37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 279415 |
Time | |
Date | 199407 |
Day | Thu |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : mia |
State Reference | FL |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 15 agl bound upper : 15 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : mia |
Operator | common carrier : air taxi |
Make Model Name | Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 135 |
Flight Phase | climbout : takeoff landing other |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air taxi |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : instrument pilot : cfi pilot : atp pilot : commercial |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 1700 flight time type : 300 |
ASRS Report | 279415 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air taxi |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : commercial pilot : instrument |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical non adherence : published procedure |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : rejected takeoff flight crew : declared emergency |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Aircraft |
Narrative:
Nose baggage door opened just after rotation, about 15 ft above the runway. Since the gear was still down and locked and about 6000 ft of runway remained, the takeoff was aborted. Action taken without hesitation. Response was almost instinctive. If event happened on a short runway, decision to abort may not have been so instantaneous. Training should include more emphasis on aborting takeoff at the critical rotation phase, including performance variables and real world distances required to abort after takeoff with gear still down. Problem arose due to ramp personnel removing a bag just prior to leaving gate, after flight crew already checked that all doors were secured. Standard procedures should require ramp personnel to inform crew of any last min opening of baggage compartments after crew has completed final check. Then the crew could decide whether to re-check doors or not.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: AIR TAXI SMT ABORTS TKOF WHILE 15 FT ABOVE RWY. CARGO DOOR HAD OPENED.
Narrative: NOSE BAGGAGE DOOR OPENED JUST AFTER ROTATION, ABOUT 15 FT ABOVE THE RWY. SINCE THE GEAR WAS STILL DOWN AND LOCKED AND ABOUT 6000 FT OF RWY REMAINED, THE TKOF WAS ABORTED. ACTION TAKEN WITHOUT HESITATION. RESPONSE WAS ALMOST INSTINCTIVE. IF EVENT HAPPENED ON A SHORT RWY, DECISION TO ABORT MAY NOT HAVE BEEN SO INSTANTANEOUS. TRAINING SHOULD INCLUDE MORE EMPHASIS ON ABORTING TKOF AT THE CRITICAL ROTATION PHASE, INCLUDING PERFORMANCE VARIABLES AND REAL WORLD DISTANCES REQUIRED TO ABORT AFTER TKOF WITH GEAR STILL DOWN. PROB AROSE DUE TO RAMP PERSONNEL REMOVING A BAG JUST PRIOR TO LEAVING GATE, AFTER FLC ALREADY CHKED THAT ALL DOORS WERE SECURED. STANDARD PROCS SHOULD REQUIRE RAMP PERSONNEL TO INFORM CREW OF ANY LAST MIN OPENING OF BAGGAGE COMPARTMENTS AFTER CREW HAS COMPLETED FINAL CHK. THEN THE CREW COULD DECIDE WHETHER TO RE-CHK DOORS OR NOT.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.