Narrative:

While airplane was at the gate, I did initial walkaround and then, after a majority of passenger were boarded, I did a walkaround to determine if deicing was necessary. I made the decision to deice and told the copilot to call for wings and stabilizer to be deiced. While I was out, the weight sheet and runway analysis was brought to the cockpit. The copilot entered the data into the FMC. I neglected to scrutinize the data which indicated a bleeds off takeoff, engine anti-ice on runway 23. After deice, we taxied out delaying flap extension, the runway was changed to runway 28 and I concentrated on taxi operation as there were plows and banks as well as deteriorating visibility. The crux -- we took off overweight for the runway. Factors: obviously the WX, coordination with ground, and deice equipment. I should have looked and asked to see final weight sheet and runway analysis and, when the runway changed, asked the copilot to check. Thanks to mr. Boeing, we made it in spite of ourselves. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter flies the B-737-300 and -500 for a major united states air carrier on the decline. He admits that neither he nor his first officer checked the final weight and balance figures or they would have noticed that they were going to a wrong runway. There were numerous distrs, deicing, runway change while taxiing, etc that contributed to this incident. The reporter has changed his personal procedures to check and rechk to be sure that they have numbers for the takeoff runway. The air carrier's preliminary figures are for several possible runways, but the final figures are for only the most probable runway. Runway changes while taxiing are not taken into account except by the flight crew asking for new numbers.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: OVERWT TKOF.

Narrative: WHILE AIRPLANE WAS AT THE GATE, I DID INITIAL WALKAROUND AND THEN, AFTER A MAJORITY OF PAX WERE BOARDED, I DID A WALKAROUND TO DETERMINE IF DEICING WAS NECESSARY. I MADE THE DECISION TO DEICE AND TOLD THE COPLT TO CALL FOR WINGS AND STABILIZER TO BE DEICED. WHILE I WAS OUT, THE WT SHEET AND RWY ANALYSIS WAS BROUGHT TO THE COCKPIT. THE COPLT ENTERED THE DATA INTO THE FMC. I NEGLECTED TO SCRUTINIZE THE DATA WHICH INDICATED A BLEEDS OFF TKOF, ENG ANTI-ICE ON RWY 23. AFTER DEICE, WE TAXIED OUT DELAYING FLAP EXTENSION, THE RWY WAS CHANGED TO RWY 28 AND I CONCENTRATED ON TAXI OP AS THERE WERE PLOWS AND BANKS AS WELL AS DETERIORATING VISIBILITY. THE CRUX -- WE TOOK OFF OVERWT FOR THE RWY. FACTORS: OBVIOUSLY THE WX, COORD WITH GND, AND DEICE EQUIP. I SHOULD HAVE LOOKED AND ASKED TO SEE FINAL WT SHEET AND RWY ANALYSIS AND, WHEN THE RWY CHANGED, ASKED THE COPLT TO CHK. THANKS TO MR. BOEING, WE MADE IT IN SPITE OF OURSELVES. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR FLIES THE B-737-300 AND -500 FOR A MAJOR UNITED STATES ACR ON THE DECLINE. HE ADMITS THAT NEITHER HE NOR HIS FO CHKED THE FINAL WT AND BAL FIGURES OR THEY WOULD HAVE NOTICED THAT THEY WERE GOING TO A WRONG RWY. THERE WERE NUMEROUS DISTRS, DEICING, RWY CHANGE WHILE TAXIING, ETC THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THIS INCIDENT. THE RPTR HAS CHANGED HIS PERSONAL PROCS TO CHK AND RECHK TO BE SURE THAT THEY HAVE NUMBERS FOR THE TKOF RWY. THE ACR'S PRELIMINARY FIGURES ARE FOR SEVERAL POSSIBLE RWYS, BUT THE FINAL FIGURES ARE FOR ONLY THE MOST PROBABLE RWY. RWY CHANGES WHILE TAXIING ARE NOT TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT EXCEPT BY THE FLC ASKING FOR NEW NUMBERS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.