Narrative:

Short and soft field takeoffs and lndgs were being conducted at pogue airport for the purpose of review for the student's certified flight instructor chkride. During the fourth pattern, after a normal turn to downwind, the student was preparing for the next landing. He was about to extend the landing gear but I advised him to wait as this landing was to be a simulated emergency landing. At midfield, I announced on the CTAF that we were executing a short approach to runway 17, simulating an engine failure. Shortly thereafter, another aircraft announced a 4 mi final to the same runway. Abeam the numbers of runway 17 I reduced power to idle and instructed the student to execute an emergency landing. He began a turn toward the airport. At this time the aircraft on the 4 mi final reported a 2 mi final to runway 17. Our modified approach, in my opinion, would have placed us too close to the other aircraft for a safe landing. At this time, I took control of the aircraft and turned back to the downwind and informed the student to discontinue the emergency approach in favor of another soft-field approach. I also told him to turn to a base leg when we were abeam the aircraft on final. The approach was continued until on about a 1/4 mi final I noticed the gear was still retracted. At the same instant, I also noticed that the other aircraft that landed before us was still on the active runway. There was some doubt in my mind as to whether we would land before the other aircraft had exited the runway. The student had also drifted off of the centerline of the runway. We had now crossed the threshold of the runway just as the other aircraft had departed the active at the midfield taxiway. At this point, the aircraft settled onto the runway gear up. How the problem arose -- distraction by another aircraft on a non standard approach and our efforts to salvage the landing. Contributing factors -- aircraft was slow to exit the active runway and I was intent on the student correcting to the centerline. Corrective actions -- the instructor's (my guard) should never be let down. Through my preoccupation of the other aircraft and trying to teach I missed an important pre-landing item. It is obvious that each item on the pre-landing checklist should be verified before the next item is completed. Note: the aircraft's gear aural warning system only sounded at idle power, and the automatic gear extension system was inoperative. I still do not know why I failed to catch the gear being up, in the last few seconds before landing I was still thinking about impressing upon the student the need to cover each checklist item. I doubt very seriously if I will ever forget about landing gears. The aircraft received minor damage and no one was injured.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: GEAR UP LNDG.

Narrative: SHORT AND SOFT FIELD TKOFS AND LNDGS WERE BEING CONDUCTED AT POGUE ARPT FOR THE PURPOSE OF REVIEW FOR THE STUDENT'S CERTIFIED FLT INSTRUCTOR CHKRIDE. DURING THE FOURTH PATTERN, AFTER A NORMAL TURN TO DOWNWIND, THE STUDENT WAS PREPARING FOR THE NEXT LNDG. HE WAS ABOUT TO EXTEND THE LNDG GEAR BUT I ADVISED HIM TO WAIT AS THIS LNDG WAS TO BE A SIMULATED EMER LNDG. AT MIDFIELD, I ANNOUNCED ON THE CTAF THAT WE WERE EXECUTING A SHORT APCH TO RWY 17, SIMULATING AN ENG FAILURE. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, ANOTHER ACFT ANNOUNCED A 4 MI FINAL TO THE SAME RWY. ABEAM THE NUMBERS OF RWY 17 I REDUCED PWR TO IDLE AND INSTRUCTED THE STUDENT TO EXECUTE AN EMER LNDG. HE BEGAN A TURN TOWARD THE ARPT. AT THIS TIME THE ACFT ON THE 4 MI FINAL RPTED A 2 MI FINAL TO RWY 17. OUR MODIFIED APCH, IN MY OPINION, WOULD HAVE PLACED US TOO CLOSE TO THE OTHER ACFT FOR A SAFE LNDG. AT THIS TIME, I TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT AND TURNED BACK TO THE DOWNWIND AND INFORMED THE STUDENT TO DISCONTINUE THE EMER APCH IN FAVOR OF ANOTHER SOFT-FIELD APCH. I ALSO TOLD HIM TO TURN TO A BASE LEG WHEN WE WERE ABEAM THE ACFT ON FINAL. THE APCH WAS CONTINUED UNTIL ON ABOUT A 1/4 MI FINAL I NOTICED THE GEAR WAS STILL RETRACTED. AT THE SAME INSTANT, I ALSO NOTICED THAT THE OTHER ACFT THAT LANDED BEFORE US WAS STILL ON THE ACTIVE RWY. THERE WAS SOME DOUBT IN MY MIND AS TO WHETHER WE WOULD LAND BEFORE THE OTHER ACFT HAD EXITED THE RWY. THE STUDENT HAD ALSO DRIFTED OFF OF THE CTRLINE OF THE RWY. WE HAD NOW CROSSED THE THRESHOLD OF THE RWY JUST AS THE OTHER ACFT HAD DEPARTED THE ACTIVE AT THE MIDFIELD TXWY. AT THIS POINT, THE ACFT SETTLED ONTO THE RWY GEAR UP. HOW THE PROB AROSE -- DISTR BY ANOTHER ACFT ON A NON STANDARD APCH AND OUR EFFORTS TO SALVAGE THE LNDG. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS -- ACFT WAS SLOW TO EXIT THE ACTIVE RWY AND I WAS INTENT ON THE STUDENT CORRECTING TO THE CTRLINE. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS -- THE INSTRUCTOR'S (MY GUARD) SHOULD NEVER BE LET DOWN. THROUGH MY PREOCCUPATION OF THE OTHER ACFT AND TRYING TO TEACH I MISSED AN IMPORTANT PRE-LNDG ITEM. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT EACH ITEM ON THE PRE-LNDG CHKLIST SHOULD BE VERIFIED BEFORE THE NEXT ITEM IS COMPLETED. NOTE: THE ACFT'S GEAR AURAL WARNING SYS ONLY SOUNDED AT IDLE PWR, AND THE AUTOMATIC GEAR EXTENSION SYS WAS INOP. I STILL DO NOT KNOW WHY I FAILED TO CATCH THE GEAR BEING UP, IN THE LAST FEW SECONDS BEFORE LNDG I WAS STILL THINKING ABOUT IMPRESSING UPON THE STUDENT THE NEED TO COVER EACH CHKLIST ITEM. I DOUBT VERY SERIOUSLY IF I WILL EVER FORGET ABOUT LNDG GEARS. THE ACFT RECEIVED MINOR DAMAGE AND NO ONE WAS INJURED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.