Narrative:

I am a private pilot (airplane sel, 140 hours total time). I also am associate lawyer in a law firm specializing in air crash litigation. I am concerned with the safety of flight operations. I recently flew as a passenger on a regularly scheduled flight from mammoth lakes, ca (mmh) to los angeles international airport. The flight was operated by poor operating practice as described below. Because the pilots involved were otherwise professional and because, notwithstanding 14 crash fire rescue equipment 91.25, I am uncertain whether to trust the FAA or air carrier X management to respond to my report with appropriate restraint, I am not providing detail sufficient to identify the pilots. I do not think the conduct I am reporting should blemish their records. However, I hope that my report will lead to a pilot briefing announcement or, if necessary, to a revision of (commercial charts of air carrier X) flight operations policy. The flight from mammoth lakes airport (mmh) departed mmh around XA00 pm local time. The flight was at all times in visual meteorological conditions. As stated, it was a regularly scheduled flight which is operated by (air carrier X). The aircraft was a beechcraft 1900, a 19 passenger, 2 crew turboprop. From my seat I had a clear view of the pilots for the entire flight. The flight deck was not partitioned from the passenger compartment. The flight took off VFR. I could see the transponder set to 1200. Both pilots actively looked for traffic during the climb out. Relatively shortly after takeoff, while still climbing, a discrete squawk was set on the transponder. I believe the flight then was operating on an instrument clearance or with VFR advisories. The aircraft did not appear to be equipped with a TCASII. Shortly after the discrete transponder code was set, perhaps 10 mins into the climb, the first officer began updating his or her (commercial) airway manual. The first officer put the binder on his or her lap, a couple stacks of charts and approach plates on the floor, others on his or her knee and began sorting and filing. He or she used a mini flashlight to help read the revision directions. The first officer's head faced down towards his or her lap pretty much continuously for the next 40 mins of flight as he or she worked on updating the (charts). He or she did not look outside the airplane. He or she did not appear to check the engine or flight instruments. 100 percent of his or her attention appeared focused on updating his or her (charts). When we neared santa clarita, north of los angeles, he or she put away the (chart) and resumed participation in the flight. He or she operated radios and appeared to be looking for traffic. The chance of a mid-air over the sierra nevadas, at night, while receiving radar advisories is slight. It is, however, non-zero. Controllers and ATC system screw up from time to time. I'm told controller error is actually more common in sectors experiencing low traffic volume. Further, I've seen computer reconstructions of mid-air crashes. It's amazingly difficult to see a constant bearing diminishing range aircraft in time to avoid collision. An additional set of eyes increases the likelihood of seeing and avoiding an unannounced traffic conflict. If a pilot has to rest to be fresh for landing or operations in crowded airspace, it may be reasonable for him or her to relax attention to traffic and instruments periodically en route. On trans-oceanic flts it may even be advisable for a crewmember to sleep. But there is no justification for a pilot to have his or her head in his or her lap doing paper work unrelated to the flight, paper work which could be done on the ground. If the pilot's going to be working, not relaxing, he or she ought be doing something to increase the flight's safety. I appreciate that pilots, especially fos, are overworked, grossly underpaid, and probably don't have much on-duty non-flying time. Consequently some may not be too motivated to update their (charts) on thier own time. Given this, and that the captain of my flight did not object to his or her first officer's non-participation in the flight, I suspect that what I saw might not be uncommon. Accordingly, the FAA should investigate whether operators have taken sufficient measures to insure that all cockpit crewmembers, not just the PF, maintain a reasonably constant, reasonably vigilant lookout for traffic. Specifically, operators should establish and promulgate policy expressly prohibiting pilots from updating (charts) while airborne. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that he believed that this matter demonstrated a lack of good safe operating procedures and was probably in non compliance with the regulations. It was agreed that this incident was not keeping with good safe operating practices but that it may have not been contrary to the FARS if the aircraft was above 10000 ft MSL, or in level flight. However, this matter could be referred to the attention of the FAA FSDO as a concerned passenger by the reporter.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FO OF AN LTT UPDATED COMMERCIAL AERO CHARTS DURING CLB AND CRUISE FLT.

Narrative: I AM A PVT PLT (AIRPLANE SEL, 140 HRS TOTAL TIME). I ALSO AM ASSOCIATE LAWYER IN A LAW FIRM SPECIALIZING IN AIR CRASH LITIGATION. I AM CONCERNED WITH THE SAFETY OF FLT OPS. I RECENTLY FLEW AS A PAX ON A REGULARLY SCHEDULED FLT FROM MAMMOTH LAKES, CA (MMH) TO LOS ANGELES INTL ARPT. THE FLT WAS OPERATED BY POOR OPERATING PRACTICE AS DESCRIBED BELOW. BECAUSE THE PLTS INVOLVED WERE OTHERWISE PROFESSIONAL AND BECAUSE, NOTWITHSTANDING 14 CFR 91.25, I AM UNCERTAIN WHETHER TO TRUST THE FAA OR ACR X MGMNT TO RESPOND TO MY RPT WITH APPROPRIATE RESTRAINT, I AM NOT PROVIDING DETAIL SUFFICIENT TO IDENT THE PLTS. I DO NOT THINK THE CONDUCT I AM RPTING SHOULD BLEMISH THEIR RECORDS. HOWEVER, I HOPE THAT MY RPT WILL LEAD TO A PLT BRIEFING ANNOUNCEMENT OR, IF NECESSARY, TO A REVISION OF (COMMERCIAL CHARTS OF ACR X) FLT OPS POLICY. THE FLT FROM MAMMOTH LAKES ARPT (MMH) DEPARTED MMH AROUND XA00 PM LCL TIME. THE FLT WAS AT ALL TIMES IN VISUAL METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS. AS STATED, IT WAS A REGULARLY SCHEDULED FLT WHICH IS OPERATED BY (ACR X). THE ACFT WAS A BEECHCRAFT 1900, A 19 PAX, 2 CREW TURBOPROP. FROM MY SEAT I HAD A CLR VIEW OF THE PLTS FOR THE ENTIRE FLT. THE FLT DECK WAS NOT PARTITIONED FROM THE PAX COMPARTMENT. THE FLT TOOK OFF VFR. I COULD SEE THE XPONDER SET TO 1200. BOTH PLTS ACTIVELY LOOKED FOR TFC DURING THE CLBOUT. RELATIVELY SHORTLY AFTER TKOF, WHILE STILL CLBING, A DISCRETE SQUAWK WAS SET ON THE XPONDER. I BELIEVE THE FLT THEN WAS OPERATING ON AN INSTRUMENT CLRNC OR WITH VFR ADVISORIES. THE ACFT DID NOT APPEAR TO BE EQUIPPED WITH A TCASII. SHORTLY AFTER THE DISCRETE XPONDER CODE WAS SET, PERHAPS 10 MINS INTO THE CLB, THE FO BEGAN UPDATING HIS OR HER (COMMERCIAL) AIRWAY MANUAL. THE FO PUT THE BINDER ON HIS OR HER LAP, A COUPLE STACKS OF CHARTS AND APCH PLATES ON THE FLOOR, OTHERS ON HIS OR HER KNEE AND BEGAN SORTING AND FILING. HE OR SHE USED A MINI FLASHLIGHT TO HELP READ THE REVISION DIRECTIONS. THE FO'S HEAD FACED DOWN TOWARDS HIS OR HER LAP PRETTY MUCH CONTINUOUSLY FOR THE NEXT 40 MINS OF FLT AS HE OR SHE WORKED ON UPDATING THE (CHARTS). HE OR SHE DID NOT LOOK OUTSIDE THE AIRPLANE. HE OR SHE DID NOT APPEAR TO CHK THE ENG OR FLT INSTRUMENTS. 100 PERCENT OF HIS OR HER ATTN APPEARED FOCUSED ON UPDATING HIS OR HER (CHARTS). WHEN WE NEARED SANTA CLARITA, N OF LOS ANGELES, HE OR SHE PUT AWAY THE (CHART) AND RESUMED PARTICIPATION IN THE FLT. HE OR SHE OPERATED RADIOS AND APPEARED TO BE LOOKING FOR TFC. THE CHANCE OF A MID-AIR OVER THE SIERRA NEVADAS, AT NIGHT, WHILE RECEIVING RADAR ADVISORIES IS SLIGHT. IT IS, HOWEVER, NON-ZERO. CTLRS AND ATC SYS SCREW UP FROM TIME TO TIME. I'M TOLD CTLR ERROR IS ACTUALLY MORE COMMON IN SECTORS EXPERIENCING LOW TFC VOLUME. FURTHER, I'VE SEEN COMPUTER RECONSTRUCTIONS OF MID-AIR CRASHES. IT'S AMAZINGLY DIFFICULT TO SEE A CONSTANT BEARING DIMINISHING RANGE ACFT IN TIME TO AVOID COLLISION. AN ADDITIONAL SET OF EYES INCREASES THE LIKELIHOOD OF SEEING AND AVOIDING AN UNANNOUNCED TFC CONFLICT. IF A PLT HAS TO REST TO BE FRESH FOR LNDG OR OPS IN CROWDED AIRSPACE, IT MAY BE REASONABLE FOR HIM OR HER TO RELAX ATTN TO TFC AND INSTRUMENTS PERIODICALLY ENRTE. ON TRANS-OCEANIC FLTS IT MAY EVEN BE ADVISABLE FOR A CREWMEMBER TO SLEEP. BUT THERE IS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR A PLT TO HAVE HIS OR HER HEAD IN HIS OR HER LAP DOING PAPER WORK UNRELATED TO THE FLT, PAPER WORK WHICH COULD BE DONE ON THE GND. IF THE PLT'S GOING TO BE WORKING, NOT RELAXING, HE OR SHE OUGHT BE DOING SOMETHING TO INCREASE THE FLT'S SAFETY. I APPRECIATE THAT PLTS, ESPECIALLY FOS, ARE OVERWORKED, GROSSLY UNDERPAID, AND PROBABLY DON'T HAVE MUCH ON-DUTY NON-FLYING TIME. CONSEQUENTLY SOME MAY NOT BE TOO MOTIVATED TO UPDATE THEIR (CHARTS) ON THIER OWN TIME. GIVEN THIS, AND THAT THE CAPT OF MY FLT DID NOT OBJECT TO HIS OR HER FO'S NON-PARTICIPATION IN THE FLT, I SUSPECT THAT WHAT I SAW MIGHT NOT BE UNCOMMON. ACCORDINGLY, THE FAA SHOULD INVESTIGATE WHETHER OPERATORS HAVE TAKEN SUFFICIENT MEASURES TO INSURE THAT ALL COCKPIT CREWMEMBERS, NOT JUST THE PF, MAINTAIN A REASONABLY CONSTANT, REASONABLY VIGILANT LOOKOUT FOR TFC. SPECIFICALLY, OPERATORS SHOULD ESTABLISH AND PROMULGATE POLICY EXPRESSLY PROHIBITING PLTS FROM UPDATING (CHARTS) WHILE AIRBORNE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THIS MATTER DEMONSTRATED A LACK OF GOOD SAFE OPERATING PROCEDURES AND WAS PROBABLY IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH THE REGS. IT WAS AGREED THAT THIS INCIDENT WAS NOT KEEPING WITH GOOD SAFE OPERATING PRACTICES BUT THAT IT MAY HAVE NOT BEEN CONTRARY TO THE FARS IF THE ACFT WAS ABOVE 10000 FT MSL, OR IN LEVEL FLT. HOWEVER, THIS MATTER COULD BE REFERRED TO THE ATTN OF THE FAA FSDO AS A CONCERNED PAX BY THE RPTR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.