Narrative:

The captain of this flight was scheduled to have his proficiency check in 2 weeks and, due to the lack of prechk training, he chose to practice an NDB approach at the azo airport (NDB 35). He chose to do the procedure by pilot navigation which involved a procedure turn to reestablish the aircraft on the inbound course. It was my duty to monitor his navigation as well as perform checklist items which is all company procedure. The approach up to the final approach segment was uneventful. His NDB navigation was good. As we started the final segment and reached the MDA, he had drifted left of course. At 100 ft to MDA minimums, I called '100 ft to minimums I'm heads up.' I looked up to search for the approach lights and runway. This is all as per company procedure. What I did not see was the fact that he had again drifted left of course. (I was searching for lights/runway, etc.) he had drifted far enough left of course that ATC called it to our attention. At this time I looked at the RMI to notice his excursion from the course. ATC (azo approach/tower) gave us a position report of the runway which I could not see due to the ceiling and visibility. A go around was initiated and vectors to the ILS runway 35 azo were performed without further incident. The aircraft and passenger were needlessly exposed to risk for 2 reasons. One is the fact that the captain felt he had to perform an actual non precision approach as practice for his upcoming proficiency check. This due to the fact that the company has no time set aside in the simulator to practice approachs/maneuvers that are rarely actually seen when flying the line but are tested for. Second reason is without my monitoring below 100 ft to minimums, the captain's navigation was thus unchked until ATC brought the deviation to our attention. All NDB/non precision practice should ultimately be done in the simulator or on VFR days when precision approachs are available as it was on this day. This would afford the proficiency without passenger risk or delays. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter is an first officer on the DH-8 for a regional air carrier flying mostly in michigan. He believes that they should not have been flying this type of approach in actual WX conditions for no other reason than making schedule and providing good service. The minimums were about 500 ft on this approach. The WX was said to be 900 ft, but was actually closer to the published minimums. The reporter has learned 'never to believe AWOS.' the reporter did not take a proficiency check with the captain. The captain passed his check and has nothing to fret about for another 6 months. The reporter did not speak up sooner or more forcefully as he 'did not want to get the captain's bad side.'

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC FLEW AN NDB APCH IN WX THAT WAS BETTER SUITED FOR AN ILS.

Narrative: THE CAPT OF THIS FLT WAS SCHEDULED TO HAVE HIS PROFICIENCY CHK IN 2 WKS AND, DUE TO THE LACK OF PRECHK TRAINING, HE CHOSE TO PRACTICE AN NDB APCH AT THE AZO ARPT (NDB 35). HE CHOSE TO DO THE PROC BY PLT NAV WHICH INVOLVED A PROC TURN TO REESTABLISH THE ACFT ON THE INBOUND COURSE. IT WAS MY DUTY TO MONITOR HIS NAV AS WELL AS PERFORM CHKLIST ITEMS WHICH IS ALL COMPANY PROC. THE APCH UP TO THE FINAL APCH SEGMENT WAS UNEVENTFUL. HIS NDB NAV WAS GOOD. AS WE STARTED THE FINAL SEGMENT AND REACHED THE MDA, HE HAD DRIFTED L OF COURSE. AT 100 FT TO MDA MINIMUMS, I CALLED '100 FT TO MINIMUMS I'M HEADS UP.' I LOOKED UP TO SEARCH FOR THE APCH LIGHTS AND RWY. THIS IS ALL AS PER COMPANY PROC. WHAT I DID NOT SEE WAS THE FACT THAT HE HAD AGAIN DRIFTED L OF COURSE. (I WAS SEARCHING FOR LIGHTS/RWY, ETC.) HE HAD DRIFTED FAR ENOUGH L OF COURSE THAT ATC CALLED IT TO OUR ATTN. AT THIS TIME I LOOKED AT THE RMI TO NOTICE HIS EXCURSION FROM THE COURSE. ATC (AZO APCH/TWR) GAVE US A POS RPT OF THE RWY WHICH I COULD NOT SEE DUE TO THE CEILING AND VISIBILITY. A GAR WAS INITIATED AND VECTORS TO THE ILS RWY 35 AZO WERE PERFORMED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. THE ACFT AND PAX WERE NEEDLESSLY EXPOSED TO RISK FOR 2 REASONS. ONE IS THE FACT THAT THE CAPT FELT HE HAD TO PERFORM AN ACTUAL NON PRECISION APCH AS PRACTICE FOR HIS UPCOMING PROFICIENCY CHK. THIS DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE COMPANY HAS NO TIME SET ASIDE IN THE SIMULATOR TO PRACTICE APCHS/MANEUVERS THAT ARE RARELY ACTUALLY SEEN WHEN FLYING THE LINE BUT ARE TESTED FOR. SECOND REASON IS WITHOUT MY MONITORING BELOW 100 FT TO MINIMUMS, THE CAPT'S NAV WAS THUS UNCHKED UNTIL ATC BROUGHT THE DEV TO OUR ATTN. ALL NDB/NON PRECISION PRACTICE SHOULD ULTIMATELY BE DONE IN THE SIMULATOR OR ON VFR DAYS WHEN PRECISION APCHS ARE AVAILABLE AS IT WAS ON THIS DAY. THIS WOULD AFFORD THE PROFICIENCY WITHOUT PAX RISK OR DELAYS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR IS AN FO ON THE DH-8 FOR A REGIONAL ACR FLYING MOSTLY IN MICHIGAN. HE BELIEVES THAT THEY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN FLYING THIS TYPE OF APCH IN ACTUAL WX CONDITIONS FOR NO OTHER REASON THAN MAKING SCHEDULE AND PROVIDING GOOD SVC. THE MINIMUMS WERE ABOUT 500 FT ON THIS APCH. THE WX WAS SAID TO BE 900 FT, BUT WAS ACTUALLY CLOSER TO THE PUBLISHED MINIMUMS. THE RPTR HAS LEARNED 'NEVER TO BELIEVE AWOS.' THE RPTR DID NOT TAKE A PROFICIENCY CHK WITH THE CAPT. THE CAPT PASSED HIS CHK AND HAS NOTHING TO FRET ABOUT FOR ANOTHER 6 MONTHS. THE RPTR DID NOT SPEAK UP SOONER OR MORE FORCEFULLY AS HE 'DID NOT WANT TO GET THE CAPT'S BAD SIDE.'

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.