Narrative:

Upon arrival to the aircraft, I discovered the maintenance crew working on a write-up. The first officer's HSI 'to-from' indicator inoperative in VOR mode, ok in INS mode.' they had been working on the problem for some time with no results. Our crew searched the MEL for a deferral, but the first officer's 'to-from' indication was not mentioned specifically. We discussed how unimportant the 'to-from' indicator was to the safe conduct of the flight in that we had triple INS formation, dual VOR/DME with RDMI bearing pointers. We resigned to the fact that the MEL did not allow a maintenance deferral of the problem and it had to be fixed prior to departure. Hours went by with no progress in finding the problem. As a crew, we were aware of the XX50Z closing time of the mail airport for construction. The time was nearing that the flight would be canceled due to this closing time. Hotel rooms in osaka were unavailable to our passenger because of all the displaced people from the kobe earthquake disaster. We were told that if the flight was canceled, our through passenger would have to spend the night on the airplane. The first officer suggested that maintenance control contact a company official who would authority/authorized us to take the aircraft on to mnl without the first officer's 'to-from' indicator working. The captain forwarded the request. Maintenance control responded that our 747-200 fleet captain had authority/authorized a 1- time flight. There was less than 30 min left before the XA40Z cancel time, the time after which we could not arrive in mnl before the XD30Z closure. The write-up was cleared 'flight approved by maintenance control.' we finished all checklists, and departed at XA37Z and arrived in mnl at XB17Z with no incident. Later, the company notified us that we should have gotten an amended dispatch release for the first officer's 'to-from' indicator and, had we requested the amended release, it would have been denied, because the 747-200 fleet captain or maintenance control could not, at their discretion, authority/authorized a crew to over-ride the MEL. We were in a hurry to get the flight airborne to prevent a cancellation, and because of the hurry, we forgot to get an amended release from the dispatcher, who would have prevented a violation of MEL and maintenance procedures.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MEL REQUIREMENT.

Narrative: UPON ARR TO THE ACFT, I DISCOVERED THE MAINT CREW WORKING ON A WRITE-UP. THE FO'S HSI 'TO-FROM' INDICATOR INOP IN VOR MODE, OK IN INS MODE.' THEY HAD BEEN WORKING ON THE PROB FOR SOME TIME WITH NO RESULTS. OUR CREW SEARCHED THE MEL FOR A DEFERRAL, BUT THE FO'S 'TO-FROM' INDICATION WAS NOT MENTIONED SPECIFICALLY. WE DISCUSSED HOW UNIMPORTANT THE 'TO-FROM' INDICATOR WAS TO THE SAFE CONDUCT OF THE FLT IN THAT WE HAD TRIPLE INS FORMATION, DUAL VOR/DME WITH RDMI BEARING POINTERS. WE RESIGNED TO THE FACT THAT THE MEL DID NOT ALLOW A MAINT DEFERRAL OF THE PROB AND IT HAD TO BE FIXED PRIOR TO DEP. HRS WENT BY WITH NO PROGRESS IN FINDING THE PROB. AS A CREW, WE WERE AWARE OF THE XX50Z CLOSING TIME OF THE MAIL ARPT FOR CONSTRUCTION. THE TIME WAS NEARING THAT THE FLT WOULD BE CANCELED DUE TO THIS CLOSING TIME. HOTEL ROOMS IN OSAKA WERE UNAVAILABLE TO OUR PAX BECAUSE OF ALL THE DISPLACED PEOPLE FROM THE KOBE EARTHQUAKE DISASTER. WE WERE TOLD THAT IF THE FLT WAS CANCELED, OUR THROUGH PAX WOULD HAVE TO SPEND THE NIGHT ON THE AIRPLANE. THE FO SUGGESTED THAT MAINT CTL CONTACT A COMPANY OFFICIAL WHO WOULD AUTH US TO TAKE THE ACFT ON TO MNL WITHOUT THE FO'S 'TO-FROM' INDICATOR WORKING. THE CAPT FORWARDED THE REQUEST. MAINT CTL RESPONDED THAT OUR 747-200 FLEET CAPT HAD AUTH A 1- TIME FLT. THERE WAS LESS THAN 30 MIN LEFT BEFORE THE XA40Z CANCEL TIME, THE TIME AFTER WHICH WE COULD NOT ARRIVE IN MNL BEFORE THE XD30Z CLOSURE. THE WRITE-UP WAS CLRED 'FLT APPROVED BY MAINT CTL.' WE FINISHED ALL CHKLISTS, AND DEPARTED AT XA37Z AND ARRIVED IN MNL AT XB17Z WITH NO INCIDENT. LATER, THE COMPANY NOTIFIED US THAT WE SHOULD HAVE GOTTEN AN AMENDED DISPATCH RELEASE FOR THE FO'S 'TO-FROM' INDICATOR AND, HAD WE REQUESTED THE AMENDED RELEASE, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED, BECAUSE THE 747-200 FLEET CAPT OR MAINT CTL COULD NOT, AT THEIR DISCRETION, AUTH A CREW TO OVER-RIDE THE MEL. WE WERE IN A HURRY TO GET THE FLT AIRBORNE TO PREVENT A CANCELLATION, AND BECAUSE OF THE HURRY, WE FORGOT TO GET AN AMENDED RELEASE FROM THE DISPATCHER, WHO WOULD HAVE PREVENTED A VIOLATION OF MEL AND MAINT PROCS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.