Narrative:

Short flight lga-bos. Approaching level off at FL210, noticed 'lower aft body overheat' light illuminated. This light is between 2 other lights, the #1 engine strut overheat light and the #3 engine strut overheat light. If either of those 2 other lights comes on, it is an 'immediate action item,' which calls for associated throttle to idle. The lower aft body overheat light usually means there is a hot air leak associated with the #2 engine but is not an immediate action item. However, at the time, I forgot this. I just pointed out the light to the captain and called for #2 throttle to idle. He looked back and saw the light and immediately pulled the throttle to idle while I dug out my book for the procedure. Here's where I screwed up. Even though the light is clearly labeled 'lower aft body overheat,' I was thinking all the way 'engine strut overheat.' so when I saw that procedure in my book I immediately started running that checklist. The captain and I ran through it while the first officer flew. Even though some of the steps in the procedure didn't make sense for the #2 engine (they applied only to a strut engine), the captain and I were focused on the procedure and did not consider that it was the wrong one. The bottom line is that we could not get the light to go out, even with the engine at idle. The (incorrect) checklist then directs you to shut down the engine, which we did. We notified ATC and made an uneventful landing in bos. The correct checklist attempts to isolate the source of the bleed air leak and directs you, if unable to extinguish light, to consider landing as soon as practical not to shut down the engine. The light never did extinguish throughout all the (incorrect) procedures we were doing, which are very similsr to the correct procedures. The captain stated later that he very likely would have shut down #2 anyway even if we had been running the right checklist. The light did extinguish after #2 was shut down. We all felt very foolish after it was all said and done, that we had not at some point realized that we were running the wrong checklist. Contributing factors: 1) the urgency of the situation. Any one of those 3 lights means a possible major problem with associated likelihood of fire or severe damage to the engine section. 2) short flight -- only 30 mins of airborne time, already approaching our descent point. 3) the WX: bos WX was 500 overcast, visibility 2 in fog -- should we go somewhere else? 4) for me, this was my second-to-last leg prior to being furloughed (just my luck, eh?) as soon as we flew back bos-lga I was out of a job. So I had many, many other thoughts on my mind. Supplemental information from acn 284013: I realized that I had allowed the flight engineer to proceed with the wrong/pneumatic checklist. I did not match the checklist with the problem and will attempt to do so in the future.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: IMPROPER ABNORMAL PROC USED.

Narrative: SHORT FLT LGA-BOS. APCHING LEVEL OFF AT FL210, NOTICED 'LOWER AFT BODY OVERHEAT' LIGHT ILLUMINATED. THIS LIGHT IS BTWN 2 OTHER LIGHTS, THE #1 ENG STRUT OVERHEAT LIGHT AND THE #3 ENG STRUT OVERHEAT LIGHT. IF EITHER OF THOSE 2 OTHER LIGHTS COMES ON, IT IS AN 'IMMEDIATE ACTION ITEM,' WHICH CALLS FOR ASSOCIATED THROTTLE TO IDLE. THE LOWER AFT BODY OVERHEAT LIGHT USUALLY MEANS THERE IS A HOT AIR LEAK ASSOCIATED WITH THE #2 ENG BUT IS NOT AN IMMEDIATE ACTION ITEM. HOWEVER, AT THE TIME, I FORGOT THIS. I JUST POINTED OUT THE LIGHT TO THE CAPT AND CALLED FOR #2 THROTTLE TO IDLE. HE LOOKED BACK AND SAW THE LIGHT AND IMMEDIATELY PULLED THE THROTTLE TO IDLE WHILE I DUG OUT MY BOOK FOR THE PROC. HERE'S WHERE I SCREWED UP. EVEN THOUGH THE LIGHT IS CLRLY LABELED 'LOWER AFT BODY OVERHEAT,' I WAS THINKING ALL THE WAY 'ENG STRUT OVERHEAT.' SO WHEN I SAW THAT PROC IN MY BOOK I IMMEDIATELY STARTED RUNNING THAT CHKLIST. THE CAPT AND I RAN THROUGH IT WHILE THE FO FLEW. EVEN THOUGH SOME OF THE STEPS IN THE PROC DIDN'T MAKE SENSE FOR THE #2 ENG (THEY APPLIED ONLY TO A STRUT ENG), THE CAPT AND I WERE FOCUSED ON THE PROC AND DID NOT CONSIDER THAT IT WAS THE WRONG ONE. THE BOTTOM LINE IS THAT WE COULD NOT GET THE LIGHT TO GO OUT, EVEN WITH THE ENG AT IDLE. THE (INCORRECT) CHKLIST THEN DIRECTS YOU TO SHUT DOWN THE ENG, WHICH WE DID. WE NOTIFIED ATC AND MADE AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG IN BOS. THE CORRECT CHKLIST ATTEMPTS TO ISOLATE THE SOURCE OF THE BLEED AIR LEAK AND DIRECTS YOU, IF UNABLE TO EXTINGUISH LIGHT, TO CONSIDER LNDG AS SOON AS PRACTICAL NOT TO SHUT DOWN THE ENG. THE LIGHT NEVER DID EXTINGUISH THROUGHOUT ALL THE (INCORRECT) PROCS WE WERE DOING, WHICH ARE VERY SIMILSR TO THE CORRECT PROCS. THE CAPT STATED LATER THAT HE VERY LIKELY WOULD HAVE SHUT DOWN #2 ANYWAY EVEN IF WE HAD BEEN RUNNING THE RIGHT CHKLIST. THE LIGHT DID EXTINGUISH AFTER #2 WAS SHUT DOWN. WE ALL FELT VERY FOOLISH AFTER IT WAS ALL SAID AND DONE, THAT WE HAD NOT AT SOME POINT REALIZED THAT WE WERE RUNNING THE WRONG CHKLIST. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) THE URGENCY OF THE SIT. ANY ONE OF THOSE 3 LIGHTS MEANS A POSSIBLE MAJOR PROB WITH ASSOCIATED LIKELIHOOD OF FIRE OR SEVERE DAMAGE TO THE ENG SECTION. 2) SHORT FLT -- ONLY 30 MINS OF AIRBORNE TIME, ALREADY APCHING OUR DSCNT POINT. 3) THE WX: BOS WX WAS 500 OVCST, VISIBILITY 2 IN FOG -- SHOULD WE GO SOMEWHERE ELSE? 4) FOR ME, THIS WAS MY SECOND-TO-LAST LEG PRIOR TO BEING FURLOUGHED (JUST MY LUCK, EH?) AS SOON AS WE FLEW BACK BOS-LGA I WAS OUT OF A JOB. SO I HAD MANY, MANY OTHER THOUGHTS ON MY MIND. SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FROM ACN 284013: I REALIZED THAT I HAD ALLOWED THE FE TO PROCEED WITH THE WRONG/PNEUMATIC CHKLIST. I DID NOT MATCH THE CHKLIST WITH THE PROB AND WILL ATTEMPT TO DO SO IN THE FUTURE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.