Narrative:

On a routine air carrier flight from msy to ewr, the first chkpoint was mgm. When checking overhead, I noticed that the fuel remaining did not match the figure on the flight plan. It was in fact about 6000 pounds less than planned. I notified the captain and we reviewed the situation. We determined that we had lifted insufficient fuel at our departure point of msy to meet flight plan requirements. We further determined that with the fuel remaining on board, given current winds, altitude and weight of the airplane, we could not reach our destination with safe reserves. We called our company dispatch through arinc and notified them of our situation. We agreed to do a fuel stop at gso and landed there shortly thereafter. On landing at gso, we had approximately 6000 pounds of fuel remaining -- about 1 hour's endurance at normal cruise. We continued our flight shortly after to ewr. In trying to determine how we had left msy with almost 6000 pounds less fuel than required we determined that: 1) the fuel slip supplied to the fueler was improperly filled out. The total fuel load was correct, but the disposition of the fuel load was incorrect. The amount required to be put in the wing tanks was entered correctly, but the amount required to be put in the center tank was left blank. The operations personnel at msy did not notice the error -- neither did the fueler and neither did we (the crew). I carried out the company required fuel computation and verified that the actual fuel loaded did in fact match what the fueler wrote that he had put in. 2) the trip was a through flight from sat on the flight release, both release fuels were listed. I believe the captain may have accepted the first leg's fuel release figure as the correct amount. The first leg required 13500 pounds and when he saw 18500 pounds on board, may have accepted the fuel as correct. 3) on pushback, the last opportunity to recognize the fuel deficiency, the workload in the cockpit was very high. We were busy entering weight and balance data, coordinating pushback with ground control and ground crew, checklists, etc. 4) the taxi out was very short -- about 50 yards from the gate to the holding point -- so no opportunity existed after pushback. Supplemental information from acn 286254: in that check, I apparently read the 13600 pound release fuel for the first leg as 18600 pounds (the amount on the fuel quantity indicator) even though that was the wrong leg of flight. My mind's eye just wanted the 2 numbers to match.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WRONG FUEL LOAD TAKEN ON, MLG MUST STOP SHORT AND REFUEL.

Narrative: ON A ROUTINE ACR FLT FROM MSY TO EWR, THE FIRST CHKPOINT WAS MGM. WHEN CHKING OVERHEAD, I NOTICED THAT THE FUEL REMAINING DID NOT MATCH THE FIGURE ON THE FLT PLAN. IT WAS IN FACT ABOUT 6000 LBS LESS THAN PLANNED. I NOTIFIED THE CAPT AND WE REVIEWED THE SIT. WE DETERMINED THAT WE HAD LIFTED INSUFFICIENT FUEL AT OUR DEP POINT OF MSY TO MEET FLT PLAN REQUIREMENTS. WE FURTHER DETERMINED THAT WITH THE FUEL REMAINING ON BOARD, GIVEN CURRENT WINDS, ALT AND WT OF THE AIRPLANE, WE COULD NOT REACH OUR DEST WITH SAFE RESERVES. WE CALLED OUR COMPANY DISPATCH THROUGH ARINC AND NOTIFIED THEM OF OUR SIT. WE AGREED TO DO A FUEL STOP AT GSO AND LANDED THERE SHORTLY THEREAFTER. ON LNDG AT GSO, WE HAD APPROX 6000 LBS OF FUEL REMAINING -- ABOUT 1 HR'S ENDURANCE AT NORMAL CRUISE. WE CONTINUED OUR FLT SHORTLY AFTER TO EWR. IN TRYING TO DETERMINE HOW WE HAD LEFT MSY WITH ALMOST 6000 LBS LESS FUEL THAN REQUIRED WE DETERMINED THAT: 1) THE FUEL SLIP SUPPLIED TO THE FUELER WAS IMPROPERLY FILLED OUT. THE TOTAL FUEL LOAD WAS CORRECT, BUT THE DISPOSITION OF THE FUEL LOAD WAS INCORRECT. THE AMOUNT REQUIRED TO BE PUT IN THE WING TANKS WAS ENTERED CORRECTLY, BUT THE AMOUNT REQUIRED TO BE PUT IN THE CTR TANK WAS LEFT BLANK. THE OPS PERSONNEL AT MSY DID NOT NOTICE THE ERROR -- NEITHER DID THE FUELER AND NEITHER DID WE (THE CREW). I CARRIED OUT THE COMPANY REQUIRED FUEL COMPUTATION AND VERIFIED THAT THE ACTUAL FUEL LOADED DID IN FACT MATCH WHAT THE FUELER WROTE THAT HE HAD PUT IN. 2) THE TRIP WAS A THROUGH FLT FROM SAT ON THE FLT RELEASE, BOTH RELEASE FUELS WERE LISTED. I BELIEVE THE CAPT MAY HAVE ACCEPTED THE FIRST LEG'S FUEL RELEASE FIGURE AS THE CORRECT AMOUNT. THE FIRST LEG REQUIRED 13500 LBS AND WHEN HE SAW 18500 LBS ON BOARD, MAY HAVE ACCEPTED THE FUEL AS CORRECT. 3) ON PUSHBACK, THE LAST OPPORTUNITY TO RECOGNIZE THE FUEL DEFICIENCY, THE WORKLOAD IN THE COCKPIT WAS VERY HIGH. WE WERE BUSY ENTERING WT AND BAL DATA, COORDINATING PUSHBACK WITH GND CTL AND GND CREW, CHKLISTS, ETC. 4) THE TAXI OUT WAS VERY SHORT -- ABOUT 50 YARDS FROM THE GATE TO THE HOLDING POINT -- SO NO OPPORTUNITY EXISTED AFTER PUSHBACK. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 286254: IN THAT CHK, I APPARENTLY READ THE 13600 LB RELEASE FUEL FOR THE FIRST LEG AS 18600 LBS (THE AMOUNT ON THE FUEL QUANTITY INDICATOR) EVEN THOUGH THAT WAS THE WRONG LEG OF FLT. MY MIND'S EYE JUST WANTED THE 2 NUMBERS TO MATCH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.