Narrative:

On descent inbound on the cvg 040 degree radial, center asked us to cross 35 DME at 12000 ft. We were handed off to cvg approach, told to maintain 11000 ft and to expect runway 18R. We discussed the fact that the clearance to 11000 ft deleted the previous crossing restr. Flying was transferred to captain. I tuned my navaids and subsequently briefed runway 18R ILS. Captain transferred flying back to myself and a clearance was received to 9000 ft and slow to 210 KTS. Next a turn to 270 degrees, followed by a turn to 265 degrees. Next we received a clearance to 7000 ft and slow to 180 KTS. Frequency change to 124.70, followed, then a left turn to 210 degree to intercept the localizer. We were in icing conditions, I was discussing the continual warnings for the cowl anti-ice and the meaning of the yellow N2 verses yellow cautionary messages. I could have missed the runway (assignment) at that point because I was descending, spoilers were out, we were busy. Next the controller told us we were right of course. I pulled up TCASII on the multi function display. Almost simultaneously we got a TCASII RA climb, climb. I followed the TCASII and we were separated only by 500 ft vertically, 0 ft horizontally. Contributing factors I believe that were involved, training in progress, initial operating experience for a captain in training. Icing conditions and continual warnings from cowl anti-ice. Compressed time frame after handoff from center until incident. I believe that was really caused this incident was the fact that we were both so busy that we were not paying enough attention to what the controller was saying, coupled with the fact that I was conducting some training at an inappropriate time in the descent. To prevent a recurrence, personally I will reevaluate my listening abilities and radio phraseology and the division of duties below 10000 ft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: NMAC. EVASIVE ACTION CLB. MULTIPLE RWY OP PARALLEL RWYS. SIMULTANEOUS ILS APCHS. WRONG RWY APCH.

Narrative: ON DSCNT INBOUND ON THE CVG 040 DEG RADIAL, CTR ASKED US TO CROSS 35 DME AT 12000 FT. WE WERE HANDED OFF TO CVG APCH, TOLD TO MAINTAIN 11000 FT AND TO EXPECT RWY 18R. WE DISCUSSED THE FACT THAT THE CLRNC TO 11000 FT DELETED THE PREVIOUS XING RESTR. FLYING WAS TRANSFERRED TO CAPT. I TUNED MY NAVAIDS AND SUBSEQUENTLY BRIEFED RWY 18R ILS. CAPT TRANSFERRED FLYING BACK TO MYSELF AND A CLRNC WAS RECEIVED TO 9000 FT AND SLOW TO 210 KTS. NEXT A TURN TO 270 DEGS, FOLLOWED BY A TURN TO 265 DEGS. NEXT WE RECEIVED A CLRNC TO 7000 FT AND SLOW TO 180 KTS. FREQ CHANGE TO 124.70, FOLLOWED, THEN A L TURN TO 210 DEG TO INTERCEPT THE LOC. WE WERE IN ICING CONDITIONS, I WAS DISCUSSING THE CONTINUAL WARNINGS FOR THE COWL ANTI-ICE AND THE MEANING OF THE YELLOW N2 VERSES YELLOW CAUTIONARY MESSAGES. I COULD HAVE MISSED THE RWY (ASSIGNMENT) AT THAT POINT BECAUSE I WAS DSNDING, SPOILERS WERE OUT, WE WERE BUSY. NEXT THE CTLR TOLD US WE WERE RIGHT OF COURSE. I PULLED UP TCASII ON THE MULTI FUNCTION DISPLAY. ALMOST SIMULTANEOUSLY WE GOT A TCASII RA CLB, CLB. I FOLLOWED THE TCASII AND WE WERE SEPARATED ONLY BY 500 FT VERTLY, 0 FT HORIZLY. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS I BELIEVE THAT WERE INVOLVED, TRAINING IN PROGRESS, INITIAL OPERATING EXPERIENCE FOR A CAPT IN TRAINING. ICING CONDITIONS AND CONTINUAL WARNINGS FROM COWL ANTI-ICE. COMPRESSED TIME FRAME AFTER HDOF FROM CTR UNTIL INCIDENT. I BELIEVE THAT WAS REALLY CAUSED THIS INCIDENT WAS THE FACT THAT WE WERE BOTH SO BUSY THAT WE WERE NOT PAYING ENOUGH ATTENTION TO WHAT THE CTLR WAS SAYING, COUPLED WITH THE FACT THAT I WAS CONDUCTING SOME TRAINING AT AN INAPPROPRIATE TIME IN THE DSCNT. TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE, PERSONALLY I WILL REEVALUATE MY LISTENING ABILITIES AND RADIO PHRASEOLOGY AND THE DIVISION OF DUTIES BELOW 10000 FT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.