Narrative:

I would like to relate a cockpit resource management (CRM) situation I experienced while flying as a first officer. On this day, I was scheduled to deadhead with the rest of my crew, whom I had never flown with before, then turn around with the same airplane and fly back to our home base. The flight started out about 2 hours late because the aircraft was still undergoing a 'C' check by maintenance. En route, the flight was further delayed about 20 mins due to ATC in the terminal area. After arrival, we relieved the inbound crew and began to prepare the airplane for departure. At this point, the captain left the plane to go to operations to get his paperwork for the flight. When he returned, he said that he had discussed with operations his plans to report a pushback time of XX35Z and a taxi time of XX40Z. He explained that this delay was not the station's fault and that this would help them look better. It also became apparent that by using these numbers the captain had figured we would receive more flight pay for the day. I became concerned that these numbers were way too far off what the real pushback and taxi times would be. I told him those times would reflect only a 30 min turn time and this would not look right. I realized what he intended to do, so I tried my best CRM technique to persuade him not to attempt it. I told him that a 30 min turn time using our contracted ground crew was highly unlikely. He just said that it was not that unusual. After I made my opinion clear to him that these times were too far off, he countered with an explanation of his idea of block times and the situation with the company pay. It became pretty clear that he was set on this course of action and had gone so far as to coordination the scheme with operations. We pushed back after a fueling delay and several mins worth of problems getting the jetway out of the way at XX15Z and XX20Z respectively, 40 mins off the pushback and taxi times that the captain said he intended to use! Again, I asked him what he wanted the numbers to be in the hopes that he, too, would realized that his idea of what thetimes should be were way off. This time he said we would give the company 5 mins and call them 40 and XX42Z. I didn't argue the issue any further at this point because we got caught up in the 6 pm departure rush. However, throughout the taxi, part of my thoughts were that surely he did not plan to go through with this scheme. Once airborne and before calling the times into operations, I pointed out that our takeoff time and his taxi time put us on the ground for more than 1 hour, and that although this is possible on an IFR day, it probably isn't probable on a cavu day such as we had. At this point,we were above 10000 ft and he launched into a defensive explanation of the company fom, FARS and the state of affairs between the pilots and management. To this, I respond that there was a recent alpa letter which warned not to engage in a work slow down or doctoring of the logbook times like he wanted to do. He responded that although he had read the letter, that's not what he was told, off the record, that alpa had hoped we would do on our own initiative. I reminded him that the company was on the look-out for people doing this very thing with the logbook times and that they would hammer anyone caught falsifying the log times. It did not seem to matter, as he had an answer for every one of my points and seemed adamant on continuing with his previously planned course of action. Finally I told him, 'look, this place may have its problems, but it's still a good job, and a job I need. I certainly would not go snitch to the company on a captain, but if you want to use these times and anyone asks me about them later, I'm going to refer them to you and you can explain them away because I think they are excessive.' this statement I thought would bring him to his senses. It didn't. He said that if that's the way I wanted to deal with it that was fine, but he had already coordinated it with operations and it would seem strange to them to change back to the real times. At this point, I called back the bogus times he wantedtouse and recorded them in the log. Per our fom, the captain had the final responsibility to insure that the numbers in the log were true and correct, and did so by signing and dating the logbook page in use. This situation, and attitude by this captain, highlights the results of yrs of stress associated with our company's bankruptcy, ongoing pay inequities and frustrations felt by employees when labor/management relations are not going well. This often creates an environment of burned out, stressed out people who feel the need to 'get back' at their company, and, in the process, can cause an improper or unsafe situation out on the line. Recognizing this, I tried every CRM trick in my bag to remind this captain of his responsibilities short of being a tough guy and refusing to call in the numbers or write them in the logbook. While it seems logical to suggest that that is what I needed to do, there is a major problem with that solution: it puts me in the situation of trying to maintain a good working relationship in the cockpit with this captain for the rest of the 4-HR flight. Because this was not a safety of flight issue such as an unstabilized approach or an MEL problem, I decided to deal with it in a less confrontational manner. I have contacted my alpa council and they have agreed that our professional standards board will review this situation with me and the captain and attempt to correct this attitude before it does carry over to a safety of flight item. Next time, however, I will 'just say no' to someone who puts me in this kind of spot the best direct way I can. Dealing with this sort of thing after the fact is messy and uncomfortable in the extreme.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LOGBOOK FALSIFICATION WITH ERRED BLOCK TIMES ENTERED BY CAPT.

Narrative: I WOULD LIKE TO RELATE A COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT (CRM) SIT I EXPERIENCED WHILE FLYING AS A FO. ON THIS DAY, I WAS SCHEDULED TO DEADHEAD WITH THE REST OF MY CREW, WHOM I HAD NEVER FLOWN WITH BEFORE, THEN TURN AROUND WITH THE SAME AIRPLANE AND FLY BACK TO OUR HOME BASE. THE FLT STARTED OUT ABOUT 2 HRS LATE BECAUSE THE ACFT WAS STILL UNDERGOING A 'C' CHK BY MAINT. ENRTE, THE FLT WAS FURTHER DELAYED ABOUT 20 MINS DUE TO ATC IN THE TERMINAL AREA. AFTER ARR, WE RELIEVED THE INBOUND CREW AND BEGAN TO PREPARE THE AIRPLANE FOR DEP. AT THIS POINT, THE CAPT LEFT THE PLANE TO GO TO OPS TO GET HIS PAPERWORK FOR THE FLT. WHEN HE RETURNED, HE SAID THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED WITH OPS HIS PLANS TO RPT A PUSHBACK TIME OF XX35Z AND A TAXI TIME OF XX40Z. HE EXPLAINED THAT THIS DELAY WAS NOT THE STATION'S FAULT AND THAT THIS WOULD HELP THEM LOOK BETTER. IT ALSO BECAME APPARENT THAT BY USING THESE NUMBERS THE CAPT HAD FIGURED WE WOULD RECEIVE MORE FLT PAY FOR THE DAY. I BECAME CONCERNED THAT THESE NUMBERS WERE WAY TOO FAR OFF WHAT THE REAL PUSHBACK AND TAXI TIMES WOULD BE. I TOLD HIM THOSE TIMES WOULD REFLECT ONLY A 30 MIN TURN TIME AND THIS WOULD NOT LOOK RIGHT. I REALIZED WHAT HE INTENDED TO DO, SO I TRIED MY BEST CRM TECHNIQUE TO PERSUADE HIM NOT TO ATTEMPT IT. I TOLD HIM THAT A 30 MIN TURN TIME USING OUR CONTRACTED GND CREW WAS HIGHLY UNLIKELY. HE JUST SAID THAT IT WAS NOT THAT UNUSUAL. AFTER I MADE MY OPINION CLR TO HIM THAT THESE TIMES WERE TOO FAR OFF, HE COUNTERED WITH AN EXPLANATION OF HIS IDEA OF BLOCK TIMES AND THE SIT WITH THE COMPANY PAY. IT BECAME PRETTY CLR THAT HE WAS SET ON THIS COURSE OF ACTION AND HAD GONE SO FAR AS TO COORD THE SCHEME WITH OPS. WE PUSHED BACK AFTER A FUELING DELAY AND SEVERAL MINS WORTH OF PROBS GETTING THE JETWAY OUT OF THE WAY AT XX15Z AND XX20Z RESPECTIVELY, 40 MINS OFF THE PUSHBACK AND TAXI TIMES THAT THE CAPT SAID HE INTENDED TO USE! AGAIN, I ASKED HIM WHAT HE WANTED THE NUMBERS TO BE IN THE HOPES THAT HE, TOO, WOULD REALIZED THAT HIS IDEA OF WHAT THETIMES SHOULD BE WERE WAY OFF. THIS TIME HE SAID WE WOULD GIVE THE COMPANY 5 MINS AND CALL THEM 40 AND XX42Z. I DIDN'T ARGUE THE ISSUE ANY FURTHER AT THIS POINT BECAUSE WE GOT CAUGHT UP IN THE 6 PM DEP RUSH. HOWEVER, THROUGHOUT THE TAXI, PART OF MY THOUGHTS WERE THAT SURELY HE DID NOT PLAN TO GO THROUGH WITH THIS SCHEME. ONCE AIRBORNE AND BEFORE CALLING THE TIMES INTO OPS, I POINTED OUT THAT OUR TKOF TIME AND HIS TAXI TIME PUT US ON THE GND FOR MORE THAN 1 HR, AND THAT ALTHOUGH THIS IS POSSIBLE ON AN IFR DAY, IT PROBABLY ISN'T PROBABLE ON A CAVU DAY SUCH AS WE HAD. AT THIS POINT,WE WERE ABOVE 10000 FT AND HE LAUNCHED INTO A DEFENSIVE EXPLANATION OF THE COMPANY FOM, FARS AND THE STATE OF AFFAIRS BTWN THE PLTS AND MGMNT. TO THIS, I RESPOND THAT THERE WAS A RECENT ALPA LETTER WHICH WARNED NOT TO ENGAGE IN A WORK SLOW DOWN OR DOCTORING OF THE LOGBOOK TIMES LIKE HE WANTED TO DO. HE RESPONDED THAT ALTHOUGH HE HAD READ THE LETTER, THAT'S NOT WHAT HE WAS TOLD, OFF THE RECORD, THAT ALPA HAD HOPED WE WOULD DO ON OUR OWN INITIATIVE. I REMINDED HIM THAT THE COMPANY WAS ON THE LOOK-OUT FOR PEOPLE DOING THIS VERY THING WITH THE LOGBOOK TIMES AND THAT THEY WOULD HAMMER ANYONE CAUGHT FALSIFYING THE LOG TIMES. IT DID NOT SEEM TO MATTER, AS HE HAD AN ANSWER FOR EVERY ONE OF MY POINTS AND SEEMED ADAMANT ON CONTINUING WITH HIS PREVIOUSLY PLANNED COURSE OF ACTION. FINALLY I TOLD HIM, 'LOOK, THIS PLACE MAY HAVE ITS PROBS, BUT IT'S STILL A GOOD JOB, AND A JOB I NEED. I CERTAINLY WOULD NOT GO SNITCH TO THE COMPANY ON A CAPT, BUT IF YOU WANT TO USE THESE TIMES AND ANYONE ASKS ME ABOUT THEM LATER, I'M GOING TO REFER THEM TO YOU AND YOU CAN EXPLAIN THEM AWAY BECAUSE I THINK THEY ARE EXCESSIVE.' THIS STATEMENT I THOUGHT WOULD BRING HIM TO HIS SENSES. IT DIDN'T. HE SAID THAT IF THAT'S THE WAY I WANTED TO DEAL WITH IT THAT WAS FINE, BUT HE HAD ALREADY COORDINATED IT WITH OPS AND IT WOULD SEEM STRANGE TO THEM TO CHANGE BACK TO THE REAL TIMES. AT THIS POINT, I CALLED BACK THE BOGUS TIMES HE WANTEDTOUSE AND RECORDED THEM IN THE LOG. PER OUR FOM, THE CAPT HAD THE FINAL RESPONSIBILITY TO INSURE THAT THE NUMBERS IN THE LOG WERE TRUE AND CORRECT, AND DID SO BY SIGNING AND DATING THE LOGBOOK PAGE IN USE. THIS SIT, AND ATTITUDE BY THIS CAPT, HIGHLIGHTS THE RESULTS OF YRS OF STRESS ASSOCIATED WITH OUR COMPANY'S BANKRUPTCY, ONGOING PAY INEQUITIES AND FRUSTRATIONS FELT BY EMPLOYEES WHEN LABOR/MGMNT RELATIONS ARE NOT GOING WELL. THIS OFTEN CREATES AN ENVIRONMENT OF BURNED OUT, STRESSED OUT PEOPLE WHO FEEL THE NEED TO 'GET BACK' AT THEIR COMPANY, AND, IN THE PROCESS, CAN CAUSE AN IMPROPER OR UNSAFE SIT OUT ON THE LINE. RECOGNIZING THIS, I TRIED EVERY CRM TRICK IN MY BAG TO REMIND THIS CAPT OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES SHORT OF BEING A TOUGH GUY AND REFUSING TO CALL IN THE NUMBERS OR WRITE THEM IN THE LOGBOOK. WHILE IT SEEMS LOGICAL TO SUGGEST THAT THAT IS WHAT I NEEDED TO DO, THERE IS A MAJOR PROB WITH THAT SOLUTION: IT PUTS ME IN THE SIT OF TRYING TO MAINTAIN A GOOD WORKING RELATIONSHIP IN THE COCKPIT WITH THIS CAPT FOR THE REST OF THE 4-HR FLT. BECAUSE THIS WAS NOT A SAFETY OF FLT ISSUE SUCH AS AN UNSTABILIZED APCH OR AN MEL PROB, I DECIDED TO DEAL WITH IT IN A LESS CONFRONTATIONAL MANNER. I HAVE CONTACTED MY ALPA COUNCIL AND THEY HAVE AGREED THAT OUR PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS BOARD WILL REVIEW THIS SIT WITH ME AND THE CAPT AND ATTEMPT TO CORRECT THIS ATTITUDE BEFORE IT DOES CARRY OVER TO A SAFETY OF FLT ITEM. NEXT TIME, HOWEVER, I WILL 'JUST SAY NO' TO SOMEONE WHO PUTS ME IN THIS KIND OF SPOT THE BEST DIRECT WAY I CAN. DEALING WITH THIS SORT OF THING AFTER THE FACT IS MESSY AND UNCOMFORTABLE IN THE EXTREME.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.