narrative: UPON INITIAL CONTACT WITH BTM FSS, ABOUT 25 MI NW OF BTM, I WAS TOLD THAT THERE WAS A METROLINER DEPARTING AND A CESSNA WORKING CLOSED TFC FOR RWY 33 AND THAT THE WIND WAS CALM. WE WERE BEING DISPATCHED TO PICK UP A CRITICALLY ILL PATIENT IN BTM. AS WE NEARED THE ARPT, ABOUT 10 MI TO THE NW, I CALLED TO SAY THAT I WOULD ENTER AN EXTENDED BASE FOR RWY 33. IMMEDIATELY AFTER I HAD MADE THIS CALL, THE FLT NURSE TOLD ME THAT THE AMBULANCE WAS WAITING AND SOME COMMENT THAT THEY WOULD BE TAKING A 'CODE 3' RIDE TO THE HOSPITAL TO PICK UP THE PATIENT. I HEARD NO RADIO TFC FROM THE CESSNA THAT WAS EARLIER RPTED IN THE TFC. I WAS ABOUT TO CALL BTM RADIO TO TELL THEM THAT I WAS GOING TO LAND ON RWY 15 TO SAVE SOME TIME. AT THAT POINT, AN ACFT CALLED IN TO GIVE A POS RPT AND REQUESTED OTHER FLT INFO. BTM TOLD HIM TO GO TO ANOTHER FREQ. APPARENTLY, THE ACFT HAD POOR RECEPTION AND CONTINUED TO TRY TO GET HIS MESSAGE TO BTM RADIO. THE NET RESULT OF THIS WAS THAT THE RADIO WAS TIED UP FOR MINS. DURING THIS TIME, I CHANGED MY MIND AND IN THE INTERESTS OF TIME ELECTED TO LAND ON RWY 15. AS I WAS APCHING THE ARPT FROM R BASE TO FINAL, I SAW THE CESSNA APCHING ME HEAD ON AND ABOVE ME. IT WAS SUFFICIENTLY SPACED THAT I WOULD NOT CALL IT A NEAR MISS. I ASSUMED THAT THE OTHER PLT HAD DEPARTED FROM RWY 22, AS DID THE METROLINER. AFTER THE RADIO FREQ CLRED, I CALL IN MY POS AS SHORT FINAL FOR RWY 33 AND THEN QUICKLY CORRECTED MYSELF AND ANNOUNCED RWY 15 AS MY LNDG RWY. AFTER LNDG, I WAS TOLD THAT I RAN THE CESSNA OUT OF THE TFC PATTERN. AS LUCK WOULD HAVE IT THE OTHER PLT WAS ON HIS FIRST SOLO FLT. I BELIEVE THAT THIS INCIDENT WAS CAUSED BY MY STRONG DESIRE TO GET MY MEDICAL CREW ON THE GND QUICKLY. COM WAS IMPEDED BY AN ACFT DOMINATING AN ADVISORY FREQ WITH TFC NOT IMPORT TO ARPT TFC SAFETY. INFLT INTERCOM COMS AND OUTGOING LIFE FLT RADIO TFC MAY HAVE DISTRACTED ME FROM HEARING THE CESSNA'S RADIO XMISSIONS, IF INDEED HE MADE ANY. SUGGESTIONS FOR SOLUTIONS: PLTS OF LIFEGUARD ACFT SHOULD NEVER BE TOLD 'HURRY, THIS LADY IS DYING.' TA FREQ SHOULD ONLY APPEAR ON APCH PLATES. ENRTE TFC SHOULD NOT HAVE ACCESS TO THESE FREQ. ALL LIFEGUARD OPS SHOULD BE A FAR MANDATED, 2 PLT OP. AT TIMES I MUST MONITOR COMS TFC FROM UP TO 4 SOURCES, SIMULTANEOUSLY. THIS IS THE RISKIEST FLYING JOB I HAVE HAD IN 24 YRS OF FLYING. THIS AEROMEDICAL INDUSTRY BEARS VERY CLOSE INSPECTION. MOST FIXED WING OPS THAT I HAVE SEEN ARE OPERATED WITH 3 PLTS. MINE IS NOT, TODAY IT SHOWED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.