Narrative:

Attention flight manager on duty/cpy. Flight air carrier a, jfk-sea arrived here at XX18 local time. According to written statements from air carrier B captain and ramp service personnel the aircraft came into gate at excessive speed and thrust level causing fumes and smoke to appear in air carrier B aircraft an A-320. The red smoke chimes were going off continuously. The captain followed ECAM procedures discharging oxygen into cargo bin. There were 2 ramp service personnel in cargo bin at time and they had to jump from aircraft. Both were taken to hospital and 1 has a broken wrist. I need statement to our version of what if anything happened. Air carrier B is very upset and port of seattle now getting involved. Port is probably going to make air carrier a tow in and out of gate to a downline point which will add delays to departures and arrs if this proves to be as air carrier B alleges. Captain in coming through sea and I would like to talk to him about this but will defer to your judgement on how best to approach him. If I hear nothing back before arrival in the morning then I will talk to him. Would appreciate your following up as well. I would assume air carrier B will contact us for statements and restitution so any information you can give will be appreciated. Thanks for your help. -- Station manager. The above message was sent to jfk-air carrier a gmf office (chief pilot) at XX20Z on oct/xx/94 by the air carrier a station manager at sea. Gmf contacted captain (me) after I arrived at pdx to fly to sea and jfk. I submitted the attached handwritten statement to captain -- chief pilot, upon my return to jfk in response to the allegations from air carrier B airlines personnel in sea. Statement: after landing in sea on runway 16R and crossing runway 16L we were instructed by ground control to follow an md-80 under tow on taxiway B en route to our gate. The direct route from taxiway B to gate (between concourse B and the south satellite) was blocked due to active construction. I was familiar with this routing and situation because of the same area of construction on a previous arrival at sea and therefore left all 3 engines running for the taxi and parking maneuver. As we proceeded around the south side of the south satellite at idle power I had to apply the brakes several times to keep pace behind the md-80 and had to hold the brakes as he made his turn-in to his hangar. I followed the yellow taxi line at all times en route to gate and did not have to apply any power above idle at any time during taxi or parking. There were no aircraft in my path, except for the md-80, en route to or during the turn-in to park at gate and we had more than adequate wingtip clearance at all times. FAA eastern region 'chief' inspector was conducting an inspection of the operation of air carrier a flight and was present in the observer's seat behind the captain, with his radio headset on, at all times during the descent, approach, landing, taxi-in and parking at sea gate, and can be a qualified witness to all the above (in addition to the captain, first officer and flight engineer). My conclusions and opinions on oct/xx/94 en route to gate at sea I was operating L-1011 aircraft in the proper manner. I have been first officer qualified on the L-1011 since 19XX and captain qualified since 1942 and have never created a problem for anyone in the operation thereof. If under duplicated conditions existing for air carrier a flight at sea on oct/xx/94. The cargo smoke alarm can be activated on air carrier B A-320 aircraft by the exhaust from L-1011 aircraft in that same set of circumstances, then air carrier a should henceforth be towed in to gate. If the alarm activation is proven to be not possible than I submit the following as possible causes of the event: 1) the alarm was false (ie, not due to smoke detection). 2) the pilot accidently set off the cargo fire extinguisher. 3) the cargo handlers were smoking cigarettes in the cargo bin (but I certainly would not want to make such a suggestion unless it was true -- that would add insult to injury and make them very angry). 4) the A-320 fire extinguisher system (for cargo bins) should perhaps be automatically deactivated when the cargo door is open. Our mechanics at jfk told me our aircraft are so wired. Perhaps the A-320 is also wired to deactivate -- but did not. The foregoing 4 possible causes are not all my own. Numbers 1 and 2 are, but numbers 3 and 4 were voiced to me by all the pilots to whom I have so far related this allegation. I, and all knowledge able L-1011 pilots I've spoken with have never seen 'visible particulate matter' emitting from the exhaust end of a warm rb-211 engine (once it got initially started). Those 3 rb-211's had just 'burned out' for 5 hours from jfk to sea. The likelihood of those engines putting out enough 'smoke' to be detected by a smoke detector in an A-320 cargo bin at the distance existing at sea is in my professional opinion zero and nil -- another factor in this which makes me suspicious that the air carrier B personnel involved are just targeting air carrier a as a convenient scapegoat for something which they are trying to 'cover up' is that during the 79 mins that we were at sea gate. No one from air carrier B gave any notice of this occurrence to me, my crew or any sea air carrier a personnel. I was on the ramp for approximately 20 mins during that time and in our operations office (ramp office) conversing with our baggage handlers, etc, and no once said anything resembling anything out of the ordinary about that gate arrival or any air carrier B problem or contact. My flight engineer was also on the ramp doing his preflight. It was a 'full moon' night, cool and calm. It was not until the next day (to my knowledge that the air carrier B personnel generated their stories which involved 'the other party,' air carrier a, in their event. The foregoing are not accusations -- just thoughts regarding this matter. I have sympathy for the air carrier B cargo handlers who were allegedly injured but I believe I am not the party who caused it.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WDB FLC ACCUSED OF FAST TAXI WHICH SET OFF FIRE INDICATIONS FROM CARGO AREA OF PARKED LOADING A320.

Narrative: ATTN FLT MGR ON DUTY/CPY. FLT ACR A, JFK-SEA ARRIVED HERE AT XX18 LCL TIME. ACCORDING TO WRITTEN STATEMENTS FROM ACR B CAPT AND RAMP SVC PERSONNEL THE ACFT CAME INTO GATE AT EXCESSIVE SPD AND THRUST LEVEL CAUSING FUMES AND SMOKE TO APPEAR IN ACR B ACFT AN A-320. THE RED SMOKE CHIMES WERE GOING OFF CONTINUOUSLY. THE CAPT FOLLOWED ECAM PROCS DISCHARGING OXYGEN INTO CARGO BIN. THERE WERE 2 RAMP SVC PERSONNEL IN CARGO BIN AT TIME AND THEY HAD TO JUMP FROM ACFT. BOTH WERE TAKEN TO HOSPITAL AND 1 HAS A BROKEN WRIST. I NEED STATEMENT TO OUR VERSION OF WHAT IF ANYTHING HAPPENED. ACR B IS VERY UPSET AND PORT OF SEATTLE NOW GETTING INVOLVED. PORT IS PROBABLY GOING TO MAKE ACR A TOW IN AND OUT OF GATE TO A DOWNLINE POINT WHICH WILL ADD DELAYS TO DEPS AND ARRS IF THIS PROVES TO BE AS ACR B ALLEGES. CAPT IN COMING THROUGH SEA AND I WOULD LIKE TO TALK TO HIM ABOUT THIS BUT WILL DEFER TO YOUR JUDGEMENT ON HOW BEST TO APCH HIM. IF I HEAR NOTHING BACK BEFORE ARR IN THE MORNING THEN I WILL TALK TO HIM. WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR FOLLOWING UP AS WELL. I WOULD ASSUME ACR B WILL CONTACT US FOR STATEMENTS AND RESTITUTION SO ANY INFO YOU CAN GIVE WILL BE APPRECIATED. THANKS FOR YOUR HELP. -- STATION MGR. THE ABOVE MESSAGE WAS SENT TO JFK-ACR A GMF OFFICE (CHIEF PLT) AT XX20Z ON OCT/XX/94 BY THE ACR A STATION MGR AT SEA. GMF CONTACTED CAPT (ME) AFTER I ARRIVED AT PDX TO FLY TO SEA AND JFK. I SUBMITTED THE ATTACHED HANDWRITTEN STATEMENT TO CAPT -- CHIEF PLT, UPON MY RETURN TO JFK IN RESPONSE TO THE ALLEGATIONS FROM ACR B AIRLINES PERSONNEL IN SEA. STATEMENT: AFTER LNDG IN SEA ON RWY 16R AND XING RWY 16L WE WERE INSTRUCTED BY GND CTL TO FOLLOW AN MD-80 UNDER TOW ON TXWY B ENRTE TO OUR GATE. THE DIRECT RTE FROM TXWY B TO GATE (BTWN CONCOURSE B AND THE S SATELLITE) WAS BLOCKED DUE TO ACTIVE CONSTRUCTION. I WAS FAMILIAR WITH THIS RTING AND SIT BECAUSE OF THE SAME AREA OF CONSTRUCTION ON A PREVIOUS ARR AT SEA AND THEREFORE LEFT ALL 3 ENGS RUNNING FOR THE TAXI AND PARKING MANEUVER. AS WE PROCEEDED AROUND THE S SIDE OF THE S SATELLITE AT IDLE PWR I HAD TO APPLY THE BRAKES SEVERAL TIMES TO KEEP PACE BEHIND THE MD-80 AND HAD TO HOLD THE BRAKES AS HE MADE HIS TURN-IN TO HIS HANGAR. I FOLLOWED THE YELLOW TAXI LINE AT ALL TIMES ENRTE TO GATE AND DID NOT HAVE TO APPLY ANY PWR ABOVE IDLE AT ANY TIME DURING TAXI OR PARKING. THERE WERE NO ACFT IN MY PATH, EXCEPT FOR THE MD-80, ENRTE TO OR DURING THE TURN-IN TO PARK AT GATE AND WE HAD MORE THAN ADEQUATE WINGTIP CLRNC AT ALL TIMES. FAA EASTERN REGION 'CHIEF' INSPECTOR WAS CONDUCTING AN INSPECTION OF THE OP OF ACR A FLT AND WAS PRESENT IN THE OBSERVER'S SEAT BEHIND THE CAPT, WITH HIS RADIO HEADSET ON, AT ALL TIMES DURING THE DSCNT, APCH, LNDG, TAXI-IN AND PARKING AT SEA GATE, AND CAN BE A QUALIFIED WITNESS TO ALL THE ABOVE (IN ADDITION TO THE CAPT, FO AND FE). MY CONCLUSIONS AND OPINIONS ON OCT/XX/94 ENRTE TO GATE AT SEA I WAS OPERATING L-1011 ACFT IN THE PROPER MANNER. I HAVE BEEN FO QUALIFIED ON THE L-1011 SINCE 19XX AND CAPT QUALIFIED SINCE 1942 AND HAVE NEVER CREATED A PROB FOR ANYONE IN THE OP THEREOF. IF UNDER DUPLICATED CONDITIONS EXISTING FOR ACR A FLT AT SEA ON OCT/XX/94. THE CARGO SMOKE ALARM CAN BE ACTIVATED ON ACR B A-320 ACFT BY THE EXHAUST FROM L-1011 ACFT IN THAT SAME SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES, THEN ACR A SHOULD HENCEFORTH BE TOWED IN TO GATE. IF THE ALARM ACTIVATION IS PROVEN TO BE NOT POSSIBLE THAN I SUBMIT THE FOLLOWING AS POSSIBLE CAUSES OF THE EVENT: 1) THE ALARM WAS FALSE (IE, NOT DUE TO SMOKE DETECTION). 2) THE PLT ACCIDENTLY SET OFF THE CARGO FIRE EXTINGUISHER. 3) THE CARGO HANDLERS WERE SMOKING CIGARETTES IN THE CARGO BIN (BUT I CERTAINLY WOULD NOT WANT TO MAKE SUCH A SUGGESTION UNLESS IT WAS TRUE -- THAT WOULD ADD INSULT TO INJURY AND MAKE THEM VERY ANGRY). 4) THE A-320 FIRE EXTINGUISHER SYS (FOR CARGO BINS) SHOULD PERHAPS BE AUTOMATICALLY DEACTIVATED WHEN THE CARGO DOOR IS OPEN. OUR MECHS AT JFK TOLD ME OUR ACFT ARE SO WIRED. PERHAPS THE A-320 IS ALSO WIRED TO DEACTIVATE -- BUT DID NOT. THE FOREGOING 4 POSSIBLE CAUSES ARE NOT ALL MY OWN. NUMBERS 1 AND 2 ARE, BUT NUMBERS 3 AND 4 WERE VOICED TO ME BY ALL THE PLTS TO WHOM I HAVE SO FAR RELATED THIS ALLEGATION. I, AND ALL KNOWLEDGE ABLE L-1011 PLTS I'VE SPOKEN WITH HAVE NEVER SEEN 'VISIBLE PARTICULATE MATTER' EMITTING FROM THE EXHAUST END OF A WARM RB-211 ENG (ONCE IT GOT INITIALLY STARTED). THOSE 3 RB-211'S HAD JUST 'BURNED OUT' FOR 5 HRS FROM JFK TO SEA. THE LIKELIHOOD OF THOSE ENGS PUTTING OUT ENOUGH 'SMOKE' TO BE DETECTED BY A SMOKE DETECTOR IN AN A-320 CARGO BIN AT THE DISTANCE EXISTING AT SEA IS IN MY PROFESSIONAL OPINION ZERO AND NIL -- ANOTHER FACTOR IN THIS WHICH MAKES ME SUSPICIOUS THAT THE ACR B PERSONNEL INVOLVED ARE JUST TARGETING ACR A AS A CONVENIENT SCAPEGOAT FOR SOMETHING WHICH THEY ARE TRYING TO 'COVER UP' IS THAT DURING THE 79 MINS THAT WE WERE AT SEA GATE. NO ONE FROM ACR B GAVE ANY NOTICE OF THIS OCCURRENCE TO ME, MY CREW OR ANY SEA ACR A PERSONNEL. I WAS ON THE RAMP FOR APPROX 20 MINS DURING THAT TIME AND IN OUR OPS OFFICE (RAMP OFFICE) CONVERSING WITH OUR BAGGAGE HANDLERS, ETC, AND NO ONCE SAID ANYTHING RESEMBLING ANYTHING OUT OF THE ORDINARY ABOUT THAT GATE ARR OR ANY ACR B PROB OR CONTACT. MY FE WAS ALSO ON THE RAMP DOING HIS PREFLT. IT WAS A 'FULL MOON' NIGHT, COOL AND CALM. IT WAS NOT UNTIL THE NEXT DAY (TO MY KNOWLEDGE THAT THE ACR B PERSONNEL GENERATED THEIR STORIES WHICH INVOLVED 'THE OTHER PARTY,' ACR A, IN THEIR EVENT. THE FOREGOING ARE NOT ACCUSATIONS -- JUST THOUGHTS REGARDING THIS MATTER. I HAVE SYMPATHY FOR THE ACR B CARGO HANDLERS WHO WERE ALLEGEDLY INJURED BUT I BELIEVE I AM NOT THE PARTY WHO CAUSED IT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.