Narrative:

We departed runway 16L at reno with clearance to execute the wagge 1 departure to intercept the fmg 182 degree radial. I was flying with my VOR tuned to the localizer for the wagge one. The captain's VOR was turned to fmg 182 degree radial. We were near the maximum weight for takeoff under these conditions and terrain clearance in the event of engine failure was clearly important, given the reno area terrain. After liftoff, I had to work my way right to intercept the localizer, which is off runway 16R, not the active 16L. I was also observing the terrain for escape rtes as well as performing routine climb out checklist items. I did not notice any problems with the captain's VOR at this time. After switching to departure, we were told to intercept the fmg 182 degrees radial. I glanced over to the captain's HSI and noted that he was recycling the VOR. He then advised me to turn left to intercept. I started a gradual left turn, concerned that an intercept should require a right turn (164 degrees localizer to 182 degrees VOR). I checked my HSI to see if I had inadvertently drifted right of course and noted I had not. The captain called for further left turn, so I began to tune my VOR to fmg to check his VOR while continuing left. The controller advised us of our deviation from course. The captain finished tuning my VOR to fmg and I advised him of a discrepancy between the vors. I then turned to course using my VOR, assuming his was in error. Discussion between the captain and me and a maintenance check resulted in the finding of a weak connection in the captain's VOR. I am concerned about hazardous terrain clearance possibilities that could result had we been taking off with the weak VOR on the localizer under IFR conditions. A takeoff from 16R aligns with the localizer and allows a constant check from before takeoff throughout the climb. Takeoff from 16 left does not allow this check and requires an intercept of the localizer angling toward high terrain. I believe that IFR takeoff minimums for 16 left departure at reno should be reviewed considering the increased hazards over 16 right and the reno area terrain. Supplemental information from acn 281895: fatigue was also a possible contributing cause. We had flown all night the night before and were scheduled to rest for about 10 1/2 hours prior to our flight. Even though tired, I found it difficult to sleep. (This was a day period when you would normally be up). There were constant interruptions from maids and noise (a rock band was getting ready for a concert outside my window) when I was trying to sort out what radios were working etc. I experienced a certain mental slowness and lethargy which I attributed to fatigue.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR LGT FLEW PAST A TURN POINT ON A SID.

Narrative: WE DEPARTED RWY 16L AT RENO WITH CLRNC TO EXECUTE THE WAGGE 1 DEP TO INTERCEPT THE FMG 182 DEG RADIAL. I WAS FLYING WITH MY VOR TUNED TO THE LOC FOR THE WAGGE ONE. THE CAPT'S VOR WAS TURNED TO FMG 182 DEG RADIAL. WE WERE NEAR THE MAX WT FOR TKOF UNDER THESE CONDITIONS AND TERRAIN CLRNC IN THE EVENT OF ENG FAILURE WAS CLRLY IMPORTANT, GIVEN THE RENO AREA TERRAIN. AFTER LIFTOFF, I HAD TO WORK MY WAY R TO INTERCEPT THE LOC, WHICH IS OFF RWY 16R, NOT THE ACTIVE 16L. I WAS ALSO OBSERVING THE TERRAIN FOR ESCAPE RTES AS WELL AS PERFORMING ROUTINE CLBOUT CHKLIST ITEMS. I DID NOT NOTICE ANY PROBS WITH THE CAPT'S VOR AT THIS TIME. AFTER SWITCHING TO DEP, WE WERE TOLD TO INTERCEPT THE FMG 182 DEGS RADIAL. I GLANCED OVER TO THE CAPT'S HSI AND NOTED THAT HE WAS RECYCLING THE VOR. HE THEN ADVISED ME TO TURN L TO INTERCEPT. I STARTED A GRADUAL L TURN, CONCERNED THAT AN INTERCEPT SHOULD REQUIRE A R TURN (164 DEGS LOC TO 182 DEGS VOR). I CHKED MY HSI TO SEE IF I HAD INADVERTENTLY DRIFTED R OF COURSE AND NOTED I HAD NOT. THE CAPT CALLED FOR FURTHER L TURN, SO I BEGAN TO TUNE MY VOR TO FMG TO CHK HIS VOR WHILE CONTINUING L. THE CTLR ADVISED US OF OUR DEV FROM COURSE. THE CAPT FINISHED TUNING MY VOR TO FMG AND I ADVISED HIM OF A DISCREPANCY BTWN THE VORS. I THEN TURNED TO COURSE USING MY VOR, ASSUMING HIS WAS IN ERROR. DISCUSSION BTWN THE CAPT AND ME AND A MAINT CHK RESULTED IN THE FINDING OF A WEAK CONNECTION IN THE CAPT'S VOR. I AM CONCERNED ABOUT HAZARDOUS TERRAIN CLRNC POSSIBILITIES THAT COULD RESULT HAD WE BEEN TAKING OFF WITH THE WEAK VOR ON THE LOC UNDER IFR CONDITIONS. A TKOF FROM 16R ALIGNS WITH THE LOC AND ALLOWS A CONSTANT CHK FROM BEFORE TKOF THROUGHOUT THE CLB. TKOF FROM 16 L DOES NOT ALLOW THIS CHK AND REQUIRES AN INTERCEPT OF THE LOC ANGLING TOWARD HIGH TERRAIN. I BELIEVE THAT IFR TKOF MINIMUMS FOR 16 L DEP AT RENO SHOULD BE REVIEWED CONSIDERING THE INCREASED HAZARDS OVER 16 R AND THE RENO AREA TERRAIN. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 281895: FATIGUE WAS ALSO A POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE. WE HAD FLOWN ALL NIGHT THE NIGHT BEFORE AND WERE SCHEDULED TO REST FOR ABOUT 10 1/2 HRS PRIOR TO OUR FLT. EVEN THOUGH TIRED, I FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO SLEEP. (THIS WAS A DAY PERIOD WHEN YOU WOULD NORMALLY BE UP). THERE WERE CONSTANT INTERRUPTIONS FROM MAIDS AND NOISE (A ROCK BAND WAS GETTING READY FOR A CONCERT OUTSIDE MY WINDOW) WHEN I WAS TRYING TO SORT OUT WHAT RADIOS WERE WORKING ETC. I EXPERIENCED A CERTAIN MENTAL SLOWNESS AND LETHARGY WHICH I ATTRIBUTED TO FATIGUE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.