Narrative:

Conducting operating experience with new captain. In proper planning eventual situation of 1000 ft high over crossing restr and 20 KTS fast. I was distracted due to monitoring of pressurization since 1 air conditioning pack was deferred and I didn't monitor the captain candidate closely enough. Discussed the deviation with center supervisor over the phone later. Apparently there was no loss of separation. Will monitor more closely next time. Supplemental information from acn 297992: while receiving my IOE in the FK28, we were cleared via the chins 2 arrival into sea. I had planned on starting the descent 72 mi out of sea or 21 mi from ykm. We received clearance to descend out of FL240 about 5 mi beyond that point. At that time we were cleared down to 16000 ft. Several mi later the controller cleared us to 16000 ft again, then changed that to 14000 ft. After the PNF (IOE captain) set the pressurization controller and accomplished the descent checklist, he noted that the pressurization controller had trouble stabilizing at an adequate rate to get the cabin down to field elevation in time. I switched over to the sea VOR just before the halfway point between sea and ykm. I had often done just that flying a slower turboprop along the same route, since the airway that underlies this arrival has no changeover point. My IOE captain correctly pointed out that in the text for the chins 2 arrival, we should proceed to raddy intersection via the ykm R-284. One would never know that from the plan view of this arrival. I switched my navigation back to ykm VOR. Since raddy is beyond the midpoint of this segment, my DME was reading more than 45 mi. The pressurization was still providing a distraction at this time. Also about this time the controller cleared us to cross snomy intersection at 12000 ft. (The arrival calls for 250 KIAS or snomy) I must have had my mind fixed on the idea of watching the DME count down toward the sea 35 DME fix to monitor the descent, because that DME reading didn't leave me feeling like I was running out of time to finish the descent. Once we did switch over to sea VOR, we both realized we might not be able to make the crossing restr. I pulled the power to idle and extended the speed brake. At 36 DME the controller queried our altitude and speed. We called out of 13000 ft for 12000 ft at 270 KIAS. Controller apparently thought we were already at 35 DME crossing fix from her tone. We crossed the fix 500-600 ft high at 280 KIAS. I don't think any traffic conflict occurred. A couple of observations come from this incident: first, the plan view on the chins 2 shows a changeover point between PDT and ykm at suned, but does not show the same for rddy. The arrival plan view ought to have a changeover point depicted at raddy or the text revised to match the plan view. Changeover points, in general should be as far away from a crossing fix as is feasible. This is a small item, but it might help insure both crewmembers are on the same wavelength when it comes to planning and executing the descent profile. Second, the IOE captain certainly was not wrong in pointing out the proper changeover point, but this added an addition distraction to the mix. In the IOE mode, you're trying hard (perhaps too hard) to please the guy next to you. Had a first officer pointed out the same thing, I likely would have continued with my own descent plan (ie, stay with sea VOR) and noted his 'good catch' later on.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC MISSED XING RESTR.

Narrative: CONDUCTING OPERATING EXPERIENCE WITH NEW CAPT. IN PROPER PLANNING EVENTUAL SIT OF 1000 FT HIGH OVER XING RESTR AND 20 KTS FAST. I WAS DISTRACTED DUE TO MONITORING OF PRESSURIZATION SINCE 1 AIR CONDITIONING PACK WAS DEFERRED AND I DIDN'T MONITOR THE CAPT CANDIDATE CLOSELY ENOUGH. DISCUSSED THE DEV WITH CTR SUPVR OVER THE PHONE LATER. APPARENTLY THERE WAS NO LOSS OF SEPARATION. WILL MONITOR MORE CLOSELY NEXT TIME. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 297992: WHILE RECEIVING MY IOE IN THE FK28, WE WERE CLRED VIA THE CHINS 2 ARR INTO SEA. I HAD PLANNED ON STARTING THE DSCNT 72 MI OUT OF SEA OR 21 MI FROM YKM. WE RECEIVED CLRNC TO DSND OUT OF FL240 ABOUT 5 MI BEYOND THAT POINT. AT THAT TIME WE WERE CLRED DOWN TO 16000 FT. SEVERAL MI LATER THE CTLR CLRED US TO 16000 FT AGAIN, THEN CHANGED THAT TO 14000 FT. AFTER THE PNF (IOE CAPT) SET THE PRESSURIZATION CTLR AND ACCOMPLISHED THE DSCNT CHKLIST, HE NOTED THAT THE PRESSURIZATION CTLR HAD TROUBLE STABILIZING AT AN ADEQUATE RATE TO GET THE CABIN DOWN TO FIELD ELEVATION IN TIME. I SWITCHED OVER TO THE SEA VOR JUST BEFORE THE HALFWAY POINT BTWN SEA AND YKM. I HAD OFTEN DONE JUST THAT FLYING A SLOWER TURBOPROP ALONG THE SAME RTE, SINCE THE AIRWAY THAT UNDERLIES THIS ARR HAS NO CHANGEOVER POINT. MY IOE CAPT CORRECTLY POINTED OUT THAT IN THE TEXT FOR THE CHINS 2 ARR, WE SHOULD PROCEED TO RADDY INTXN VIA THE YKM R-284. ONE WOULD NEVER KNOW THAT FROM THE PLAN VIEW OF THIS ARR. I SWITCHED MY NAV BACK TO YKM VOR. SINCE RADDY IS BEYOND THE MIDPOINT OF THIS SEGMENT, MY DME WAS READING MORE THAN 45 MI. THE PRESSURIZATION WAS STILL PROVIDING A DISTR AT THIS TIME. ALSO ABOUT THIS TIME THE CTLR CLRED US TO CROSS SNOMY INTXN AT 12000 FT. (THE ARR CALLS FOR 250 KIAS OR SNOMY) I MUST HAVE HAD MY MIND FIXED ON THE IDEA OF WATCHING THE DME COUNT DOWN TOWARD THE SEA 35 DME FIX TO MONITOR THE DSCNT, BECAUSE THAT DME READING DIDN'T LEAVE ME FEELING LIKE I WAS RUNNING OUT OF TIME TO FINISH THE DSCNT. ONCE WE DID SWITCH OVER TO SEA VOR, WE BOTH REALIZED WE MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO MAKE THE XING RESTR. I PULLED THE PWR TO IDLE AND EXTENDED THE SPD BRAKE. AT 36 DME THE CTLR QUERIED OUR ALT AND SPD. WE CALLED OUT OF 13000 FT FOR 12000 FT AT 270 KIAS. CTLR APPARENTLY THOUGHT WE WERE ALREADY AT 35 DME XING FIX FROM HER TONE. WE CROSSED THE FIX 500-600 FT HIGH AT 280 KIAS. I DON'T THINK ANY TFC CONFLICT OCCURRED. A COUPLE OF OBSERVATIONS COME FROM THIS INCIDENT: FIRST, THE PLAN VIEW ON THE CHINS 2 SHOWS A CHANGEOVER POINT BTWN PDT AND YKM AT SUNED, BUT DOES NOT SHOW THE SAME FOR RDDY. THE ARR PLAN VIEW OUGHT TO HAVE A CHANGEOVER POINT DEPICTED AT RADDY OR THE TEXT REVISED TO MATCH THE PLAN VIEW. CHANGEOVER POINTS, IN GENERAL SHOULD BE AS FAR AWAY FROM A XING FIX AS IS FEASIBLE. THIS IS A SMALL ITEM, BUT IT MIGHT HELP INSURE BOTH CREWMEMBERS ARE ON THE SAME WAVELENGTH WHEN IT COMES TO PLANNING AND EXECUTING THE DSCNT PROFILE. SECOND, THE IOE CAPT CERTAINLY WAS NOT WRONG IN POINTING OUT THE PROPER CHANGEOVER POINT, BUT THIS ADDED AN ADDITION DISTR TO THE MIX. IN THE IOE MODE, YOU'RE TRYING HARD (PERHAPS TOO HARD) TO PLEASE THE GUY NEXT TO YOU. HAD A FO POINTED OUT THE SAME THING, I LIKELY WOULD HAVE CONTINUED WITH MY OWN DSCNT PLAN (IE, STAY WITH SEA VOR) AND NOTED HIS 'GOOD CATCH' LATER ON.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.