Narrative:

On the inbound flight when the landing gear was selected down absolutely nothing happened. We cycled it once. It extended normally. We proceeded with the landing, without incident. Wrote up the problem and called maintenance. A ferry permit was issued and the crew departed for the maintenance base. At the maintenance base the landing gear did not extend normally. The crew declared an emergency and pumped the gear down. There was a 3 down and locked indication when they landed. The landing, taxi in, and shutdown was uneventful. Upon arrival the captain was informed that the ferry permit was for a gear down ferry. I was the captain on this flight. After the landing I was surprised to learn about the restr on the ferry permit. There are 3 factors I feel contributed to my oversight of the restr. 1) after the initial landing, where the gear only needed to be cycled once to work, I discussed the problem with the maintenance foreman. He actually asked me, 'did you try to cycle the gear after it showed 3 down and locked?' no, was my response. The question left me thinking that he would have liked me to duplicate the problem. It lead me to anticipate a maintenance test flight soon. This put me in the frame of mind that this was really a maintenance test flight and a ferry flight combined. 2) no one actually verbalized this was a gear down ferry permit. For unknown reasons I didn't read the entire ferry permit. I don't know if I was interrupted or if I had so many other things on my mind at the time that I just overlooked the last part of the gear down restr. 3) I have never received any training on how to handle emergencys during ferry flts. I can only suggest some corrective actions so that someone else will not make such an oversight: 1) the permit should be referred to as a, 'gear down ferry permit.' if flight control said they were sending me on a 'gear down ferry,' this would not have happened. If the permit had, 'gear down permit' at the beginning of it I would nave noted it. It actually started off reading, 'ferry for gear maintenance.' the part that read, 'ferry with gear down,' was last. 2) our airline does absolutely no training on the subject. Some ground and flight training should be conducted pertaining to single engine aircraft performance capabilities during gear down operations. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated the gear problem occurred at forbes airport prior to landing. There was no maintenance at forbes and the ferry permit was sent via teletype. The ferry flight was supposed to be gear down from forbes to mci where maintenance would have been done and a retraction test performed on the ground. The FAA required him to send in a report and as of yet there has been no further repercussions. The reporter seems rather calloused about gear misbehavior. When asked if there were other gear problems he heard about, he said that about 2 weeks later he had a gear indication abnormality in which when the gear was lowered the in-transit light came on as it was supposed to and then went out without the gear green lights coming on in a timely fashion. There was such a delay the copilot and he had time to comment like 'the gear down green lights did not come on.' then the green light came on. But, it was the last flight of the day and he did not write it up. The next morning he was dead heading on that aircraft's first flight and the crew had to extend the gear by the alternate method. He did not know whether this incident was the same aircraft of 2 weeks before.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC RAISES GEAR ON A GEAR DOWN FERRY FLT.

Narrative: ON THE INBOUND FLT WHEN THE LNDG GEAR WAS SELECTED DOWN ABSOLUTELY NOTHING HAPPENED. WE CYCLED IT ONCE. IT EXTENDED NORMALLY. WE PROCEEDED WITH THE LNDG, WITHOUT INCIDENT. WROTE UP THE PROB AND CALLED MAINT. A FERRY PERMIT WAS ISSUED AND THE CREW DEPARTED FOR THE MAINT BASE. AT THE MAINT BASE THE LNDG GEAR DID NOT EXTEND NORMALLY. THE CREW DECLARED AN EMER AND PUMPED THE GEAR DOWN. THERE WAS A 3 DOWN AND LOCKED INDICATION WHEN THEY LANDED. THE LNDG, TAXI IN, AND SHUTDOWN WAS UNEVENTFUL. UPON ARRIVAL THE CAPT WAS INFORMED THAT THE FERRY PERMIT WAS FOR A GEAR DOWN FERRY. I WAS THE CAPT ON THIS FLT. AFTER THE LNDG I WAS SURPRISED TO LEARN ABOUT THE RESTR ON THE FERRY PERMIT. THERE ARE 3 FACTORS I FEEL CONTRIBUTED TO MY OVERSIGHT OF THE RESTR. 1) AFTER THE INITIAL LNDG, WHERE THE GEAR ONLY NEEDED TO BE CYCLED ONCE TO WORK, I DISCUSSED THE PROB WITH THE MAINT FOREMAN. HE ACTUALLY ASKED ME, 'DID YOU TRY TO CYCLE THE GEAR AFTER IT SHOWED 3 DOWN AND LOCKED?' NO, WAS MY RESPONSE. THE QUESTION LEFT ME THINKING THAT HE WOULD HAVE LIKED ME TO DUPLICATE THE PROB. IT LEAD ME TO ANTICIPATE A MAINT TEST FLT SOON. THIS PUT ME IN THE FRAME OF MIND THAT THIS WAS REALLY A MAINT TEST FLT AND A FERRY FLT COMBINED. 2) NO ONE ACTUALLY VERBALIZED THIS WAS A GEAR DOWN FERRY PERMIT. FOR UNKNOWN REASONS I DIDN'T READ THE ENTIRE FERRY PERMIT. I DON'T KNOW IF I WAS INTERRUPTED OR IF I HAD SO MANY OTHER THINGS ON MY MIND AT THE TIME THAT I JUST OVERLOOKED THE LAST PART OF THE GEAR DOWN RESTR. 3) I HAVE NEVER RECEIVED ANY TRAINING ON HOW TO HANDLE EMERS DURING FERRY FLTS. I CAN ONLY SUGGEST SOME CORRECTIVE ACTIONS SO THAT SOMEONE ELSE WILL NOT MAKE SUCH AN OVERSIGHT: 1) THE PERMIT SHOULD BE REFERRED TO AS A, 'GEAR DOWN FERRY PERMIT.' IF FLIGHT CTL SAID THEY WERE SENDING ME ON A 'GEAR DOWN FERRY,' THIS WOULD NOT HAVE HAPPENED. IF THE PERMIT HAD, 'GEAR DOWN PERMIT' AT THE BEGINNING OF IT I WOULD NAVE NOTED IT. IT ACTUALLY STARTED OFF READING, 'FERRY FOR GEAR MAINT.' THE PART THAT READ, 'FERRY WITH GEAR DOWN,' WAS LAST. 2) OUR AIRLINE DOES ABSOLUTELY NO TRAINING ON THE SUBJECT. SOME GND AND FLT TRAINING SHOULD BE CONDUCTED PERTAINING TO SINGLE ENG ACFT PERFORMANCE CAPABILITIES DURING GEAR DOWN OPS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE GEAR PROB OCCURRED AT FORBES ARPT PRIOR TO LNDG. THERE WAS NO MAINTENANCE AT FORBES AND THE FERRY PERMIT WAS SENT VIA TELETYPE. THE FERRY FLT WAS SUPPOSED TO BE GEAR DOWN FROM FORBES TO MCI WHERE MAINT WOULD HAVE BEEN DONE AND A RETRACTION TEST PERFORMED ON THE GND. THE FAA REQUIRED HIM TO SEND IN A RPT AND AS OF YET THERE HAS BEEN NO FURTHER REPERCUSSIONS. THE RPTR SEEMS RATHER CALLOUSED ABOUT GEAR MISBEHAVIOR. WHEN ASKED IF THERE WERE OTHER GEAR PROBS HE HEARD ABOUT, HE SAID THAT ABOUT 2 WEEKS LATER HE HAD A GEAR INDICATION ABNORMALITY IN WHICH WHEN THE GEAR WAS LOWERED THE IN-TRANSIT LIGHT CAME ON AS IT WAS SUPPOSED TO AND THEN WENT OUT WITHOUT THE GEAR GREEN LIGHTS COMING ON IN A TIMELY FASHION. THERE WAS SUCH A DELAY THE COPLT AND HE HAD TIME TO COMMENT LIKE 'THE GEAR DOWN GREEN LIGHTS DID NOT COME ON.' THEN THE GREEN LIGHT CAME ON. BUT, IT WAS THE LAST FLT OF THE DAY AND HE DID NOT WRITE IT UP. THE NEXT MORNING HE WAS DEAD HDG ON THAT ACFT'S FIRST FLT AND THE CREW HAD TO EXTEND THE GEAR BY THE ALTERNATE METHOD. HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THIS INCIDENT WAS THE SAME ACFT OF 2 WEEKS BEFORE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.