Narrative:

On oct/xx/94, I was on an IFR flight plan in VFR WX with millville as a scheduled fuel stop. Atlantic city approach cleared me to the millville airport for a visual approach, at which time I canceled the IFR clearance and raised millville radio on 123.65 (CTAF). The radio response I received was from a gentleman who gave me a prolonged litany of all of the aircraft in the general area who had apparently reported in within the last several mins. The wind favored runway 28 and the planes in the pattern were landing runway 28: there was also an aircraft making practice low approachs for the ILS runway 10. The gentlemen on the radio frequency effectively blocked all other air-to-air or ground-to-air communication with his excessive description of the traffic to anybody and everybody who called in. This meant that the aircraft in the pattern could not effectively communication with one another and certainly the aircraft making the low approach ILS to runway 10 presented a hazard to runway 28 traffic, in that we could not effectively communication with this aircraft, making a low traffic pattern 180 degrees to the prevailing pattern. Following a 30 min ground fuel stop, I recontacted CTAF on 123.65 for re-activation of my IFR flight plan. A new radio operator read the new IFR clearance, following which I asked for clarification of 1 intersection, at which time she reread the entire clearance from start to finish, without interruption. My clearance void time was 2 mins following the first reading. Meanwhile, the frequency was blocked and multiple aircraft were trying to communication with one another. In addition to the CTAF frequency, a unicom frequency is listed. My airman's information manual indicates that the CTAF frequency should be used for TA's when a tower is active, as in this case. The 2 individuals working the CTAF frequency were definitely blocking the majority of xmissions being attempted by other pilots. I feel that this definitely represents a safety hazard and these 2 individuals should either be excluded from use of the radio or at least undergo significant retraining so as to understand their role in ATC and not become an impediment to safety at this airfield.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FREQ CONGESTION ON CTAF.

Narrative: ON OCT/XX/94, I WAS ON AN IFR FLT PLAN IN VFR WX WITH MILLVILLE AS A SCHEDULED FUEL STOP. ATLANTIC CITY APCH CLRED ME TO THE MILLVILLE ARPT FOR A VISUAL APCH, AT WHICH TIME I CANCELED THE IFR CLRNC AND RAISED MILLVILLE RADIO ON 123.65 (CTAF). THE RADIO RESPONSE I RECEIVED WAS FROM A GENTLEMAN WHO GAVE ME A PROLONGED LITANY OF ALL OF THE ACFT IN THE GENERAL AREA WHO HAD APPARENTLY RPTED IN WITHIN THE LAST SEVERAL MINS. THE WIND FAVORED RWY 28 AND THE PLANES IN THE PATTERN WERE LNDG RWY 28: THERE WAS ALSO AN ACFT MAKING PRACTICE LOW APCHS FOR THE ILS RWY 10. THE GENTLEMEN ON THE RADIO FREQ EFFECTIVELY BLOCKED ALL OTHER AIR-TO-AIR OR GND-TO-AIR COM WITH HIS EXCESSIVE DESCRIPTION OF THE TFC TO ANYBODY AND EVERYBODY WHO CALLED IN. THIS MEANT THAT THE ACFT IN THE PATTERN COULD NOT EFFECTIVELY COM WITH ONE ANOTHER AND CERTAINLY THE ACFT MAKING THE LOW APCH ILS TO RWY 10 PRESENTED A HAZARD TO RWY 28 TFC, IN THAT WE COULD NOT EFFECTIVELY COM WITH THIS ACFT, MAKING A LOW TFC PATTERN 180 DEGS TO THE PREVAILING PATTERN. FOLLOWING A 30 MIN GND FUEL STOP, I RECONTACTED CTAF ON 123.65 FOR RE-ACTIVATION OF MY IFR FLT PLAN. A NEW RADIO OPERATOR READ THE NEW IFR CLRNC, FOLLOWING WHICH I ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION OF 1 INTXN, AT WHICH TIME SHE REREAD THE ENTIRE CLRNC FROM START TO FINISH, WITHOUT INTERRUPTION. MY CLRNC VOID TIME WAS 2 MINS FOLLOWING THE FIRST READING. MEANWHILE, THE FREQ WAS BLOCKED AND MULTIPLE ACFT WERE TRYING TO COM WITH ONE ANOTHER. IN ADDITION TO THE CTAF FREQ, A UNICOM FREQ IS LISTED. MY AIRMAN'S INFO MANUAL INDICATES THAT THE CTAF FREQ SHOULD BE USED FOR TA'S WHEN A TWR IS ACTIVE, AS IN THIS CASE. THE 2 INDIVIDUALS WORKING THE CTAF FREQ WERE DEFINITELY BLOCKING THE MAJORITY OF XMISSIONS BEING ATTEMPTED BY OTHER PLTS. I FEEL THAT THIS DEFINITELY REPRESENTS A SAFETY HAZARD AND THESE 2 INDIVIDUALS SHOULD EITHER BE EXCLUDED FROM USE OF THE RADIO OR AT LEAST UNDERGO SIGNIFICANT RETRAINING SO AS TO UNDERSTAND THEIR ROLE IN ATC AND NOT BECOME AN IMPEDIMENT TO SAFETY AT THIS AIRFIELD.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.