Narrative:

We were climbing through 29000 ft, approximately 40 mi west of volunteer VOR (vxv), when the #2 engine experienced a moderate level of engine vibration. The engine #2 EPR momentarily increased but quickly decreased as the captain reduced the throttle to idle. The #2 engine oil temperature was momentarily high but also quickly returned to normal. The captain was flying the aircraft at the time of the incident, but turned control of the aircraft over to me and then began to execute the emergency checklist procedures with the so. Although the vibration was still audible the captain decided to defer a shutdown of the engine until he spoke with maintenance in minneapolis. The so contacted maintenance over the radio and maintenance recommended that the hydraulic pumps on engine #2 be shutdown. This was done but the vibration continued. Maintenance had us standby while they looked at the problem. By now we had flown 15-20 mins with the vibration and we were approaching falmouth VOR (flm). Maintenance got back to us and a decision to shutdown the engine was made just north of flm. The engine was then shutdown and we continued on to dtw, our destination. No emergency was declared, but the captain directed me to request 'priority' handling and request that emergency equipment be available upon landing. That is the narrative of the events as I saw it. I will now offer my observations as to what I thought was done improperly throughout this incident. As soon as the vibrations began on climb out I felt that the engine should be shutdown and that we should have diverted to the nearest suitable airfield, which was knoxville (tys). Instead we continued our climb to 31000 ft. I recommended to the captain that we request a descent to 25000 ft. The captain agreed and a descent was requested and approved for 25000 ft. This airline's training encourages the captain to work on the abnormal procedures with the so, and allow the first officer to fly the airplane and communicate with ATC. This was done so I was not fully involved in handling the engine vibration problem. I became concerned when I felt that an inordinate amount of time was being taken to shut down the errant engine.I conveyed my feelings to the captain immediately after the first consultation with maintenance was made, and no action to secure the engine was made. I expressed my feelings to the captain that it was possible that a catastrophic failure of the engine could occur. We were unable to determine the cause of the vibration, yet no expeditious effort was being made to shutdown the engine. The captain seemingly agreed with me, yet did not want to shutdown the engine until maintenance expressed their opinion that the engine should be shutdown. The captain informed me that maintenance preferred that we get the airplane to dtw and not to divert if possible. I expressed to the captain again that I thought we had little choice but to secure the engine and to land at the nearest suitable airfield, which by now was cincinnati (cvg). I thought that the captain had agreed and I even told the passenger over the PA in an update of the situation that there was the 'strong' possibility that we would divert to cvg. The decision to secure the #2 engine finally took place just north of flm. The captain and maintenance agreed to continue to detroit (dtw). At this point I told the captain that 'I feel uncomfortable' with the decision to continue past the nearest suitable landing field. He told me that we still had 2 engines and that we were close to dtw. I pointed out that cvg was the closest airport and that we would actually fly over dayton (day). He said he understood my concern but that maintenance would like the aircraft in dtw. I pointed out that proceeding past suitable airfields was not prudent and hard to justify. My ability to persuade him was unsuccessful. It is interesting that during all of this the so never interjected with his opinion as to the proper course of action. I feel that this lack of initiative allowed the captain to wallow in delayed decision making and ultimately improper decisions. I realize that the captain is ultimately responsible, but I felt he needed some added nudging, even if the so and first officer had to 'gang- up' on him. After the #2 engine was shutdown I asked the captain ifhe would like to declare an emergency. We had talked about this earlier and he knew that he should, but when the time came (in my opinion) to do it he showed a great reluctance to declare an emergency. The so offered an 'alternative' to declaring an emergency--request priority handling. I pointed out that 'priority' handling meant nothing, and that the proper thing to do was to declare an emergency. The captain directed me to request priority handling, and I did. The captain took back control of the aircraft shortly after passing flm and we continued to dtw. We made a few small deviations around some thunderstorms and made an uneventful landing in dtw. I had never flown with either the captain or the so prior to the day of this flight. We all got along well and the cockpit atmosphere was cordial and relaxed, even throughout this incident. The captain listened to my concerns and discussed them with me, and then totally dismissed them. I tend to have a forceful personality, yet I did not believe that I was trying to be overbearing or usurp the captain's prerogative. I do admit to being frustrated with the captain's inability to make what I felt were clearly proper decisions. I noted with some irony that after we landed, the captain commented that this incident was unlike the scenarios he experienced in the simulator. My feelings were opposite. This scenario was a carbon copy of scenarios I had seen on numerous occasions. The only difference was that this particular captain responded differently than any other captain I had seen in the simulator. This airline has exerted a lot of energy to promote crew resource management, but all of my effort to provide useful input failed. All during this incident I was well aware of previous accidents in which no one challenged the captain as he made improper decisions. I wanted to make sure that this would not happen due to my inaction. I discovered my limitations in the face of a captain who made improper decisions.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ENG VIBRATION, FO BELIEVES CAPT ERRANT IN NOT FOLLOWING HIS SUGGESTIONS.

Narrative: WE WERE CLBING THROUGH 29000 FT, APPROX 40 MI W OF VOLUNTEER VOR (VXV), WHEN THE #2 ENG EXPERIENCED A MODERATE LEVEL OF ENG VIBRATION. THE ENG #2 EPR MOMENTARILY INCREASED BUT QUICKLY DECREASED AS THE CAPT REDUCED THE THROTTLE TO IDLE. THE #2 ENG OIL TEMP WAS MOMENTARILY HIGH BUT ALSO QUICKLY RETURNED TO NORMAL. THE CAPT WAS FLYING THE ACFT AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT, BUT TURNED CTL OF THE ACFT OVER TO ME AND THEN BEGAN TO EXECUTE THE EMER CHKLIST PROCS WITH THE SO. ALTHOUGH THE VIBRATION WAS STILL AUDIBLE THE CAPT DECIDED TO DEFER A SHUTDOWN OF THE ENG UNTIL HE SPOKE WITH MAINT IN MINNEAPOLIS. THE SO CONTACTED MAINT OVER THE RADIO AND MAINT RECOMMENDED THAT THE HYD PUMPS ON ENG #2 BE SHUTDOWN. THIS WAS DONE BUT THE VIBRATION CONTINUED. MAINT HAD US STANDBY WHILE THEY LOOKED AT THE PROB. BY NOW WE HAD FLOWN 15-20 MINS WITH THE VIBRATION AND WE WERE APCHING FALMOUTH VOR (FLM). MAINT GOT BACK TO US AND A DECISION TO SHUTDOWN THE ENG WAS MADE JUST N OF FLM. THE ENG WAS THEN SHUTDOWN AND WE CONTINUED ON TO DTW, OUR DEST. NO EMER WAS DECLARED, BUT THE CAPT DIRECTED ME TO REQUEST 'PRIORITY' HANDLING AND REQUEST THAT EMER EQUIP BE AVAILABLE UPON LNDG. THAT IS THE NARRATIVE OF THE EVENTS AS I SAW IT. I WILL NOW OFFER MY OBSERVATIONS AS TO WHAT I THOUGHT WAS DONE IMPROPERLY THROUGHOUT THIS INCIDENT. AS SOON AS THE VIBRATIONS BEGAN ON CLBOUT I FELT THAT THE ENG SHOULD BE SHUTDOWN AND THAT WE SHOULD HAVE DIVERTED TO THE NEAREST SUITABLE AIRFIELD, WHICH WAS KNOXVILLE (TYS). INSTEAD WE CONTINUED OUR CLB TO 31000 FT. I RECOMMENDED TO THE CAPT THAT WE REQUEST A DSCNT TO 25000 FT. THE CAPT AGREED AND A DSCNT WAS REQUESTED AND APPROVED FOR 25000 FT. THIS AIRLINE'S TRAINING ENCOURAGES THE CAPT TO WORK ON THE ABNORMAL PROCS WITH THE SO, AND ALLOW THE FO TO FLY THE AIRPLANE AND COMMUNICATE WITH ATC. THIS WAS DONE SO I WAS NOT FULLY INVOLVED IN HANDLING THE ENG VIBRATION PROB. I BECAME CONCERNED WHEN I FELT THAT AN INORDINATE AMOUNT OF TIME WAS BEING TAKEN TO SHUT DOWN THE ERRANT ENG.I CONVEYED MY FEELINGS TO THE CAPT IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE FIRST CONSULTATION WITH MAINT WAS MADE, AND NO ACTION TO SECURE THE ENG WAS MADE. I EXPRESSED MY FEELINGS TO THE CAPT THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT A CATASTROPHIC FAILURE OF THE ENG COULD OCCUR. WE WERE UNABLE TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE OF THE VIBRATION, YET NO EXPEDITIOUS EFFORT WAS BEING MADE TO SHUTDOWN THE ENG. THE CAPT SEEMINGLY AGREED WITH ME, YET DID NOT WANT TO SHUTDOWN THE ENG UNTIL MAINT EXPRESSED THEIR OPINION THAT THE ENG SHOULD BE SHUTDOWN. THE CAPT INFORMED ME THAT MAINT PREFERRED THAT WE GET THE AIRPLANE TO DTW AND NOT TO DIVERT IF POSSIBLE. I EXPRESSED TO THE CAPT AGAIN THAT I THOUGHT WE HAD LITTLE CHOICE BUT TO SECURE THE ENG AND TO LAND AT THE NEAREST SUITABLE AIRFIELD, WHICH BY NOW WAS CINCINNATI (CVG). I THOUGHT THAT THE CAPT HAD AGREED AND I EVEN TOLD THE PAX OVER THE PA IN AN UPDATE OF THE SIT THAT THERE WAS THE 'STRONG' POSSIBILITY THAT WE WOULD DIVERT TO CVG. THE DECISION TO SECURE THE #2 ENG FINALLY TOOK PLACE JUST N OF FLM. THE CAPT AND MAINT AGREED TO CONTINUE TO DETROIT (DTW). AT THIS POINT I TOLD THE CAPT THAT 'I FEEL UNCOMFORTABLE' WITH THE DECISION TO CONTINUE PAST THE NEAREST SUITABLE LNDG FIELD. HE TOLD ME THAT WE STILL HAD 2 ENGS AND THAT WE WERE CLOSE TO DTW. I POINTED OUT THAT CVG WAS THE CLOSEST ARPT AND THAT WE WOULD ACTUALLY FLY OVER DAYTON (DAY). HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD MY CONCERN BUT THAT MAINT WOULD LIKE THE ACFT IN DTW. I POINTED OUT THAT PROCEEDING PAST SUITABLE AIRFIELDS WAS NOT PRUDENT AND HARD TO JUSTIFY. MY ABILITY TO PERSUADE HIM WAS UNSUCCESSFUL. IT IS INTERESTING THAT DURING ALL OF THIS THE SO NEVER INTERJECTED WITH HIS OPINION AS TO THE PROPER COURSE OF ACTION. I FEEL THAT THIS LACK OF INITIATIVE ALLOWED THE CAPT TO WALLOW IN DELAYED DECISION MAKING AND ULTIMATELY IMPROPER DECISIONS. I REALIZE THAT THE CAPT IS ULTIMATELY RESPONSIBLE, BUT I FELT HE NEEDED SOME ADDED NUDGING, EVEN IF THE SO AND FO HAD TO 'GANG- UP' ON HIM. AFTER THE #2 ENG WAS SHUTDOWN I ASKED THE CAPT IFHE WOULD LIKE TO DECLARE AN EMER. WE HAD TALKED ABOUT THIS EARLIER AND HE KNEW THAT HE SHOULD, BUT WHEN THE TIME CAME (IN MY OPINION) TO DO IT HE SHOWED A GREAT RELUCTANCE TO DECLARE AN EMER. THE SO OFFERED AN 'ALTERNATIVE' TO DECLARING AN EMER--REQUEST PRIORITY HANDLING. I POINTED OUT THAT 'PRIORITY' HANDLING MEANT NOTHING, AND THAT THE PROPER THING TO DO WAS TO DECLARE AN EMER. THE CAPT DIRECTED ME TO REQUEST PRIORITY HANDLING, AND I DID. THE CAPT TOOK BACK CTL OF THE ACFT SHORTLY AFTER PASSING FLM AND WE CONTINUED TO DTW. WE MADE A FEW SMALL DEVS AROUND SOME TSTMS AND MADE AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG IN DTW. I HAD NEVER FLOWN WITH EITHER THE CAPT OR THE SO PRIOR TO THE DAY OF THIS FLT. WE ALL GOT ALONG WELL AND THE COCKPIT ATMOSPHERE WAS CORDIAL AND RELAXED, EVEN THROUGHOUT THIS INCIDENT. THE CAPT LISTENED TO MY CONCERNS AND DISCUSSED THEM WITH ME, AND THEN TOTALLY DISMISSED THEM. I TEND TO HAVE A FORCEFUL PERSONALITY, YET I DID NOT BELIEVE THAT I WAS TRYING TO BE OVERBEARING OR USURP THE CAPT'S PREROGATIVE. I DO ADMIT TO BEING FRUSTRATED WITH THE CAPT'S INABILITY TO MAKE WHAT I FELT WERE CLRLY PROPER DECISIONS. I NOTED WITH SOME IRONY THAT AFTER WE LANDED, THE CAPT COMMENTED THAT THIS INCIDENT WAS UNLIKE THE SCENARIOS HE EXPERIENCED IN THE SIMULATOR. MY FEELINGS WERE OPPOSITE. THIS SCENARIO WAS A CARBON COPY OF SCENARIOS I HAD SEEN ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS. THE ONLY DIFFERENCE WAS THAT THIS PARTICULAR CAPT RESPONDED DIFFERENTLY THAN ANY OTHER CAPT I HAD SEEN IN THE SIMULATOR. THIS AIRLINE HAS EXERTED A LOT OF ENERGY TO PROMOTE CREW RESOURCE MGMNT, BUT ALL OF MY EFFORT TO PROVIDE USEFUL INPUT FAILED. ALL DURING THIS INCIDENT I WAS WELL AWARE OF PREVIOUS ACCIDENTS IN WHICH NO ONE CHALLENGED THE CAPT AS HE MADE IMPROPER DECISIONS. I WANTED TO MAKE SURE THAT THIS WOULD NOT HAPPEN DUE TO MY INACTION. I DISCOVERED MY LIMITATIONS IN THE FACE OF A CAPT WHO MADE IMPROPER DECISIONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.