Narrative:

ATC clearance specified direct jingo intersection, direct sac, cap 02 arrival to sjc. Maintain 4000 ft (the most common clearance given to us on this route is direct sac, maintain 11000 ft). This was the sixth leg of our day. Flying in constant ice and turbulence due to a frontal system moving through northern ca and southern or. Most of the legs were flown in constant IMC, and we have no autoplt, so it is normal to be quite tired toward the end of our 8 leg, 11 hour day. During the pre-departure briefing, I noted the 4000 ft altitude restriction. Upon takeoff, controller in charge tower requested a base report from us. During climb out, I do not recall hearing the first officer call the mandatory '1000 ft to go' and '300 ft to go' altitude calls. Since we have no altitude alerter, I was not reminded of my level-off altitude. Unfortunately, I let myself become distracted by helping the first officer estimate the cloud bases, in order to tell center so they could relay the information to controller in charge tower. Climbing through 5300 ft, center asked us our altitude and I realized I had busted my 4000 ft limit. I quickly stopped my climb and asked oakland if they wanted me back to 4000 ft. The controller replied no and directed us to continue climb to 11000 ft. Had I maintained proper sterile cockpit discipline and not become distracted by trying to estimate the cloud bases, I would have recognized my level-off altitude and the deviation would not have occurred. I also firmly believe that an altitude alerter would have prevented this deviation. I believe the FAA should require alerters in all scheduled airline aircraft, not just those over 30 seats. If we wait for the airlines to install them of their own volition, it will never happen, because it cuts into profits. I also believe we need more stringent regulations pertaining to crew duty and rest times. I regularly fly 12-15 hour duty days, up to 12 legs and 8 hours of flight time. By the end of a day in which IFR conditions prevail, I am physically exhausted, and the potential for mistakes exists.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LTT OVERSHOT ASSIGNED ALT DURING CLB.

Narrative: ATC CLRNC SPECIFIED DIRECT JINGO INTXN, DIRECT SAC, CAP 02 ARR TO SJC. MAINTAIN 4000 FT (THE MOST COMMON CLRNC GIVEN TO US ON THIS RTE IS DIRECT SAC, MAINTAIN 11000 FT). THIS WAS THE SIXTH LEG OF OUR DAY. FLYING IN CONSTANT ICE AND TURB DUE TO A FRONTAL SYS MOVING THROUGH NORTHERN CA AND SOUTHERN OR. MOST OF THE LEGS WERE FLOWN IN CONSTANT IMC, AND WE HAVE NO AUTOPLT, SO IT IS NORMAL TO BE QUITE TIRED TOWARD THE END OF OUR 8 LEG, 11 HR DAY. DURING THE PRE-DEP BRIEFING, I NOTED THE 4000 FT ALT RESTRICTION. UPON TKOF, CIC TWR REQUESTED A BASE RPT FROM US. DURING CLBOUT, I DO NOT RECALL HEARING THE FO CALL THE MANDATORY '1000 FT TO GO' AND '300 FT TO GO' ALT CALLS. SINCE WE HAVE NO ALT ALERTER, I WAS NOT REMINDED OF MY LEVEL-OFF ALT. UNFORTUNATELY, I LET MYSELF BECOME DISTRACTED BY HELPING THE FO ESTIMATE THE CLOUD BASES, IN ORDER TO TELL CTR SO THEY COULD RELAY THE INFO TO CIC TWR. CLBING THROUGH 5300 FT, CTR ASKED US OUR ALT AND I REALIZED I HAD BUSTED MY 4000 FT LIMIT. I QUICKLY STOPPED MY CLB AND ASKED OAKLAND IF THEY WANTED ME BACK TO 4000 FT. THE CTLR REPLIED NO AND DIRECTED US TO CONTINUE CLB TO 11000 FT. HAD I MAINTAINED PROPER STERILE COCKPIT DISCIPLINE AND NOT BECOME DISTRACTED BY TRYING TO ESTIMATE THE CLOUD BASES, I WOULD HAVE RECOGNIZED MY LEVEL-OFF ALT AND THE DEV WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED. I ALSO FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT AN ALT ALERTER WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THIS DEV. I BELIEVE THE FAA SHOULD REQUIRE ALERTERS IN ALL SCHEDULED AIRLINE ACFT, NOT JUST THOSE OVER 30 SEATS. IF WE WAIT FOR THE AIRLINES TO INSTALL THEM OF THEIR OWN VOLITION, IT WILL NEVER HAPPEN, BECAUSE IT CUTS INTO PROFITS. I ALSO BELIEVE WE NEED MORE STRINGENT REGS PERTAINING TO CREW DUTY AND REST TIMES. I REGULARLY FLY 12-15 HR DUTY DAYS, UP TO 12 LEGS AND 8 HRS OF FLT TIME. BY THE END OF A DAY IN WHICH IFR CONDITIONS PREVAIL, I AM PHYSICALLY EXHAUSTED, AND THE POTENTIAL FOR MISTAKES EXISTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.