Narrative:

This incident occurred during an IFR flight from ixd to cht, the alternate was sgf. The WX was low IFR over most of north mo and southern ia. After checking WX with FSS on the ground in ixd and calling the local FBO in cht and being assured that their WX was 'plenty good for a visual,' I filed and departed ixd. Flight conditions were low ceilings and visibility, tops of about 2500 ft MSL and clear above the unlimited visibility. The single engine complex aircraft was well equipped and performing properly. Upon descent into cht I was informed that the cht NDB was inoperative and I could try for a visual. About 10 mi out I obtained visual contact and canceled my IFR flight plan. Dusk was approaching and the WX closed in as I was descending for landing. I was forced to break off the approach. At this time I felt that the WX might pick up enough to allow me to land VFR, my fuel level was adequate so I began circling the airport in the clear, on top of the thin overcast. After about 30 mins I realized that there was no use in continuing, so I turned toward sgf and contacted center to receive flight following, VFR on top, to my alternate. At this time, I became aware of a problem. An aircraft on the ground at cht advised center and myself that an aircraft was making 'illegal approachs' into cht. After a short discussion, I felt that the implied meaning was to involve me with a deviation of the FARS. The flight then continued on to sgf without incident and ended with a landing in sgf. I feel that, although I had a safe flight, I may have made a few decision errors whose basis need to be addressed. As a several thousand hour pilot that is used to operating complex, high speed cpr jets and turboprops, I think I fell into becoming complacent as a I stepped out of that world and into a single engine propeller airplane with no passenger. This state of mind allowed me to rely upon 'the guy at the FBO' as a dependable WX source, believe I could make a visual in rapidly deteriorating conditions, and think that if I waited long enough, the WX would improve enough to let me land VFR. Not to mention tying up the airspace around the cht airport. All of these things that any professional pilot wouldn't allow himself to fall for, things that I normally wouldn't fall for. In closing, I would like to make clear that I believe that the problem here is one that is common and needs to be addressed. Complacency, how it occurs, how to recognize it, and how to avoid becoming a victim of it. In this case, it started when I went from one type of flight operation to another, but I'm sure we can all think of other times that it occurs.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WHILE AIR HOLDING OVER AN UNCTLED ARPT, PLT IS ACCUSED OF MAKING ILLEGAL INST APCHS BY ANOTHER PLT IN AN ACFT ON THE GND.

Narrative: THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED DURING AN IFR FLT FROM IXD TO CHT, THE ALTERNATE WAS SGF. THE WX WAS LOW IFR OVER MOST OF N MO AND SOUTHERN IA. AFTER CHKING WX WITH FSS ON THE GND IN IXD AND CALLING THE LCL FBO IN CHT AND BEING ASSURED THAT THEIR WX WAS 'PLENTY GOOD FOR A VISUAL,' I FILED AND DEPARTED IXD. FLT CONDITIONS WERE LOW CEILINGS AND VISIBILITY, TOPS OF ABOUT 2500 FT MSL AND CLR ABOVE THE UNLIMITED VISIBILITY. THE SINGLE ENG COMPLEX ACFT WAS WELL EQUIPPED AND PERFORMING PROPERLY. UPON DSCNT INTO CHT I WAS INFORMED THAT THE CHT NDB WAS INOP AND I COULD TRY FOR A VISUAL. ABOUT 10 MI OUT I OBTAINED VISUAL CONTACT AND CANCELED MY IFR FLT PLAN. DUSK WAS APCHING AND THE WX CLOSED IN AS I WAS DSNDING FOR LNDG. I WAS FORCED TO BREAK OFF THE APCH. AT THIS TIME I FELT THAT THE WX MIGHT PICK UP ENOUGH TO ALLOW ME TO LAND VFR, MY FUEL LEVEL WAS ADEQUATE SO I BEGAN CIRCLING THE ARPT IN THE CLR, ON TOP OF THE THIN OVCST. AFTER ABOUT 30 MINS I REALIZED THAT THERE WAS NO USE IN CONTINUING, SO I TURNED TOWARD SGF AND CONTACTED CTR TO RECEIVE FLT FOLLOWING, VFR ON TOP, TO MY ALTERNATE. AT THIS TIME, I BECAME AWARE OF A PROB. AN ACFT ON THE GND AT CHT ADVISED CTR AND MYSELF THAT AN ACFT WAS MAKING 'ILLEGAL APCHS' INTO CHT. AFTER A SHORT DISCUSSION, I FELT THAT THE IMPLIED MEANING WAS TO INVOLVE ME WITH A DEV OF THE FARS. THE FLT THEN CONTINUED ON TO SGF WITHOUT INCIDENT AND ENDED WITH A LNDG IN SGF. I FEEL THAT, ALTHOUGH I HAD A SAFE FLT, I MAY HAVE MADE A FEW DECISION ERRORS WHOSE BASIS NEED TO BE ADDRESSED. AS A SEVERAL THOUSAND HR PLT THAT IS USED TO OPERATING COMPLEX, HIGH SPD CPR JETS AND TURBOPROPS, I THINK I FELL INTO BECOMING COMPLACENT AS A I STEPPED OUT OF THAT WORLD AND INTO A SINGLE ENG PROP AIRPLANE WITH NO PAX. THIS STATE OF MIND ALLOWED ME TO RELY UPON 'THE GUY AT THE FBO' AS A DEPENDABLE WX SOURCE, BELIEVE I COULD MAKE A VISUAL IN RAPIDLY DETERIORATING CONDITIONS, AND THINK THAT IF I WAITED LONG ENOUGH, THE WX WOULD IMPROVE ENOUGH TO LET ME LAND VFR. NOT TO MENTION TYING UP THE AIRSPACE AROUND THE CHT ARPT. ALL OF THESE THINGS THAT ANY PROFESSIONAL PLT WOULDN'T ALLOW HIMSELF TO FALL FOR, THINGS THAT I NORMALLY WOULDN'T FALL FOR. IN CLOSING, I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE CLR THAT I BELIEVE THAT THE PROB HERE IS ONE THAT IS COMMON AND NEEDS TO BE ADDRESSED. COMPLACENCY, HOW IT OCCURS, HOW TO RECOGNIZE IT, AND HOW TO AVOID BECOMING A VICTIM OF IT. IN THIS CASE, IT STARTED WHEN I WENT FROM ONE TYPE OF FLT OP TO ANOTHER, BUT I'M SURE WE CAN ALL THINK OF OTHER TIMES THAT IT OCCURS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.