Narrative:

After a normal takeoff, which was preceded with a normal preflight as well as normal first flight of the day system checks, we were climbing as per our spokane 5 SID. When the flight attendant called on the interphone to advise the pilots that a passenger had noticed 2 of 3 cowling engine latches on the right side #2 engine, had popped open, into the wind, as we made our first turn from runway heading to the east as per ATC. The passenger later told the pilots that the latches appeared to be secure during ground operations and during the runup (as per first flight of the day). Furthermore, I, being the first officer, it is my responsibility to ensure a proper preflight. I did preflight the aircraft and saw that the engine cowls were secure and latched properly. Perhaps the preflight after maintenance should include a lift as a ladder to properly check security of otherwise unreachable cowls, latches and the like. Also, the design of the latch must be changed to prevent an 'appeared lock,' ie, making it impossible to stow the latches in a locked position unless these latches are 'really' locked into place. A return to field was accomplished to have maintenance relock the latches correctly. I recommend that on this aircraft, during preflight, one must physically check cowls to be in their locked position. A visual inspection will not insure that the cowls are properly secured. Also, I encourage passenger with a 'good eye' to look outside to observe unusual configns or sits that we crew members cannot see. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter is an first officer and flies the dornier 328 turboprop, an light transport category aircraft. It is a high winged aircraft. The pilot that performs the preflight is only able to verify the 'closed and latched' position of the cowl latches by a visual inspection. There is not any way for the crew member to climb up high enough to physically check the latches in a closed and locked position. Apparently the ground crews, when working on the engine, sometimes fail to secure the latches in accordance with any specified procedures. The reporter stated that at least 3 other incidents of like kind were reported to him as he asked fellow crew members about this situation. He reported this to his 'in-house' union pilot representative but not to the company. It was suggested to the reporter that he ask the union representative to bring this matter to the attention of the air carrier.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: #2 ENG COWLING LATCHES BECOME UNSECURED, ALLOWING HATCH TO OPEN INFLT. RETURN LAND.

Narrative: AFTER A NORMAL TKOF, WHICH WAS PRECEDED WITH A NORMAL PREFLT AS WELL AS NORMAL FIRST FLT OF THE DAY SYS CHKS, WE WERE CLBING AS PER OUR SPOKANE 5 SID. WHEN THE FLT ATTENDANT CALLED ON THE INTERPHONE TO ADVISE THE PLTS THAT A PAX HAD NOTICED 2 OF 3 COWLING ENG LATCHES ON THE R SIDE #2 ENG, HAD POPPED OPEN, INTO THE WIND, AS WE MADE OUR FIRST TURN FROM RWY HDG TO THE E AS PER ATC. THE PAX LATER TOLD THE PLTS THAT THE LATCHES APPEARED TO BE SECURE DURING GND OPS AND DURING THE RUNUP (AS PER FIRST FLT OF THE DAY). FURTHERMORE, I, BEING THE FO, IT IS MY RESPONSIBILITY TO ENSURE A PROPER PREFLT. I DID PREFLT THE ACFT AND SAW THAT THE ENG COWLS WERE SECURE AND LATCHED PROPERLY. PERHAPS THE PREFLT AFTER MAINT SHOULD INCLUDE A LIFT AS A LADDER TO PROPERLY CHK SECURITY OF OTHERWISE UNREACHABLE COWLS, LATCHES AND THE LIKE. ALSO, THE DESIGN OF THE LATCH MUST BE CHANGED TO PREVENT AN 'APPEARED LOCK,' IE, MAKING IT IMPOSSIBLE TO STOW THE LATCHES IN A LOCKED POS UNLESS THESE LATCHES ARE 'REALLY' LOCKED INTO PLACE. A RETURN TO FIELD WAS ACCOMPLISHED TO HAVE MAINT RELOCK THE LATCHES CORRECTLY. I RECOMMEND THAT ON THIS ACFT, DURING PREFLT, ONE MUST PHYSICALLY CHK COWLS TO BE IN THEIR LOCKED POS. A VISUAL INSPECTION WILL NOT INSURE THAT THE COWLS ARE PROPERLY SECURED. ALSO, I ENCOURAGE PAX WITH A 'GOOD EYE' TO LOOK OUTSIDE TO OBSERVE UNUSUAL CONFIGNS OR SITS THAT WE CREW MEMBERS CANNOT SEE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR IS AN FO AND FLIES THE DORNIER 328 TURBOPROP, AN LTT CATEGORY ACFT. IT IS A HIGH WINGED ACFT. THE PLT THAT PERFORMS THE PREFLT IS ONLY ABLE TO VERIFY THE 'CLOSED AND LATCHED' POS OF THE COWL LATCHES BY A VISUAL INSPECTION. THERE IS NOT ANY WAY FOR THE CREW MEMBER TO CLB UP HIGH ENOUGH TO PHYSICALLY CHK THE LATCHES IN A CLOSED AND LOCKED POS. APPARENTLY THE GND CREWS, WHEN WORKING ON THE ENG, SOMETIMES FAIL TO SECURE THE LATCHES IN ACCORDANCE WITH ANY SPECIFIED PROCS. THE RPTR STATED THAT AT LEAST 3 OTHER INCIDENTS OF LIKE KIND WERE RPTED TO HIM AS HE ASKED FELLOW CREW MEMBERS ABOUT THIS SIT. HE RPTED THIS TO HIS 'IN-HOUSE' UNION PLT REPRESENTATIVE BUT NOT TO THE COMPANY. IT WAS SUGGESTED TO THE RPTR THAT HE ASK THE UNION REPRESENTATIVE TO BRING THIS MATTER TO THE ATTN OF THE ACR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.