Narrative:

Cruising at FL350 we were given a descent clearance to cross fredy intersection at 10000 ft. Moments later one of our flight attendants entered the cockpit and explained that we had a clear liquid coming from our left wing root, aft section of the wing, and that it was spraying onto the window just forward of our left engine. I asked her to enlist one of our deadhdg pilots in the cabin to survey the situation and return. I quickly calculated that it would take 65 mi to descend to 10000 ft, looked at the arrival plate and decided that we would start down approximately at nickl intersection.??? 23+39=62. Our flight attendant returned and stated that the deadhdg pilot was not familiar enough with the aircraft to make a fair judgement of the situation. At that time I decided to send my first officer back to the cabin for his opinion. While he was gone I went back into the aircraft logbooks looking for a past history of fuel seepage, recalculated the flight plan fuel burn, tested the fuel gauges, and looked over the circuit breaker panels for popped breakers. Everything was normal up to this point. My first officer returned and indicated that he thought that the liquid was residue deicing fluid from deicing that must had taken place earlier that day. About that time ZMP asked if we had started our descent yet. We had just arrived at nickl intersection, and to myself, I questioned why they were asking if we had started down yet. Since this was my planned spot to start descent we did and answered that we were in fact starting descent. After initiating descent I recalculated the required mileage to descend to 10000 ft and revisited the arrival plate one more time. This is when we discovered that I mistakenly used 39 mi instead of 7 mi distance between fredy and biltr intxns for my calculations. I deployed the spoilers and made a maximum effort descent, notified ATC that we were not going to be able to make fredy at 10000 ft and was in fact 10 mi short of the restr. If I had not flown this arrival 100 times in the past, I have not flown it once. I believe the leaking liquid, hasty descent planning, familiarity with the arrival, coupled with the absence of a crew member to double check me were all contributing factors in this missed restr. Always remember rule #1 'fly the aircraft first.'

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ALT CROSSING RESTR NOT MET.

Narrative: CRUISING AT FL350 WE WERE GIVEN A DSCNT CLRNC TO CROSS FREDY INTXN AT 10000 FT. MOMENTS LATER ONE OF OUR FLT ATTENDANTS ENTERED THE COCKPIT AND EXPLAINED THAT WE HAD A CLR LIQUID COMING FROM OUR L WING ROOT, AFT SECTION OF THE WING, AND THAT IT WAS SPRAYING ONTO THE WINDOW JUST FORWARD OF OUR L ENG. I ASKED HER TO ENLIST ONE OF OUR DEADHDG PLTS IN THE CABIN TO SURVEY THE SIT AND RETURN. I QUICKLY CALCULATED THAT IT WOULD TAKE 65 MI TO DSND TO 10000 FT, LOOKED AT THE ARR PLATE AND DECIDED THAT WE WOULD START DOWN APPROX AT NICKL INTXN.??? 23+39=62. OUR FLT ATTENDANT RETURNED AND STATED THAT THE DEADHDG PLT WAS NOT FAMILIAR ENOUGH WITH THE ACFT TO MAKE A FAIR JUDGEMENT OF THE SIT. AT THAT TIME I DECIDED TO SEND MY FO BACK TO THE CABIN FOR HIS OPINION. WHILE HE WAS GONE I WENT BACK INTO THE ACFT LOGBOOKS LOOKING FOR A PAST HISTORY OF FUEL SEEPAGE, RECALCULATED THE FLT PLAN FUEL BURN, TESTED THE FUEL GAUGES, AND LOOKED OVER THE CIRCUIT BREAKER PANELS FOR POPPED BREAKERS. EVERYTHING WAS NORMAL UP TO THIS POINT. MY FO RETURNED AND INDICATED THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE LIQUID WAS RESIDUE DEICING FLUID FROM DEICING THAT MUST HAD TAKEN PLACE EARLIER THAT DAY. ABOUT THAT TIME ZMP ASKED IF WE HAD STARTED OUR DSCNT YET. WE HAD JUST ARRIVED AT NICKL INTXN, AND TO MYSELF, I QUESTIONED WHY THEY WERE ASKING IF WE HAD STARTED DOWN YET. SINCE THIS WAS MY PLANNED SPOT TO START DSCNT WE DID AND ANSWERED THAT WE WERE IN FACT STARTING DSCNT. AFTER INITIATING DSCNT I RECALCULATED THE REQUIRED MILEAGE TO DSND TO 10000 FT AND REVISITED THE ARR PLATE ONE MORE TIME. THIS IS WHEN WE DISCOVERED THAT I MISTAKENLY USED 39 MI INSTEAD OF 7 MI DISTANCE BETWEEN FREDY AND BILTR INTXNS FOR MY CALCULATIONS. I DEPLOYED THE SPOILERS AND MADE A MAX EFFORT DSCNT, NOTIFIED ATC THAT WE WERE NOT GOING TO BE ABLE TO MAKE FREDY AT 10000 FT AND WAS IN FACT 10 MI SHORT OF THE RESTR. IF I HAD NOT FLOWN THIS ARR 100 TIMES IN THE PAST, I HAVE NOT FLOWN IT ONCE. I BELIEVE THE LEAKING LIQUID, HASTY DSCNT PLANNING, FAMILIARITY WITH THE ARR, COUPLED WITH THE ABSENCE OF A CREW MEMBER TO DOUBLE CHK ME WERE ALL CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IN THIS MISSED RESTR. ALWAYS REMEMBER RULE #1 'FLY THE ACFT FIRST.'

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.