Narrative:

I am a captain and check airman on this aircraft type. Last min sick call placed me right seat with a much older, junior captain. In such circumstances I was instructed by management that I was only an first officer. I have been a line check airman for 1 1/2 yrs, and a pc check airman for 3/4 yr. My experience level is moderate. I train ground, simulator, flight, cpt, IOE and cockpit resource management. During our 2 day trip, I noted the captain's disregard for strict adherence to company procedures and the 'bending' of FARS. During our briefing I told him I was only an first officer and that if I ever had something to say, I would. During day 1, had I critiqued everything I saw, it would have set a 'bad tone' for crew coordination for the remaining trip. Cockpit resource management taught me to avoid such things...so I let minor things ride. Day 2: started well with good decisions by the captain...but very poor ones later on. We were behind schedule with a quick turn coming out of aty for our 20 min flight to abr. Captain was flying. He briefed for the ILS which was nearly straight-in off of the airway, but would require either a procedure turn or an arc. He said we would fly RNAV to the OM, figuring to pick up the localizer well in advance. With much discussion I advised him of the proper transition. I thought the arc was to be used. His navs were not set up properly, so I gave him distances to the arc from my DME (he was still RNAV). I called reaching the arc, told him to turn left to the localizer, he said he 'thinks its alive.' the arc allowed a descent, it was not initiated and I advised that the GS was going beneath us, and again told him to turn left. He started to turn and the localizer immediately came alive. A dive for the GS was made, he flew away from the flight director's commands (still on altitude hold). The 'initial check' was called late and was never completed. His required calls were missed at the marker, mine were not, his responses were missed again. The GS wasn't captured until we broke out at 500 ft, I had to prompt the flaps. I called 'gear' awaiting his 'down 3 green,' instead I got his excuses for missing the flaps. I again called 'gear' and got the appropriate response to continue and complete the final check. I (unsolicited) made all the local traffic calls, yet a mowing tractor was driving right along the runway's side. The captain saw this and landed long-good call. Landing was normal. At the gate we had a frank discussion on what happened, the trip continued. With all my experience and training, why didn't I take the aircraft away? 1) the aircraft wasn't out of control, and was on the localizer above localizer mins. 2) because of my original briefing, I felt that, had I taken control, a struggle may have ensued. Cockpit resource management taught me the hazards of that...' instead I monitored and directed to the ground. Subsequent to this, my authority/authorized has been clarified...I can give on the spot line checks and gndings of pilots if I see fit. My briefings are now changing to reflect that I am an first officer until I state 'my aircraft' upon which controls will be relinquished to me, a check airman with ultimate authority/authorized. I am amazed that I was not more direct. I didn't clarify the transition in use I never once said 'go around,' etc. I have learned that one mistake precipitates another and another, and that the 'red flags' that seemed minor, are normally just the tip of the iceberg. I am a changed pilot...I can't wait to teach others that which I have learned.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CHK AIRMAN COMPLAINS ABOUT ANOTHER PLT'S FLYING SKILLS. THE CHK AIRMAN HAS NOW GAINED MORE LIFE-AND-DEATH AUTH.

Narrative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

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.