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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 284509 |
Time | |
Date | 199409 |
Day | Thu |
Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | atc facility : isn |
State Reference | ND |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 6000 msl bound upper : 6000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | Mixed |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | artcc : zlc tower : bvy |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Beech 1900 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 135 |
Navigation In Use | Other Other |
Flight Phase | descent : approach descent other |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : commercial pilot : instrument pilot : cfi |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 240 flight time total : 3500 flight time type : 2000 |
ASRS Report | 284509 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : less severe non adherence : clearance non adherence : published procedure other anomaly other other spatial deviation |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | none taken : anomaly accepted |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | other |
Narrative:
While 30 mi out of isn inbound, center gave us an unexpected clearance for the 20 mi arc to the ILS 31 approach. As we started the descent and I started to set up my radios, we encountered some light chop. The captain got nervous and shouted 'you just fly! I'll set up your radios!' (there was no need for the panic, we were still outside of the arc by a few [5 maybe] mi.) when he tried to set up the radios he couldn't get the DME to come up on my side. While he was goofing around with that. I knew that the arc was coming up quick so I thought I would do it myself. (I knew what I needed to do.) but still no DME. Now we had things really screwed up and the captain was really getting pissed (as was I). So I just turned left 90 degrees to our course to approximately the procedure. The captain saw that he had DME on his side, so he selected drive transfer to transfer all of his data to my screen, but he didn't have any ILS data up yet. As we were passing the lead in radial I kept yelling, 'I need an ILS! I need an ILS, now!' so he gives me nothing but a CDI on my upper eadi and a GS. At this time we get a visual on the airport and I shoot for the runway. Here were the dangers as I saw them, the solutions are self evident: 1) lack of consistent protocol on who sets up what radios. 2) a captain that freaks out when he's nervous and does things his way without regard to crew coordination or communication. 3) captain/first officer frustrated and angry with each other. 4) the #1 navigation DME was inoperative! That's why the DME problem!
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT.
Narrative: WHILE 30 MI OUT OF ISN INBOUND, CTR GAVE US AN UNEXPECTED CLRNC FOR THE 20 MI ARC TO THE ILS 31 APCH. AS WE STARTED THE DSCNT AND I STARTED TO SET UP MY RADIOS, WE ENCOUNTERED SOME LIGHT CHOP. THE CAPT GOT NERVOUS AND SHOUTED 'YOU JUST FLY! I'LL SET UP YOUR RADIOS!' (THERE WAS NO NEED FOR THE PANIC, WE WERE STILL OUTSIDE OF THE ARC BY A FEW [5 MAYBE] MI.) WHEN HE TRIED TO SET UP THE RADIOS HE COULDN'T GET THE DME TO COME UP ON MY SIDE. WHILE HE WAS GOOFING AROUND WITH THAT. I KNEW THAT THE ARC WAS COMING UP QUICK SO I THOUGHT I WOULD DO IT MYSELF. (I KNEW WHAT I NEEDED TO DO.) BUT STILL NO DME. NOW WE HAD THINGS REALLY SCREWED UP AND THE CAPT WAS REALLY GETTING PISSED (AS WAS I). SO I JUST TURNED L 90 DEGS TO OUR COURSE TO APPROX THE PROC. THE CAPT SAW THAT HE HAD DME ON HIS SIDE, SO HE SELECTED DRIVE TRANSFER TO TRANSFER ALL OF HIS DATA TO MY SCREEN, BUT HE DIDN'T HAVE ANY ILS DATA UP YET. AS WE WERE PASSING THE LEAD IN RADIAL I KEPT YELLING, 'I NEED AN ILS! I NEED AN ILS, NOW!' SO HE GIVES ME NOTHING BUT A CDI ON MY UPPER EADI AND A GS. AT THIS TIME WE GET A VISUAL ON THE ARPT AND I SHOOT FOR THE RWY. HERE WERE THE DANGERS AS I SAW THEM, THE SOLUTIONS ARE SELF EVIDENT: 1) LACK OF CONSISTENT PROTOCOL ON WHO SETS UP WHAT RADIOS. 2) A CAPT THAT FREAKS OUT WHEN HE'S NERVOUS AND DOES THINGS HIS WAY WITHOUT REGARD TO CREW COORD OR COM. 3) CAPT/FO FRUSTRATED AND ANGRY WITH EACH OTHER. 4) THE #1 NAV DME WAS INOP! THAT'S WHY THE DME PROB!
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.