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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 293760 |
Time | |
Date | 199501 |
Day | Fri |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | atc facility : mia |
State Reference | FL |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | artcc : zob |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 135 |
Flight Phase | ground other : taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : cfi pilot : commercial pilot : instrument pilot : private |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 212 flight time total : 676 flight time type : 320 |
ASRS Report | 293760 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Events | |
Anomaly | incursion : runway non adherence : clearance other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other controllera |
Resolutory Action | other |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
Complacency. After all my yrs at aviation school enrolled in safety classes, I thought I would never become complacent. It was my 4TH leg of the day and the new captain and I were taxiing to the pad at the runway 09L/12 intersection at miami. The passenger had been briefed, the before taxi checklist completed, and we were down to the line on the before takeoff checklist. The captain and I had been playing a guessing game to see who could correctly guess the heading or altitude ATC would assign. Since both of us had flown to key west several times, always departing runway 12, we both hypothesized a heading of 160 degrees after takeoff. Tower called and commanded, 'flight XXX,' taxi into position and hold runway 09L.' I replied, 'into position and hold runway 09L.' at this time, I reached for the checklist and began reading below the line as the captain started the final segment of our taxi. Having complete faith in the captain's cognitive skills and taxi abilities and not catching that runway 09L for key west wasn't the usual runway for a south departure, I limited my attention to inside the aircraft. When I looked up, something didn't feel right. Tower called, 'flight XXX,' you are on runway 12, air carrier 737 is on a 1 1/2 mi final, left turn taxi to runway 9L. Immediately I realized why I didn't feel right. Not only was this event unsafe, it was unprofessional and a direct reflection of complacency. We fly 10 legs a day, do 10 before takeoff checklists, and pull up to the pad on every flight leaving miami. In the back of our minds we were thinking, key west -- runway 12, key west -- runway 12, key west -- runway 12...I read back 'taxi into position and hold runway 09L,' the captain heard me reply 'runway 09L,' and he still taxied to runway 12. I always take time and look to see if any traffic is on final but I was 'too busy' concentrating on completing the checklists instead of maintaining situational awareness. The captain admitted he was preoccupied with irrelevant thoughts as well. After this event, I elected to read back to myself and the captain all clrncs whether I or the captain answered ATC. The captain agreed and we now communication as well on the ground as we do in the air. Safety is an attitude!
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: RWY TRANSGRESSION.
Narrative: COMPLACENCY. AFTER ALL MY YRS AT AVIATION SCHOOL ENROLLED IN SAFETY CLASSES, I THOUGHT I WOULD NEVER BECOME COMPLACENT. IT WAS MY 4TH LEG OF THE DAY AND THE NEW CAPT AND I WERE TAXIING TO THE PAD AT THE RWY 09L/12 INTXN AT MIAMI. THE PAX HAD BEEN BRIEFED, THE BEFORE TAXI CHKLIST COMPLETED, AND WE WERE DOWN TO THE LINE ON THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST. THE CAPT AND I HAD BEEN PLAYING A GUESSING GAME TO SEE WHO COULD CORRECTLY GUESS THE HDG OR ALT ATC WOULD ASSIGN. SINCE BOTH OF US HAD FLOWN TO KEY WEST SEVERAL TIMES, ALWAYS DEPARTING RWY 12, WE BOTH HYPOTHESIZED A HDG OF 160 DEGS AFTER TKOF. TWR CALLED AND COMMANDED, 'FLT XXX,' TAXI INTO POS AND HOLD RWY 09L.' I REPLIED, 'INTO POS AND HOLD RWY 09L.' AT THIS TIME, I REACHED FOR THE CHKLIST AND BEGAN READING BELOW THE LINE AS THE CAPT STARTED THE FINAL SEGMENT OF OUR TAXI. HAVING COMPLETE FAITH IN THE CAPT'S COGNITIVE SKILLS AND TAXI ABILITIES AND NOT CATCHING THAT RWY 09L FOR KEY WEST WASN'T THE USUAL RWY FOR A S DEP, I LIMITED MY ATTN TO INSIDE THE ACFT. WHEN I LOOKED UP, SOMETHING DIDN'T FEEL RIGHT. TWR CALLED, 'FLT XXX,' YOU ARE ON RWY 12, ACR 737 IS ON A 1 1/2 MI FINAL, L TURN TAXI TO RWY 9L. IMMEDIATELY I REALIZED WHY I DIDN'T FEEL RIGHT. NOT ONLY WAS THIS EVENT UNSAFE, IT WAS UNPROFESSIONAL AND A DIRECT REFLECTION OF COMPLACENCY. WE FLY 10 LEGS A DAY, DO 10 BEFORE TKOF CHKLISTS, AND PULL UP TO THE PAD ON EVERY FLT LEAVING MIAMI. IN THE BACK OF OUR MINDS WE WERE THINKING, KEY WEST -- RWY 12, KEY WEST -- RWY 12, KEY WEST -- RWY 12...I READ BACK 'TAXI INTO POS AND HOLD RWY 09L,' THE CAPT HEARD ME REPLY 'RWY 09L,' AND HE STILL TAXIED TO RWY 12. I ALWAYS TAKE TIME AND LOOK TO SEE IF ANY TFC IS ON FINAL BUT I WAS 'TOO BUSY' CONCENTRATING ON COMPLETING THE CHKLISTS INSTEAD OF MAINTAINING SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. THE CAPT ADMITTED HE WAS PREOCCUPIED WITH IRRELEVANT THOUGHTS AS WELL. AFTER THIS EVENT, I ELECTED TO READ BACK TO MYSELF AND THE CAPT ALL CLRNCS WHETHER I OR THE CAPT ANSWERED ATC. THE CAPT AGREED AND WE NOW COM AS WELL ON THE GND AS WE DO IN THE AIR. SAFETY IS AN ATTITUDE!
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.