Narrative:

We started our pushback from gate at bwi. Shortly thereafter, we started engines and were waved off by the safety man. First officer requested and received taxi clearance from bwi ground control. The clearance was, as I remember it 'taxi to runway 28, take the second left turn on the outer taxiway, join taxiway U, cross runway 4/22.' I was taxiing the aircraft slowly and referencing my 10-9 chart to orient myself so that I could make the second left turn. I was looking for some signage to see if I could tell which was the proper turn. The first officer was just starting to say 'this doesn't seem right when the ground controller said you have just violated an active runway, make a 180 degree turn and take the first right turn.' I turned the aircraft by making a left 180 degree turn and made first right turn as instructed. I stopped the aircraft momentarily to reorient myself. I apologized for the mistake and the ground controller acknowledged and mentioned that they have a lot of trouble with pilot becoming confused at that intersection. The ground controller reclred us across runway 4/22. As we were taxiing on the parallel taxiway, a jet was cleared for takeoff on runway 28. The most significant factor, I believe, contributing to this incident was the poorly marked and lighted intersection of runway 10/28, taxiway O, taxiway P and the ramp exit. I feel that this runway violation would not have occurred during daylight conditions, however, at night it is very difficult to ascertain where the correct taxi route was. I believe that if the new style red light bar that extends across the taxiway centerline where it intersects a runway and/or green taxiway centerline lights were installed this incident would not have happened. Human performance considerations of this incident are threefold. First, an unclr vision of the taxi route that was issued. Second, continuation of taxi by the captain without a clear understanding of his location in relation to the taxi route and active runways. Third, inattn by the ground controller that allowed an aircraft to slowly progress onto an active runway. The flight crew always has the option to stop the aircraft and ask for clarification, however, in this instance that was not done. Although the aircraft was traveling at a very slow speed, situational awareness must always be maintained. The verbal challenge by the first officer was a positive demonstration of good crew coordination. By his own admission, the ground controller knew that the intersection was a problem area. The ATC supervisor on duty at the time of the occurrence said that another aircraft had done the same thing 5 mins before and that intersection is a chronic problem. The traffic was very light that should have allowed the ground controller to be more focused on this problem area. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter states the ramp area does not look like the airport diagram. Phraseology of 'take the second left turn' does not compute since there are no areas to turn on this wide expanse. A new taxiway had been constructed near the fire station and the lighting and signage was not good. When talking to controller later, reporter was told another flight had done the same thing just 15 mins prior. When controllers spoke to airport management there ensued a tug of war with regard to filing violations. Since ATC had not done so, airport people said there was no problem. Violations were then filed on such excursions. Reporter stated that part of the area had now been barricaded so that taxi is not possible there.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MLG TAXIES ONTO ACTIVE RWY.

Narrative: WE STARTED OUR PUSHBACK FROM GATE AT BWI. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, WE STARTED ENGS AND WERE WAVED OFF BY THE SAFETY MAN. FO REQUESTED AND RECEIVED TAXI CLRNC FROM BWI GND CTL. THE CLRNC WAS, AS I REMEMBER IT 'TAXI TO RWY 28, TAKE THE SECOND L TURN ON THE OUTER TXWY, JOIN TXWY U, CROSS RWY 4/22.' I WAS TAXIING THE ACFT SLOWLY AND REFING MY 10-9 CHART TO ORIENT MYSELF SO THAT I COULD MAKE THE SECOND L TURN. I WAS LOOKING FOR SOME SIGNAGE TO SEE IF I COULD TELL WHICH WAS THE PROPER TURN. THE FO WAS JUST STARTING TO SAY 'THIS DOESN'T SEEM RIGHT WHEN THE GND CTLR SAID YOU HAVE JUST VIOLATED AN ACTIVE RWY, MAKE A 180 DEG TURN AND TAKE THE FIRST R TURN.' I TURNED THE ACFT BY MAKING A L 180 DEG TURN AND MADE FIRST R TURN AS INSTRUCTED. I STOPPED THE ACFT MOMENTARILY TO REORIENT MYSELF. I APOLOGIZED FOR THE MISTAKE AND THE GND CTLR ACKNOWLEDGED AND MENTIONED THAT THEY HAVE A LOT OF TROUBLE WITH PLT BECOMING CONFUSED AT THAT INTXN. THE GND CTLR RECLRED US ACROSS RWY 4/22. AS WE WERE TAXIING ON THE PARALLEL TXWY, A JET WAS CLRED FOR TKOF ON RWY 28. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT FACTOR, I BELIEVE, CONTRIBUTING TO THIS INCIDENT WAS THE POORLY MARKED AND LIGHTED INTXN OF RWY 10/28, TXWY O, TXWY P AND THE RAMP EXIT. I FEEL THAT THIS RWY VIOLATION WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED DURING DAYLIGHT CONDITIONS, HOWEVER, AT NIGHT IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO ASCERTAIN WHERE THE CORRECT TAXI RTE WAS. I BELIEVE THAT IF THE NEW STYLE RED LIGHT BAR THAT EXTENDS ACROSS THE TXWY CTRLINE WHERE IT INTERSECTS A RWY AND/OR GREEN TXWY CTRLINE LIGHTS WERE INSTALLED THIS INCIDENT WOULD NOT HAVE HAPPENED. HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS OF THIS INCIDENT ARE THREEFOLD. FIRST, AN UNCLR VISION OF THE TAXI RTE THAT WAS ISSUED. SECOND, CONTINUATION OF TAXI BY THE CAPT WITHOUT A CLR UNDERSTANDING OF HIS LOCATION IN RELATION TO THE TAXI RTE AND ACTIVE RWYS. THIRD, INATTN BY THE GND CTLR THAT ALLOWED AN ACFT TO SLOWLY PROGRESS ONTO AN ACTIVE RWY. THE FLC ALWAYS HAS THE OPTION TO STOP THE ACFT AND ASK FOR CLARIFICATION, HOWEVER, IN THIS INSTANCE THAT WAS NOT DONE. ALTHOUGH THE ACFT WAS TRAVELING AT A VERY SLOW SPD, SITUATIONAL AWARENESS MUST ALWAYS BE MAINTAINED. THE VERBAL CHALLENGE BY THE FO WAS A POSITIVE DEMONSTRATION OF GOOD CREW COORD. BY HIS OWN ADMISSION, THE GND CTLR KNEW THAT THE INTXN WAS A PROB AREA. THE ATC SUPVR ON DUTY AT THE TIME OF THE OCCURRENCE SAID THAT ANOTHER ACFT HAD DONE THE SAME THING 5 MINS BEFORE AND THAT INTXN IS A CHRONIC PROB. THE TFC WAS VERY LIGHT THAT SHOULD HAVE ALLOWED THE GND CTLR TO BE MORE FOCUSED ON THIS PROB AREA. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATES THE RAMP AREA DOES NOT LOOK LIKE THE ARPT DIAGRAM. PHRASEOLOGY OF 'TAKE THE SECOND L TURN' DOES NOT COMPUTE SINCE THERE ARE NO AREAS TO TURN ON THIS WIDE EXPANSE. A NEW TXWY HAD BEEN CONSTRUCTED NEAR THE FIRE STATION AND THE LIGHTING AND SIGNAGE WAS NOT GOOD. WHEN TALKING TO CTLR LATER, RPTR WAS TOLD ANOTHER FLT HAD DONE THE SAME THING JUST 15 MINS PRIOR. WHEN CTLRS SPOKE TO ARPT MGMNT THERE ENSUED A TUG OF WAR WITH REGARD TO FILING VIOLATIONS. SINCE ATC HAD NOT DONE SO, ARPT PEOPLE SAID THERE WAS NO PROB. VIOLATIONS WERE THEN FILED ON SUCH EXCURSIONS. RPTR STATED THAT PART OF THE AREA HAD NOW BEEN BARRICADED SO THAT TAXI IS NOT POSSIBLE THERE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.