Pilot alleges controller wrongfully swapped runways inside OM between him and a 747 ahead.

Attributes
ACN	282580
Time
Date	199409
Day	Mon
Local Time Of Day	0601 To 1200
Place
Locale Reference	airport : sfo
State Reference	CA
Altitude	agl bound lower : 900 agl bound upper : 900
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Controlling Facilities	tower : sfo
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	Commercial Fixed Wing
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Flight Phase	descent : approach
Route In Use	approach : visual
Flight Plan	IFR
Aircraft 2
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	B747 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Navigation In Use	Other Other
Flight Phase	descent : approach
Route In Use	approach : visual
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Qualification	pilot : flight engineer pilot : atp
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 100 flight time total : 11200 flight time type : 2200
ASRS Report	282580
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : first officer
Qualification	pilot : instrument pilot : commercial
Events
Anomaly	conflict : airborne less severe other anomaly other
Independent Detector	other flight crewa
Resolutory Action	flight crew : took evasive action other
Consequence	faa : reviewed incident with flight crew
Supplementary
Primary Problem	Flight Crew Human Performance
Air Traffic Incident	other

Narrative:

We were on visual approach to runway 28L. A boeing 747 was on visual to runway 28R. 1 1/4 mi ahead of us per sfo tower callout earlier. Aircraft which had just landed on runway 28R ahead of the 747 was slow to clear the runway. When we were 3 mi from touchdown, tower instructed B-747 change to and land on runway 28L. We were instructed to criss-cross and land on runway 28R. First officer was flying. We both came to the decision immediately that the crisscross maneuver was impossible to do without encountering the B-747 wake and still be low enough to make a normal landing on runway 28R. We executed a go around and returned for a normal visual approach and landing. Suggest that tower operators not be allowed to issue change-over instructions when aircraft are so close to landing, close together on narrowly spaced visual approachs. Contacted sfo tower by telephone after landing. They said they issued these instructions because we had the 747 in sight. Having an aircraft in sight does not necessarily allow safe maneuvering, especially so close in to the touchdown point.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT ALLEGES CTLR WRONGFULLY SWAPPED RWYS INSIDE OM BTWN HIM AND A 747 AHEAD.

Narrative: WE WERE ON VISUAL APCH TO RWY 28L. A BOEING 747 WAS ON VISUAL TO RWY 28R. 1 1/4 MI AHEAD OF US PER SFO TWR CALLOUT EARLIER. ACFT WHICH HAD JUST LANDED ON RWY 28R AHEAD OF THE 747 WAS SLOW TO CLR THE RWY. WHEN WE WERE 3 MI FROM TOUCHDOWN, TWR INSTRUCTED B-747 CHANGE TO AND LAND ON RWY 28L. WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO CRISS-CROSS AND LAND ON RWY 28R. FO WAS FLYING. WE BOTH CAME TO THE DECISION IMMEDIATELY THAT THE CRISSCROSS MANEUVER WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO DO WITHOUT ENCOUNTERING THE B-747 WAKE AND STILL BE LOW ENOUGH TO MAKE A NORMAL LNDG ON RWY 28R. WE EXECUTED A GAR AND RETURNED FOR A NORMAL VISUAL APCH AND LNDG. SUGGEST THAT TWR OPERATORS NOT BE ALLOWED TO ISSUE CHANGE-OVER INSTRUCTIONS WHEN ACFT ARE SO CLOSE TO LNDG, CLOSE TOGETHER ON NARROWLY SPACED VISUAL APCHS. CONTACTED SFO TWR BY TELEPHONE AFTER LNDG. THEY SAID THEY ISSUED THESE INSTRUCTIONS BECAUSE WE HAD THE 747 IN SIGHT. HAVING AN ACFT IN SIGHT DOES NOT NECESSARILY ALLOW SAFE MANEUVERING, ESPECIALLY SO CLOSE IN TO THE TOUCHDOWN POINT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.